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A. THE UNFINISHED WAR 
As the Second World War was a continuation of the 
unfinished business of World War I , so, too, the 
contemporary geo-political situation is very much a 
reflection of the global conflict of the 1940s. To the many 
who had to flee to distant shores, World War II is still 
very much a daily experience; exile is a reminder of the 
battles that raged around them. To this day, the conflict 
has an impact upon people of all backgrounds and in all 
places, be it in an ethnic neighborhood in urban America or 
on maneuvers with the US Army's Berlin Brigade. 
One daily reminder of World War I I in the United 
the Lithuanian States is the anomalous presence of 
Diplomatic Service. The members of the service, ministers 
and consuls,· defend the interests of the Lithuanian nation 
whenever and wherever possible, and are living symbols of 
that nation's aspirations for freedom and the resumption of 
sovereignty. One reason that the Service still exists may 
l 
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Milda Danys, DP: Lithuanian Immigration to Canada 
After the Second World War (Toronto: Multicultural 
History Society of Ontario, 1986), p. 2. 
3 
be found in a postwar memorandum issued by the Supreme 
committee for the Liberation of Lithuania, which states: 
Determined to fight on uncompromisingly until the 
exercise of the sovereignty of the Lithuanian 
State is restored, the Lithuanian people will 
consider null and void and not binding any and all 
decisions made without the participation of their 
lawful representatives, and which might prejudice 
or deny the basic rights of Lithuania and her 
vital interests. 1 
Be that as it may, it is practically not within the 
power of the Lithuanian people to decide their own 
governmental or national fate. Thus it is not according to 
the discretion of that people that the Lithuanian Diplomatic 
Service continues to function. The necessary discretion 
lies elsewhere. As legal scholars and diplomats are aware, 
international law, both statutory and customary, is not 
carved in stone. Law among nations is interpreted by those 
nations themselves, in each respective capital. In the US, 
it is Washington which determines the existence of the 
Lithuanian Diplomatic Service -- and the juridical existence 
of the Lithuanian state. 2 
1 Supreme Lithuanian Committee of Liberation, 
Memorandum on the Restoration of Lithuania's Independence 
(np: Lithuanian Executive Council, 1950), p. 15. 
2 For accounts in US-Lithuanian diplomatic history, see 
David Martin Crowe, Jr., The Foreign Relations of Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania, 1938-1939, Ph.D. dissertation, 
University of Georgia, 1974; William Morris David, Jr., The 
Development of United States Policy Toward the Baltic 
States, 1917-1922, Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 
1962; Constantine R. Jurgela, Lithuania and the United 
States: The Establishment of State Relations (Chicago: 
Lithuanian Research and Studies Center, 1985). 
4 
In order to understand the paradox of a practically 
non-existent state possessing diplomatic representation in 
the US, it is necessary to understand the circumstances of 
the Second World War, and Washington's application of 
international law thereto. 
At the outset of the Second World war, following the 
dissolution of Poland by Germany and the Soviet Union, the 
Kremlin issued an ultimatum to Lithuania demanding the 
formation of a new government and the entry of an unlimited 
number of Soviet troops into the country. This was in line 
with the plan adopted in a secret protocol to the Molotov-
Ribbentrop non-aggression pact of 23 August 1939. The 
Lithuanian government, having decided that opposition would 
be futile, reluctantly decided to accept the ultimatum. In 
procedures which violated Lithuanian constitutional law, a 
new Soviet regime was installed in the provisional capital 
of Kaunas in June 1940. The Seimas (parliament) was 
dissolved the following month, and was succeeded by a· 
"People's Seimas," which petitioned the Kremlin for entry 
into the USSR. The Supreme Soviet obliged on 3 August 
1940. 3 
3 George F. Kennan writes: 
See his 
Little, 
It is ironic to reflect that these little 
countries, the first to establish normal relations 
with Moscow, should also have been, together with 
Poland, the first to be swallowed up again by 
Moscow . 
Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin (Boston: 
Brown, 1961), p. 172. 
5 
The implications for Lithuanian municipal law were 
enormous. The prime minister, Antanas Merkys, who was 
acting as president in the wake of the departed President 
Antanas Smetana, was forced to both appoint a new government 
and transfer the presidency to a Soviet sympathizer. The 
dissolution of the Seimas, rump elections to a new one, the 
promulgation of various decrees, and the method of 
incorporation into the Soviet Union were all in violation of 
Lithuanian law. Due to these violations, the nonrecognition 
policy announced by the United States on 23 July 1940 was 
valid and legitimate, for it was the USSR, and not the US, 
which was 
country. 
interfering in the internal affairs of another 
B. US APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The struggle for national self-determination has 
been a major component of the twentieth century's history. 
While geo-physically unequal, states, great and small, have 
claimed moral and intrinsic equality, as well as the right 
to rule themselves under international law. The process of 
creating states and governments has necessarily touched upon 
the question of recognition extended to these new entities. 
Traditionally, effective administrative control over a 
territory and population, and the capacity and willingness 
to discharge international obligations have sufficed to 







in the case of a new 
power through extra-
political factors outweigh legal ones 
in the decision to recognize. Recognition has not usually 
been utilized as a moral tool. Further, recognition does 
not necessarily translate into approval of the new regime. 
The Japanese conquest of Manchuria and the creation 
of the puppet state of Manchukuo in 1931-1932 added a new 
factor to recognition. Secretary of State Henry Stimson 
announced that the United States would not recognize the new 
regime and situation in Manchuria, as it had come to power 
in .violation of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and accepted 
principles of international law. The League of Nations 
agreed with him and, subsequently, Latin American 
governments took the lead in formally making nonrecognition 
a principle of international law. 
Nonrecognition is mainly a moral sanction possessing 
relatively little concrete impact. However, the declaration 
of nonrecognition is a positive reaffirmation of the 
international legal order, namely that illegal actions 
cannot be the source of legal title to territory and power. 
The displaced regime possesses juridical continuity in the 
eyes of those not recognizing the new rulers. 
Nonrecognition as applied to Lithuania means that 
the independent prewar government of that country possesses 
a vestige of international legal personality. There is no 
7 
legal foundation to the country's incorporation into the 
USSR; it is null and void. Lithuania is considered to be 
with the occupant possessing under a military occupation, 
limited rights and obligations under the Geneva Conventions. 
The events which occured there in the summer of 1940 are 
deemed to be manifestations of a misrepresentation of 
sovereignty by the Soviet-installed Lithuanian government. 
Further, the sovereignty of the prewar regime has been 
suspended, and can be exercised following the occupant's 
evacuation. 
When Lithuania and the other Baltic States of Latvia 
and Estonia were occupied by the Soviet Union in 1940, the 
act was met by the protests of Lithuanian-Americans and the 
Lithuanian minister to the United States, Povilas Zadeikis. 
On 15 July 1940, Loy Wesley Henderson, assistant chief of 
the State Department's European Affairs office, authored a 
memorandum where he asked if the United States would fight 
Hitler, while ignoring Stalin's aggression. The day the 
document was written, President Franklin Roosevelt, who 
stated that Lithuania's sovereignty had been temporarily 
suspended, i~sued Executive Order 8484, which froze Baltic 
assets in this country, making them inaccessible to Soviet 
authorities. On 23 July, Undersecretary of State Sumner 
Welles, 
implied 
in an announcement condemning the occupation, 
the application of the Stimson Doctrine of 
nonrecognition to the Baltic situation. 
8 
Despite Soviet protests, Washington proceeded to 
implement nonrecognition vis-a-vis the Baltic States. 
Though Antanas Smetona, the Lithuanian president, was 
allowed to live in the US only in a private capacity without 
the possibility of heading a government-in-exile, Lithuanian 
diplomats and consuls retained their formal status. US-
Lithuanian treaties were considered to be in force, but 
suspended. Official personnel were supported in their 
activity from the frozen assets. Further, consuls possessed 
standing in courts to defend their country's economic 
interests from the Soviets. 
It was in this area that nonrecognition had the 
greatest impact. American courts, taking the executive's 
nonrecognition policy into account, held that an 
unrecognized government possesses no standing in court. 
Hence, the nationalization decrees promulgated in the Baltic 
in 1940 were considered to be without legal effect in the 
US, and the Kremlin could not claim Baltic assets and 
property. Thanks to nonrecognition, actual physical 
resources were kept out of reach of the occupant. The 
Stimson Doct~ine thus became both a moral and practical tool 
in the condemnation of illegal aggression. 
C. WARTIME EXPEDIENCY WEAKENS THE POLICY 
One year following the incorporation of the Baltic 
States, Germany, breaking the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, 
9 
attacked the Red Army. The US, UK, and USSR now had a 
mutual enemy in Adolph Hitler. As the Wehrmacht advanced 
eastward, the Soviet Union was able to attract sympathy and 
support in the West, with the unintended result that Soviet 
aggression of 1939-1940 was deemphasized. 
The Atlantic Charter was signed by President 
Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill on 14 
August 1941. It embraced the principle of self-
determination vis-a-vis European territorial changes and 
forms of government. Stalin initially announced his 
acceptance of the Charter's principles, but, as the tide of 
the war shifted in his favor, he indicated that he would not 
be bound by them. The western allies, seeing that they 
could practically do little on behalf of eastern Europe, 
declared that the Charter was not a formal treaty, and that 




In other words, 
following the 
all settlements would be 
successful conclusion of 
The negotiations over the Anglo-Soviet treaty of 
alliance of 1941-1942 witnessed a fight between east and 
west over the nonrecognition policy. Stalin pressed 
Churchill for recognition of the Soviet regimes in the 
Baltic. In turn, the prime minister asked the Roosevelt 
administration to moderate its stance, which Washington 
refused to do. Following US-UK tensions at a time when the 
10 
war itself was at stake, Stalin agreed to drop the matter of 
nonrecognition, and a simple treaty of alliance was signed 
on 26 May 1942. The policy condemning Soviet aggression had 
survived this assault when political expediency would have 
dictated its retreat. 
The wartime conferences at Moscow, Teheran, and 
Yalta did not alter the nonrecognition policy, but they also 
did not alter the fact that the Soviets controlled eastern 
Europe. Indeed, Roosevelt stressed the importance of 
friendly contacts and concessions as strategies in placating 
Stalin and mitigating his rule over the continent. In 
employing this approach, the president even jokingly 
informed Stalin that he was sure the Baltic people would 
vote to remain in the USSR provided that there would be a 
vote. Stalin, of course, refused to discuss the matter. 
With the Baltic used as a bargaining chip, nonrecognition 
failed to win liberation for the area. 
The postwar Potsdam declaration of 3 August 1945 did 
not repudiate nonrecognition, but did not support it either. 
Konigsberg and the adjacent area was turned over to Moscow 
for its admihistration. It is difficult to see how the 
"adjacent area" could not have included Lithuania. As the 
war had approached its conclusion, the West did not press 
Stalin for concessions in eastern Europe. Some commentators 
believe that even broken agreements would have strengthened 
the status of the Baltic States. As it turned out, the Cold 
11 
war was merely an afterthought. 
D. INCOMPLETE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POLICY 
Since the Second World War, numerous statements, 
resolutions and certifications have reaffirmed the policy of 
nonrecognition, even to the point of maintaining a Baltic 
desk at the State Department, noting the policy on official 
maps, and forming an Ad Hoc Congressional Committee on the 
Baltic States and Ukraine in the House of Representatives. 
of course, the existence of the policy has had some effect 
upon US-USSR relations. Protests during 1940-1941 from the 
Kremlin went unheeded by Washington. The war crimes trials 
at Nuremberg also saw a reservation attached to the 
indictment, which did not agree with the use of the phrase 
''Soviet Socialist Republic" in conjunction with Lithuania, 
Latvia, and Estonia. The US and Soviet Union have clashed 
over the Baltic at numerous conferences and negotiations. 
Practically, however, the routine of international 
intercourse has not been interrupted by the policy, with 
nonrecognition not hindering US-USSR dealings regarding 
specific issties and individuals. The diplomacy of the early 
1940s and the detente of the 1970s proceeded in spite of 
nonrecognition. In short, it is unavoidable to deal with 
the Soviet regimes in the Baltic, due to the necessary 
requirements of diplomacy, political expediency, and the 
lack of tools for concrete action. 
12 
Several case studies have indicated why 
nonrecognition cannot be perfectly implemented. The cases 
described in this study are: postwar repatriation, the Simas 
Kudirka incident, the Helsinki accords, and the activity of 
the US Office of Special Investigations. Among US officials 
who are supposed to be apprised of the policy, it has 
sometimes either been ignored or unknown. Nonrecognition 
has also often been submerged under the issues of asylum, 
political persecution, diplomacy, and the prosecution of war 
criminals. Indeed, during the Helsinki negotiations, the 
policy itself was called into question by several senior 
officials. Finally, Baltic diplomats have unavoidably been 
able to play a limited role in defending the interests of 
their nations and their independent governments. 
Be that as it may, the policy has not been 
forgotten. This conclusion can be reached when noting its 
various reaffirmations, and the controversy surrounding even 
perceived attempts to undermine it. Unfortunately, it is 
too often invoked in a pro forma declaration only after it 
has been violated and then only after the matter has come 
to the publi~'s attention. 
designed to protect people, 
successful at this task. 
Though the policy has been 
it has not always proved 
Initially, only diplomatic officers commissioned as 
of 15 June 1940 could succeed Baltic ministers who died. 
The advent of the 1980s witnessed a rebirth of the policy, 
13 
the means of supporting it, and the people who embody it. 
l980 saw the pooling of the frozen assets of Lithuania, 
Latvia, and Estonia into a single fund. This money 
continues to support diplomatic and consular facilities. 
Further, President Jimmy Carter waived the rule that only 
officers active in 1940 could succeed as charge d'affaires. 
When Stasys Lozoraitis, Jr., who was not a commissioned 
officer in 1940, succeeded Dr. Stasys Backis as charge 
d'affaires in Washington in 1987, the Carter policy was 
successfully implemented for the first time. Prior to this 
policy switch, consular officers had continued to be 
appointed with little difficulty, for they filled honorary 
posts, with no authority to defend their nationals in court. 
Does a state exist because of recognition, or 
because of fulfilling certain requirements of statehood? 
For the Lithuanian nation, statehood, though occasionally 
interrupted, has existed since the thirteenth century, both 
in the national consciousness, as well as in the formal 
trappings of government. 
even under occupation. 
Its manifestations have occured 
Despite practical limitations, 
international law recognizes all states as morally and 
juridically equal. The United States recognizes Lithuania, 
Latvia, and Estonia as legitimate members of the 
international community, despite the fact that their 
sovereignty has been suspended. 
Obviously, the Soviet presence in the Baltic cannot 
14 
be ignored indefinitely. Yet, under the law, the presence 
of soviet authority could only be legitimated in three ways: 
precription, that is, the lack of opposition; validation by 
the residents; formal validation by the international 
community. None of these methods have been employed. 
Hence, Washington is not being unreasonable in maintaining a 
policy of not recognizing the legitimacy of the Soviet 
government in the Baltic. 
The nonrecognition policy finds its roots in 
traditional American foreign policy which, eschews a 
Machiavellian approach. 4 Values are ultimately at the heart 
of nonrecognition. Of course, morality, in order to be 
effective, may need power to back it up. This lack of 
power is where nonrecognition has fallen short for nearly 
five centuries. However, nonrecognition was limited in 
scope from its very inception. Nonrecognition has proceeded 
as far as originally intended. In other words, it was 
4 Others view foreign policy, in general, differently: 
Most writers in the modern tradition of political 
theory, and many contemporary students of 
international politics, have conceived of 
international relations on the analogy of the 
state of nature. States are pictured as purposive 
and autonomous agents coexisting in an anarchic 
environment without significant social, political, 
or economic activity and devoid of stable 
expectations regarding the agents' behavior with 
respect to one another. According to the most 
extreme views, like Hobbes', moral judgements are 
inappropriate in such an environment. 
See Charles R. Beitz, Political Theory and International 
Relations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979), 
p. 179. 
15 
always meant to be primarily a moral statement supporting 
Baltic sovereignty. Actual sovereignty must be 
reconstituted by the Balts themselves. 
In another sense, nonrecognition is active 
intervention, for it asserts the rule of law, regardless of 
how imperfectly enforced. The Stimson Doctrine is not 
gathering dust on diplomatic shelves. 
and always has been, a long-term policy. 
Nonrecognition is, 
It has yet to 
reach its logical conclusion in the restoration of the 
Baltic States. Thus, in terms of its original purpose, it 
has been 
incomplete. 
successful. In terms of its goal, it is 
E. METHODOLOGICAL QUESTIONS 
It will be the purpose of this study to 
systematically examine the official us policy of 
nonrecognition of the Soviet occupation of Lithuania. 
The cases of the other Baltic States of Latvia and Estonia 
are usually one and the same. Thus the reader should not be 
surprised if all three countries are often approached as a 
single unit. 
The nonrecognition policy, in essence, refuses to 
recognize de jure, that is as a matter of right, the regime 
functioning in the Lithuanian SSR and its governmental acts. 
As far as the US is concerned, the only legitimate 
Lithuanian government is its independent one, which 
16 
functioned from 1918 to 1940. 
This study aims to link the nonrecognition policy 
to: 1) US public policy making processes and implementation; 
2) us interpretation and application of international law; 
and 3) the development of the policy to the present day. 
The first two links can be viewed in light of theoretical 
development to discover common and deviating aspects of the 
Lithuanian case from theory. The last link wishes to ground 
the study in contemporary public policy, to more fully 
understand if policy is merely a practical instrument, or if 
it also possesses some normative, 
dimension. 
ethical, and moral 
This unique official policy as applied to Lithuania 
has never been systematically studied in this particular 
fashion by the academic community, in either the English or 
Lithuanian language. It is thus another purpose of this 
study to fill the scholarly vacuum. 
The issues involved, of course, have been addressed 
by many individuals: scholars, participants, observers, 
arguing the American, Lithuanian, and Soviet points of view. 
However, the~e merely provide pieces of a grand puzzle which 
no one has yet constructed. 
are as follows: 
The problems with these pieces 
1) They are often quite small, sometimes just a few 
sentences in a book or article, which are minimally 
comprehensible when not viewed in the general context of 
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events. 
2) Bias takes two forms. 
A) Memoirs, biographies, and historical 
accounts are often written by participants or other 
individuals who wish to present information from a 
particular perspective. 
B) Some accounts of the nonrecognition policy 
are written by Soviet scholars, who paint a fascist portrait 
of independent Lithuania in order to discredit the regime, 
and who misrepresent the manner of occupation in order to 
legitimize it. 
These factors create obstacles which obscure 
objectivity. Objectivity can be attempted, however, by 
piecing many of these diverse and often contradictory--
pieces together. Research to date has demonstrated the 
value of critically viewing and synthesizing large 
quantities of data. 
A reservation, though, must be immediately noted. 
There should be no doubt in the mind of the reader that the 
author of the present study condemns the Soviet occupation 
of Lithuania· as illegal, and lauds the US government for 
maintaining the policy of nonrecognition. This certainly 
colors the basis of his approach to the subject. Be that as 
it may, this should not impede an objective study of the 
strengths and weaknesses, and the successes and failures, of 
the policy. 
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The study commences with an examination of the 
events which gave birth to the nonrecognition policy, that 
. the occupation and incorporation of Lithuania by the is. 
soviet Union. It is this subject which the following 
chapter addresses. 
CHAPTER II 
THE TWILIGHT OF INDEPENDENCE 1939-1940 
A. PRELUDE TO OCCUPATION 
In order to fully understand the circumstances which 
led to the US nonrecognition policy, it is first necessary 
to acquire a familiarity with the events which led to the 
extinction of Lithuania's independence. Lithuania's major 
diplomatic difficulty during the interwar period was the 
Vilnius dispute. Vilnius had been the ancient capital of 
Lithuania during the time of the Kingdom and Grand Duchy. 
Wars with Muscovy in the sixteenth century forced Lithuania 
to seek aid from her old ally, Poland. Poland, however, 
agreed to give aid only in return for a political union with 
Lithuania. After a series of high-level maneuvers, the 
Union of Lublin was signed in 1569, creating the unified 
Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania. 
polonized and more cosmopolitan. 
Gradually, Vilnius became 
Poles came to outnumber 
Lithuanians, while the latter continued to predominate in 
the countryside. The partitions of Poland and Lithuania in 
1772, 1793, and 1795 by Prussia, Russia, and Austria placed 
Lithuania under Czarist rule. 
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At the conclusion of World War I, new states began 
carving niches for themselves on the European continent. 
TWO such countries were the formerly united Poland and 
Lithuania. Immediately upon reconstitution, both sides 
clashed over Vilnius and its surrounding territories. 
Lithuania declared her independence on 16 February 1918. 
This was followed by two years of turbulence. The 
vanquished Germans retreated and the Bolsheviks entered the 
Vilnius territory in late 1918. Polish and Lithuanian 
volunteers drove the Red Army out of Lithuania -- Poland 
entering Vilnius first on 19 April 1919. During the summer 
of 1920, the Bolsheviks reoccupied the territory. 
Subsequently, Russia concluded an armistice with Lithuania, 
turning over to her the capital and surrounding areas. The 
peace treaty caused renewed fighting to break out between 
Poland and Lithuania. Finally, after much maneuvering--
including the intervention of the League of Nations -- the 
Treaty of Suvalkai was signed on 7 October 1920; the Vilnius 
territory was to remain in Lithuanian hands. 
change with lightning speed. 
signing of the treaty, Polish 
with Polish strongman Marshal 
staged a rebellion and led 
The situation was to 
Just two days after the 
general Lucjan Zeligowski, 
Jozef Pilsudski's blessing, 
Polish forces back into the eastern third of Lithuania, 
occupying Vilnius. The Lithuanian counterattack was halted 
by an order of the League of Nations; diplomatic efforts 
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failed to bring Vilnius back to Lithuania, which set up a 
provisional capital in Kaunas. The Conference of 
Ambassadors recognized the existing situation in 1923. 
The interwar years were to see continuing tensions 
between the two countries over the Vilnius question. 
Lithuania would not officially renounce the capital; Poland 
would not relinquish the predominantly Polish city. A 
stalemate ensued for eighteen years, despite secret and 
sometimes high-level contacts between the belligerents. 
Nothing appeared able to break the deadlock, which included 
the lack of diplomatic relations and a technical state of 
war. An administration line was created between the two 
antagonists. Diplomats on the continent saw the unresolved 
situation as a tinderbox ready to ignite; they hoped for a 
resolution to the conflict. Their wish came true in March 
1938. A border incident in which a Polish soldier was 
killed was followed by Warsaw's ultimatum demanding the 
restoration of diplomatic ties. Seeing the massing of 
Polish troops along the administration line, the Lithuanian 
government acquiesced. This was, in many respects, the 
actual start of the Second World War for the country. 
Adolph Hitler decided to add the Klaipeda (Memel) 
Territory to his empire in March 1939. An ultimatum was 
issued to the Lithuanian government demanding its cession to 
Germany. The Lithuanian government, feeling powerless 
against the military might of the Third Reich, grudgingly 
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accepted Hitler's ultimatum. On 22 March 1939, a treaty was 
signed by both governments which "reunited the Territory 
with the Reich." The Germans moved into the area very 
quickly, indicating premeditation, and Lithuanian private 
citizens, government agencies, and military components 
suffered many losses in the sudden move to Lithuania-Major. 1 
The nation was forced to adjust to the economic 
dislocation which emerged following the ultimatum. In 
addition, approximately twelve thousand refugees from the 
Klaipeda Territory had to be absorbed. Lithuania was 
simultaneously maneuvering through the troubled continental 
political situation brewing before the outbreak of outright 
hostilities. Despite external pressure, Prime Minister 
Jonas Cernius was charged by President Antanas Smetona with 
executing a policy of strict neutrality. 2 
Moscow: 
Another problem was constructed by Berlin and 
When German Foreign Minister Ribbentrop signed the 
famous Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact on August 
23, 1939, the public announcement of the pact made 
no mention of a secret protocol signed between the 
two parties the same day. By terms of this secret 
protocol the Baltic area, including Finland, 
Eitonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and the entire 
1 Juozas Audenas, Paskutinis posedis: Atsiminimai 
(Final Meeting: Reminiscences) (New York: Romuva, 1966), p. 
127; Julius P. Slavenas, "Klaipeda Territory," Encyclopedia 
Lituanica, 1973, vol. 3, p. 137. 
2 U.S. House of Representatives, Third Interim Report 
of the Select Committee on Communist Aggression, 83rd 
Congress, Second Session (Washington: U.S. Government 
Printing Off i.c e , 19 5 4 ) , pp . 15 4 -15 5 . 
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territory of the Polish Republic, was partitioned 
between the U.S.S.R. and Nazi Germany. The 
northern boundary of Lithuania provided the 
dividing line between the two spheres of interest. 
The Vilnius area was recognized as part of 
Lithuania. Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and the 
Polish territories east of the line of the rivers 
Narev, Vistula, and San were declared the spheres 
of influence of the U.S.S.R., whereas Lithuania 
and the Polish territories west of these rivers 
would constitute the German sphere of influence. 
The ultimate fate of Poland was also sealed in 
this secret protocol, which provided that "whether 
the interests of both parties make the maintenance 
of an independent Polish state desirable can be 
determined only in the course of further political 
developments." Later Germany traded 
[Lithuania] away . to . the U.S.S.R. 3 
3 Bronis J. Kaslas, "The Lithuanian Strip in Soviet-
German Diplomacy, 1939-1941," Journal of Baltic Studies, 4,3 
(Fall 1973), 211. See also George F. Kennan, Russia and the 
West Under Lenin and Stalin (Boston: Little, Brown, 1961), 
pp. 329-336; Domas Krivickas, "Formalities Preliminary to 
Aggression: Soviet and Nazi Tactics Against Lithuania and 
Austria," Baltic Review, 5 (June 1955), 5-22; Krivickas, 
"Lithuania's Struggle Against Aggression and Subjugation," 
in Twenty Years' Struggle for Freedom of Lithuania, ed. 
Juozas Audenas (New York: ELTA, 1963), pp. 126-131; 
Krivickas, "Naciu-sovietu pakto teisines ir politines 
pasekmes po 40 metu" ("Legal and Political Consequences of 
the Nazi-Soviet Pact After 40 Years"), in Lituanistikos 
instituto 1981 metu suvaziavimo darbai (Proceedings of the 
Institute of Lithuanian Studies 1981), ed. Ina C. Uzgiris 
(Chicago: ILS, 1985), pp. 83-104; Krivickas, Soviet-German 
Pact of 1939 and Lithuania (Hamilton, Ontario: Federation of 
Lithuanian-Canadians, 1959); August Rei, Nazi-Soviet 
Conspiracy and the Baltic States: Diplomatic Documents and 
Other Evidence (London: Boreas, 1948), pp. 37-39, 45, 49-52; 
US Department of State, Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941: 
Documents from the Archives of the German Foreign Office, 
ed. Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie 
(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 76-
78, 107-108; Leonhard Vahter, "Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 
August 23, 1939," Baltic Review, 18 (November 1959), 58-64. 
Following the conclusion of World War II, the Soviets or 
their agents published accounts of the pact from their own 
viewpoint, denouncing documents released by Washington. 
See, for example, Falsifiers of History: An Historical 
Document on the Origins of World War II (New York: Committee 
for Promotion. of Peace, c. 1948), 48 pp.; Soviet Information 
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This opened the way for the dissolution of Poland. 
on 1 September 1939 the German blitzkrieg began swallowing 
the country. The Red Army moved into the Polish-occupied 
Vilnius territory on the 17th of that month. Ten days 
later, the two powers carried out the "fourth partition" of 
Poland according to the terms of the secret protocol. 
Lithuania was immediately mobilized, albeit temporarily, and 
began absorbing and interning Polish refugees and military 
perso.nnel. In October, the Kremlin placed pressure on 
Kaunas to sign a mutual assistance pact, allowing the 
establishment of four Soviet bases in Lithuania. For the 
tiny country, this was a two-edged sword. On the one hand, 
Lithuania, under the provisions of the pact, received most 
of the Vilnius territory -- the territory for which it had 
been fighting nineteen years. On the other hand, the Soviet 




USSR, 1948), 61 pp. 
of History (An Historical 
Bulletin of the Embassy 
Note) 
of the 
4 For accounts of these events, see Audenas, p. 150; 
Adolfs Klive, "Pacts of Mutual Assistance Between the Baltic 
States and the USSR," Baltic Review, 18 (November 1959), 31-
40; Stasys Rastikis, Ivykiai ir zmones: Is mano uzrasu 
(Events and Personalities: From My Notes), ed. Bronius 
Kviklys (Chicago: Academic Press, 1972), p. 44; Rastikis, 
Lietuvos likimo keliais: Is mano uzrasu (On the Roads of 
Lithuania's Destiny: From My Notes), ed. Jonas Dainauskas 
(Chicago: Academic Press, 1982), p. 225; Adolfas Sapoka, 
Vilnius in the Life of Lithuania (Toronto: Lithuanian 
Association of the Vilnius Region, 1962), pp. 153-161. Many 
military of~icers and citizens did not understand why 
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Technically, the Treaty on the Transfer of Vilnius 
and soviet-Lithuanian Mutual Assistance, signed at Moscow on 
10 October 1939, was intended solely to guarantee 
Lithuania's borders with the help of fifty thousand 
soviet troops. Article VII stated that the treaty had no 
effect upon sovereign rights or internal affairs. The 
following article wrote that the treaty would come up for 
review in fifteen years. On 14 November, the first of 
twenty thousand Red Army soldiers entered Lithuania. 
Soldiers also entered the other Baltic States, under 
terms of mutual assistance pacts concluded at the same time. 
Ostensibly, the Soviet troops were there to guarantee the 
independence of the three countries. However, as Pakstas 
writes, this was not to be: 
In November, 1939, the mechanized units of the 
Russian army (about 70,000) were already 
established in . the three Baltic countries. 
Juridically the Baltic states were in the position 
of Cuba or Egypt, but the "protecting" partner was 
not the law-abiding Anglo-Saxon or Yankee. 0 
Lithuania did not invade and take back the Vilnius territory 
when Poland was attacked and Berlin was urging Kaunas to 
move. This, though, would have violated Smetona's policy of 
strict neutrality. See Vaclovas Sliogeris, Antanas Smetona: 
Zmogus ir valstybininkas. Atsiminimai (Antanas Smetona: 
Person and Statesman. Reminiscences) (Sodus, MI: Juozas J. 
Bachunas, 1966), pp. 135-136. 
° Kazys Pakstas, "The Baltic Victims of the Present 
War," World Affairs Interpreter, 12, 1 (April 1941), 36-37. 
See also Bronis J. Kaslas, ed., The USSR-German Aggression 
Against Lithuania (New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1973), 
pp. 149-151; Benedict V. Maciuika, ed., Lithuania in the 
Last 30 Years. Subcontractor's monograph prepared in the 
Division of the Social Sciences at the University of 
Chicago. HRA~ Subcontract HRAF-1 Chi-1 (New Haven, CT: Human 
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s. THE SOVIET UNION INTERVENES 
The final cabinet meeting of independent Lithuania 
took place during the night of 14-15 June 1940. The 
president himself was presiding, for the government was 
considering an ultimatum from Moscow. The ultimatum 
included a demand for the arrest of Interior Minister 
Brigadier General Kazys Skucas for allegedly ordering the 
kidnapping of Red Army soldiers stationed in Lithuania, 
though it was apparent that they had themselves deserted. 
Another point of the ultimatum was permission to allow an 
unlimited number of Soviet troops into Lithuania for the 
purpose of "guaranteeing" the Soviet-Lithuanian mutual 
assistance pact. Finally, the Kremlin called for the 
formation of a government acceptable to it. Divisional 
General Stasys Rastikis, former commander-in-chief of the 
army, was invited to the meeting and appointed prime 
minister. He began forming a government, but word soon 
arrived from Moscow that Rastikis was unacceptable. 
Following further discussion, the cabinet decided that 
President Smetana should leave the country and turn 
Relations Area Files, 1955), pp. 70-72. For an overview of 
the prewar military situation in the Baltic, see Edgar 
Anderson, "Die militarische Situation der Baltischen 
Staaten" ("The Military Situation in the Baltic States"), 
Acta Baltica, 8 (1968), 106-155; Anderson, "Military 
Policies and Plans of the Baltic States on the Eve of World 
War II," Lituanus, 20, 2 (Summer 1974), 15-34. 
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presidential power over to Prime Minister Antanas Merkys, 
who had been appointed to succeed Prime Minister Cernius on 
2 2 November 1939. 
The Red Army began occupying Lithuania and the 
other Baltic States, who had been induced by similar 
ultimatums on 15 June 1940. This was managed on the 
scene by fQnctionaries from the Soviet Commisariat for 
Foreign Affairs. In Lithuania it was Vladimir Dekanazov, 
assisted by the Soviet minister to Kaunas, Pozdniakov. In 
Latvia it was Andrei Vishinsky, while Andrei Zhdanov managed 
the takeover in Estonia. 
Prime Minister Merkys was forced two days later to 
name communist sympathizer and journalist Justas Paleckis as 
new prime minister and de facto president, though, as will 
be seen below, Merkys 1 action did not conform with the 
requirements of Lithuanian constitutional law.a 
a For accounts of events surrounding the occupation, 
see Bronius Ausrotas, Sunkiu sprendimu metai (Year of 
Difficult Decisions) (Chicago: Lithuanian Book Club, 1985), 
pp. 182-226; William J.H. Hough, III, "The Annexation of the 
Baltic States and its Effect on the Development of Law 
Prohibiting Forcible Seizure of Territory," New York Law 
School Journal of International and Comparative Law, 6, 2 
Winter 1985), 370-384; Petras Maciulis, Trys ultimatumai 
(Three Ultimatums) (Brooklyn: Darbininkas, 1962), pp. 77-
122; Thomas Remeikis, "The Decision of the Lithuanian 
Government to Accept the Soviet Ultimatum of June 14, 1940," 
Lituanus, 21, 4 (Winter 1975), 19-44; Leonardas Simutis, 
Amerikos lietuviu taryba: 30 metu Lietuvos laisves kovoje 
1940-1970 (Lithuanian American Council: 30 Year Struggle for 
the Liberation of Lithuania 1940-1970) (Chicago: LAC, 1971), 
pp. 11-15; Antanas Steponaitis, Tevyneje ir pasauly: 
Prisiminimai ir apybraizos (In the Homeland and the World: 
Reminiscences and Sketches) (Brooklyn: Franciscan Press, 
1962), . pp. 196-225; Supreme Lithuanian Cammi ttee of 
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As far as public Soviet justifications were 
concerned, the occupation was necessary, because the Baltic 
states were engaged in a secret military collaboration in 
violation of the Baltic-Soviet mutual assistance pacts. 
Indeed, it was asserted that the occupation was benign and 
designed to preserve the Baltic States: 
The U.S.S.R. never, either in words or in deeds, 
threatened the independence of the Baltic 
countries. On the contrary, she was herself 
interested in their independence. There was 
therefore no reason whatever for the formation in 
the Baltic States of various blocs and coalitions 
directed ostensibly against "threats on the part 
of the U.S.S.R." In any case, none of these blocs 
and coalitions could have defended the Baltic 
States had the U.S.S.R. really desired to violate 
their independence. 7 
Liberation, Appeal to the United Nations on Genocide (np: 
Lithuanian Foreign Service, nd), pp. 6-10; US Senate, 
Committee on Foreign Relations, Consular Convention with the 
Soviet Union. Hearings on Executive D, 23 January, 3, 17 
February 1967, 90th Congress, First Session (Washington: US 
Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 416-454; US 
Department of State, "Case Studies in Soviet Colonialism," 
Soviet Affairs Notes, 249, 22 November 1960, pp. 15-24; 
Mykolas Vaitkus, Milzinu rungtynese 1940-1944: Atsiminimai 
(The Contest of Giants 1940-1944: Reminiscences) (London: 
Nida, 1972), pp. 61-109. 
7 Soviet Information Bureau, The Soviet Union, Finland 
and the Baltic States (np: Soviet War News, 1941), p. 6. 
For the Soviet view of the occupation, see J. Blieka, et 
al., eds.,· Tarybu Lietuvos valstybes ir teises 
dvidesimtmetis (Two Decades of Statehood and Law in Soviet 
Lithuania) (Vilnius: State Political and Scientific Press, 
1960), pp. 18 ff.; Mecislovas Gedvilas (first Soviet 
Lithuanian interior minister), Lemiamas posukis: 1940-1945 
metai (Decisive Turn 1940-1945) (Vilnius: Vaga, 1975), pp. 
28-179; E. Jacovskis, et al., eds., Tarybu valdzios 
atkurimas Lietuvoje 1940-1941: Dokumentu rinkinys 
(Reconstitution of Soviet Rule in Lithuania 1940-1941: 
Documentary Collection) (Vilnius: Mintis, 1965), pp. 61 ff.; 
Vytautas Kancevicius, ed., Lithuania in 1939-1940: The 
Historic Turn to Socialism (Vilnius: Mintis, 1976); 
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It soon became, obvious, however, that it was the Soviet 
Union's intent to liquidate Lithuania's independence and 
incorporate the country.a 
c. LITHUANIA'S INCORPORATION INTO THE USSR 
The new Lithuanian government created under the 
direction of Dekanazov was a mixture of patriots and 
communist sympathizers. However, there was no question that 
it would perform at the will of the Kremlin. On 19 June, a 
number of communists jailed by Smetana for their agitation 
were released from imprisonment and communist-sponsored 
public rallies were held. That day the Lithuanian 
Kancevicius, 1940 metu birzelis Lietuvoje (June 1940 in 
Lithuania) (Vilnius, Mintis, 1973); Lithuania: The Road to 
Independence 1917-1941. A Documentary Survey (Moscow: 
Novosti, 1987), pp. 56-80; Kostas Navickas, The Struggle of 
the Lithuanian People for Statehood (Vilnius: Gintaras, 
1971), pp. 139-156; Navickas, TSRS vaidmuo ginant Lietuva 
nuo imperialistines agresijos 1920-1940 metais (The Role of 
the USSR in Defending Lithuania From Imperialist Aggression 
1920-1940) (Vilnius: Mintis, 1966), pp. 268-329; A. Butkute-
Rameliene, Lietuvos Komunistu Partijos kova uz Tarybu 
valdzios itvirtinima respublikoje 1940-1941 m. (The Fight of 
the Communist Party of Lithuania for a Soviet Government in 
the Republic 1940-1941) (Vilnius: State Political and 
Scientific Press, 1958); Antanas Snieckus (longtime leader 
of the Lithuanian Communist Party), Su Lenino veliava. 
Straipsniai, kalbos ir pranesimai I: 1927-1969 (With Lenin's 
Flag. Articles, Addresses and Reports I: 1927-1969) 
(Vilnius: Mintis, 1977); B. Vaitkevicius, Tarybu Lietuva: 
Praeities ir dabarties bruozai 1940-1980 (Soviet Lithuania: 
Sketches of the Past and Present 1940-1980) (Vilnius: 
Mokslas I Science, 1980), pp. 16-39; Antanas Venclova, 
Vidurdienio vetra (Midday Storm) (Vilnius: Vaga, 1969), pp. 
11-93. 
0 Soviet military maps 
indicated Lithuania and 
components of the USSR. 
printed 
the other 
in 1939 already 
Baltic States as 
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Nationalist Association, President Smetona's political 
faction which had ruled Lithuania since the coup of 17 
December 1926, was outlawed. On 25 June, Interior Minister 
Mecislovas Gedvilas announced that the Communist Party would 
be the only legal political party and entered it in the 
register of societies and associations. Three days later 
came the legalization of the Young Communist League. The 
Seimas (Parliament) was dissolved on 1 July. The following 
day the Lithuanian army was renamed the People's Army, and 
would later become the 29th Territorial Corps of the Red 
Army; political commisars joined the ranks. Nationalization 
and collectivization of property were also begun. 9 
On 5 July, the government announced that elections 
to a People's Seimas would be held on the 14th of that 
month. Acting President Paleckis published the new 
electoral law the following day. Only candidates of the 
9 Algirdas J. Kasulaitis, Lithuanian Christian 
Democracy (Chicago: Leo XIII Fund, 1976), p. 153. See also 
P. Dicius, "Tarybine zemes reforma Lietuvoje 1940-1941 
metais" ("Soviet Land Reform in Lithuania 1940-1941"), 
Lietuvos TSR Mokslu Akademijos darbai (Proceedings of the 
Lithuanian SSR Academy of Sciences), Series A, 1 (1958), 19-
30; A. Jefremenka, "Kolukiu kurimasis Tarybu Lietuvoje 1940-
1941 m." ("The Establishment of Collective Farms in Soviet 
Lithuania 1940-1941"), Lietuvos TSR Mokslu Akademijos darbai 
(Proceedings of the Lithuanian SSR Academy of Sciences), 
Series A, 2 (21) (1966), 211-223: L. Truska, "Visuomenes 
klasines sudeties pakitimas Lietuvoje socializmo statybos 
metais 1940-1941 m." ("The Change in the Class Structure in 
Lithuania While Building Socialism 1940-1941"), Lietuvos TSR 
Mokslu Akademijos darbai (Proceedings of the Lithuanian SSR 
Ac ad em Y. of Sciences ) , Series A , 2 ( 1 9 ) ( 196 5 ) , 193 - 2 11 . 
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communist Party10 were allowed to run, and there would be 
only as many candidates as there were seats in the Seimas. 
Because only 15-20 percent of those eligible actually voted 
on election day, the voting was extended to 10:00 pm the 
following day. The official tally stated that 1,386,469 
(95.51%) individuals voted to elect seventy-nine Seimas 
deputies. 11 
The People's Seimas convened in the Kaunas State 
Theater on 21 July 1940. Red Army soldiers, secret police 
agents, members of the Soviet legation, and representatives 
from Moscow sat among the deputies, some of whom had been 
elected against their will. Their names commanded respect 
among the citizenry, and it was thought by the Soviets that 
their presence would give the proceedings at least 
superficial legitimacy. The convocation was marked by 
almost continuous shouting and turmoil. During the voting, 
non-deputies raised their hands and resolutions were 
recorded as having passed unanimously. Only two were 
10 Officially called the Union of Working People of 
Lithuania. 
11 Maciuika, pp. 73-74; US House of Representatives, 
Communist Takeover and Occupation of Lithuania. Special 
Report No. 14 of the Select Committee on Communist 
Aggression (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 
1955), pp. 12-13. The reporting of the election results 
sometimes went to rather interesting extremes. For example, 
on 16 July, one newspaper reported that some areas had a 
138% voter turnout. The following day, Vilniaus balsas 
(Voice of Vilnius) reported that some Vilnius precincts saw 
a turnout of 133%. See Albertas Gerutis, "Occupied 
Lithuania," in Lithuania 700 Years, 2nd rev. ed., ed. 
Alberta~ Gerutis (New York: Manyland, 1969), p. 273. 
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passed. The first declared that the Soviet system would be 
introduced into Lithuania; the second requested admission 
into the Soviet Union. 12 
The following month, the second resolution was 
presented by a Lithuanian delegation to the Supreme Soviet 
of the USSR, which admitted the Lithuanian SSR into the 
nation on 3 August. On the 24th of that month, a new 
constitution was promulgated for Lithuania, and Justas 
Paleckis was named chairman of the Presidium of Lithuania's 
supreme Soviet. 13 
It was no surprise that Germany, the Soviet Union's 
ally in dividing eastern Europe, did not hinder Soviet 
12 Liudas Dovydenas, Mes valdysim pasauli: Atsiminimai 
ll. (We Will Rule the World: Reminiscences II) (New York: 
Romuva, 1970), p. 284; Gerutis, p. 276; Kaslas, pp. 237-243. 
For copies of the polemic addresses made at the People's 
Seimas, along with analysis from the communist perspective, 
see R. Sarmaitis, ed., Revoliucinis judejimas Lietuvoje: 
Straipsniu rinkinys (Revolutionary Movement in Lithuania: 
Collection of Essays) (Vilnius: State Political and 
Scientific Press, 1957), pp. 535-582. Similar events were 
occuring in Latvia and Estonia at the same time. Indeed, 
the wording of the resolutions was almost identical. See 
August Rei, Nazi-Soviet Conspiracy and the Baltic States: 
Diplomatic Documents and Other Evidence (London: Boreas, 
1948), p. 5 
13 On SO August 1942 in Kaunas, after the Germans had 
invaded and occupied Lithuania, ten members of the People's 
Seimas issued a public declaration repudiating the elections 
and the incorporation process. They cited threats against 
them and their families. See Conference of Free 
Byelorussians, Estonian World Council, Lithuanian World 
Community, World Congress of Free Ukrainians, World 
Federation of Free Latvians, To the United Nations General 
Assembly: A Resolution with Appended Documents Concerning 
the Decolonization of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (Toronto I New York: Joint Committee I Ucrainica 
Research Institute, 1978), pp. 109-111. 
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actions in the Baltic States. On 22 July, the Lithuanian 
minister to Berlin, Kazys Skirpa, handed a letter of protest 
regarding Soviet activities to Ernst Woermann, director of 
the political department of the German foreign ministry. 
woermann transmitted the letter to Foreign Minister 
Ribbentrop with a request for instructions. The Latvian 
minister presented a similar letter that day. Two days 
later, Woermann returned these letters and refused to accept 
one from the Estonian minister. By the middle of the 
following month, German legations in the Baltic States were 
converted to consulates. 14 
August Rei, former president of Estonia, wrote of 
the incorporation: 
Every observer who followed with any attention the 
so-called "incorporation" of the Baltic States 
into the Soviet Union in the summer of 1940, was 
aware from the very first that this was an act of 
violence brutally disregarding both international 
law and the agreements then in force, even though 
terrorist methods were applied in such a manner as 
to suggest that the nations concerned had 
themselves freely renounced their political 
independence, declared themselves Soviet Republics 
and applied for admission to the Soviet Union as 
federal States. 10 
14 US Department of State, Documents on German Foreign 
Policy 1918-1945, Series D (1937-1945), Vol. X: The War 
Years June 23 - August 31, 1940 (Washington: US Government 
Printing Office, 1957, pp. 264, 267, 286, 483. 
10 Rei, p. 5. The incorporation is elaborated upon in 
Algirdas Budreckis, Soviet Occupation and Annexation of the 
Republic of Lithuania June 15 - August 3, 1940 (New York: 
American Lithuanian National Association, 1968); Juozas 
Kajeckas, "The Lithuanian Annexation," Baltic Review, 1, 4-5 
(July-August 1946), 214-216; Johannes Klesment, "The Crime: 
Seizure and Forced 'Incorporation,'" Baltic Review, 1 
34 
It was thus -- at bayonet point -- that Lithuania became the 
fourteenth Soviet Republic. 
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR LITHUANIAN MUNICIPAL LAW 
Prior to entering upon a discussion of international 
law and its interpretation by the US in the case of 
Lithuania, it may be useful to see how the incorporation, 
from its inception, was illegal and could in no way 
legitimately set the stage for the events of the summer of 
1940. 
On 15 June 1940, prior to leaving the country, 
President Antanas Smetana signed an order, by the authority 
vested in him by Article 71 of the Constitution, which gave 
Prime Minister Antanas Merkys the authority to act on his 
behalf as acting president 16 under Article 72. This 
(December 1953), 5-14; Krivickas, "Lithuania's Struggle 
Against Aggression and Subjugation," , pp. 132-137; Vaclovas 
Sidzikauskas, "On the Seizure and Forced Incorporation of 
the Baltic States by the USSR," Baltic Review, 4 (April 
1955), 76-79; Julius Smulkstys, "The Incorporation of the 
Baltic States by the Soviet Union," Lituanus, 14, 2 (Summer 
1968), 19-44; Rein Taagepara, "De-Choicing of Elections: 
July 1940 in Estonia," Journal of Baltic Studies, 14, 3 
(Fall 1983f, 215-246; Albert N. Tarulis, Soviet Policy 
Toward the Baltic States 1918-1940 (Notre Dame: University 
of Notre Dame Press, 1959), pp. 200-256; V. Stanley Vardys, 
"Aggression, Soviet Style, 1939-40," in Lithuania Under the 
Soviets: Portrait of a Nation, 1940-65, ed. V. Stanley 
Vardys (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 47-58. 
16 J. Ziugzda, ed., Lietuvos TSR istorijos saltiniai 
IV: Lietuvos burzuazijos valdymo metai (1919-1940) (Sources 
in the History of the Lithuanian SSR IV: Lithuania During 
the Years of Bourgeoise Rule (1919-1940)) (Vilnius: State 
Political and Scientific Press, 1961), p. 773. 
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presented a problem to the Soviets, however, in attempting 
to present the governmental changes to follow as legal. 
under Articles 71, 72, and 102 of the 1938 Constitution, the 
prime minister is not the president, but merely an acting 
president whose powers are limited. Under these provisions, 
Merkys did not possess the authority to appoint a new prime 
minister (whose off ice automatically reverted to the deputy 
prime minister) or to approve a new cabinet. He could only 
do this if the president died or resigned, and Smetana had 
done neither. In addition, he most certainly could not 
transfer the presidency to anyone else solely by his own 
decree. 
Yet, the Soviets needed at least the pretense of 
governmental continuity. Thus the law was subject to broad 
interpretation by the Kremlin's emmisary, Dakanazov. Two· 
days after Smetana's departure, it was publicly announced 
that the government considered the president's action a 
resignation. 17 That day, Merkys appointed a new cabinet and 
17 Gediminas Galva, Ernestas Galvanauskas: Politine 
biografija (Ernestas Galvanauskas: A Political Biography) 
(Chicago: Academic Press, 1982), pp. 412-413; Konstantinas 
Rackauskas, Lietuvos konstitucines teises klausimais (On 
Questions of Lithuanian Constitutional Law) (New York: 
Author, 1967), pp. 60-61; Leonas Sabaliunas, Lithuania in 
frisis: Nationalism to Communism, 1939-1940 (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1972), pp. 187-188; US House of 
Representatives, Communist Takeover and Occupation of 
Lithuania, p. 11; B. Vaitkevicius, ed., Lietuvos TSR 
istorija IV: 1940-1958 metai (History of the Lithuanian SSR 
IV: 1940-1958) (Vilnius: Mokslas, 1975), p. 9; Ziugzda, IV, 
p. 77 5. 
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named Paleckis prime minister and acting president. 18 
Alexander Shtromas succinctly passes judgement on 
what has been described in this chapter: 
Illegal governments, by means of illegal decrees, 
ordered elections which were carried out by 
illegal methods. The results of these "elections" 
were the "People's" Diets, legally invalid bodies 
that passed decisions which even legally 
constituted parliaments had no constitutional 
authority to enact. 19 
In other words, when the United States refused to recognize 
the incorporation of Lithuania into the Soviet Union, it was 
not merely interfering in the internal affairs of the Soviet 
Union, or even mouthing abstract concepts of international 
law. On the contrary, the US could look to clear violations 
of Lithuanian municipal law as the sandy foundation upon 
which the Lithuanian SSR was constructed and subsumed. It is 
18 V. Stanley Vardys, The Catholic Church, Dissent and 
Nationality in Soviet Lithuania (Boulder, CO: East European 
Quarterly, 1978), pp. 42-43; Ziugzda, IV, p. 776. See also 
Lietuvos TSR Teisingumo Ministerija (Lithuanian SSR Ministry 
of Justice), Lietuvos TSR istatymu, Auksciausiosios Tarybos 
Prezidiumo isaku ir Vyriausybes nutarimu chronologinis 
rinkinys I: 1940-1947 (Chronological Collection of the Laws 
of the Lithuanian SSR, Decrees by the Lithuanian SSR Supreme 
Soviet, and Decisions of the Lithuanian SSR Government I: 
1940-1947) (Vilnius: State Political and Scientific Press, 
1956), pp. 5-83. For a discussion of these events from the 
Soviet peispective, which glosses over constitutional 
irregularities, see J. Zinkus, ed., Lietuvos TSR (Lithuanian 
SSR) (Vilnius: Mokslas, 1980), pp. 198-200. Mykolas Romeris 
discusses these questions in terms of the 1922 Constitution, 
which was vague regarding presidential succession. See his 
Lietuvos konstitucines teises paskaitos I (Lectures in 
Lithuanian Constitutional Law I) (Kaunas: Law Faculty of the 
University of Vytautas the Great, 1937), pp. 276-277. 
19 Alexander Shtromas, "Political and 
the Soviet Occupation and Incorporation 
States," Baltic Forum, l, 1 (Fall 1984), 36. 
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this basis which grants legitimacy and validity to the 
nonrecognition policy. 
We have seen the foundations of this policy in terms 
of Lithuanian domestic affairs. It is now necessary to 
examine the policy from its roots in public international 
law. This is the subject of the following chapter. 
CHAPTER III 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE LITHUANIAN SITUATION 
A. SELF-DETERMINATION 
The emergence of the European nation-states in the 
nineteenth century, and the decolonization of Africa and 
Asia which began in the middle of this century, point up the 
importance of the concept of self-determination as the basis 
for the existence of states, as well as the relations among 
them. Obviously, in geo-physical terms, not all states are 
equal, for "the survival of small states depends to-day, as 
in the past, on the policy the dominant great powers 
adopt." 1 However, intrinsically, as far as the law of 
nations is concerned, 
the principle of equality is not affected by 
differences of power, and it precedes the idea of 
self-determination. It is a basic principle of 
international law, and goes back to the time when 
a state was personified in the person of its ruler 
o~ sovereign body. 2 
When examining the development of international law 
1 A 1 f r e d C ob b an , ~T_;;h;;...e:;__~N;...;;a;;...t~i ..o:.o..o:.n;;..___;;;.S_;t;...;a;:_t-"--"'e--a=n;...;d;;.._---"-N-'a;;...t~i_:;o;...;;n"'"a=l--'S'-' e;;;.,;:;.l_;:;:f_-
D et er min at ion (New York: Crowell, 1970), p. 290. 
2 Cobban, p. 303. 
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since the Second World War, it is apparent that self-
determination has been an explicit consideration in inter-
state relations. To demonstrate this, the following passage 
is quoted in extenso: 
The Second Inter-American Conference of Foreign 
Ministers, held in July, 1940, in Havana, Cuba, 
confirmed the right of self-determination in 
Latin-American countries. The Third International 
Conference of Jurists held in August, 1943, in 
Mexico City, reaffirmed it. The Charter of the 
United Nations (Articles 1(2) and 55) consider the 
right of peoples to self-determination as a basic 
pre-requisite for the maintenance of friendly and 
peaceful relations among nations. The British-
Egyptian agreement of February 12, 1953, granted 
the right of self-determination to the Sudanese 
people, and Sudan became an independent state. 
The resolution adopted by the Asian Socialist 
Conference held in Rangoon in January, 1952, 
emphasized the right of self-determination for 
Asian peoples. The Inter-American Conference held 
in Caracas in March, 1954, also stressed this 
right as essential for the maintenance of 
international peace and order. The Pacific 
Charter of September 8, 1954, reaffirmed the right 
of self-determination to all nations of the world, 
and the Afro-Asian Conference held in April, 1955, 
in Bandung, demanded the right of self-
determination for all Afro-Asian peoples. 3 
The United Nations has on numerous occasions declared the 
importance of self-determination for the successful 
maintenance of the global community. 4 
3 Ant~nas Trimakas, "The Soviet Disregard of 




4 Trimakas, p. 41. It is ironic that the first 
bilateral treaty embodying the principle of self-
determination was the Estonian-Russian peace treaty of 2 
February 1920. Article II wrote: 
On the basis of the right of all peoples freely to 
decide their own destinies and even to separate 
themselves completely from the State of which they 
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s. RECOGNITION 
Recognition in inter-state relations deals with the 
existence of a new state or government, and the decision 
whether or not to enter into relations with it. 
Recognition, in and of itself, is not a legal matter, but 
rather "a political act with legal consequences." 0 Legal 
effects stem from this political act, as when national 
courts depend upon executive policy for determining 
judgements in cases involving foreign governments, property, 
or nationals. There is never any duty to recognize another 
state or government and, when dealing with the idea of 
implied or tacit recognition, "there must be a very clear 
indication of intent to recognize." 0 
When the recognition of a completely new state is at 
issue, the important factors to examine are the possession 
of a distinct territory and population, the presence of a 
government which has effective control over both, is not 
form a part, a right proclaimed by the Socialist 
Republic of Soviet Russia, Russia unreservedly 
recognizes the independence and autonomy of the 
State of Estonia, and renounces voluntarily and 
forever all rights of sovereignty formerly held by 
Russia over the Estonian people and territory. 
See E. Krepp, Security and Non-Aggression: Baltic States and 
U.S.S.R. Treaties of Non-Aggression (Stockholm: Estonian 
Information Centre I Latvian National Foundation, 1973), p. 
7. See also G. Mennen Williams, "Global Self-Determination 
and the Baltic States," Baltic Review, 31 (April 1966), 3-6. 
0 Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations: An Introduction 
to Public International Law, 4th ed. (New York: Macmillan, 
1981), p. 90. 
a von Glahn, p. 91. His emphasis. 
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itself controlled by outside forces, and has the capacity to 
responsibly enter into foreign relations. These, once again, 
are matters of fact, not law. 7 
Recognition of governments differs from that of 
states. Unless there are political objections to 
recognition, there are three objective tests that must be 
successfully met. First, the government must possess de 
facto administrative control. Second, there must be an 
absence of meaningful resistance to it. Third, it must have 
the backing of a substantial segment of public opinion. 
Beginning with the second half of the nineteenth century, a 
fourth, subjective, test was applied, namely, the capacity 
and willingness to discharge international obligations. 
Thus the United States and Cuba, for example, have 
obligations toward each other as states under customary 
international law, treaties, and international agreements, 
regardless of the differences between their governments. 8 
It must be noted that recognition has two degrees. 
"Recognition is either definite and complete (de jure) or 
provisional or limited to a certain juridical relation (de 
7 L. Thomas Galloway, Recognizing Foreign Governments: 
The Practice of the United States (Washington: American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1978), p. 
3; van Glahn, p. 92. 
a Gerard J. Mangone, The Elements of International Law, 
rev. ed. (Homewood, IL: Dorsey Press, 1967), p. 52; van 
Glahn, pp. 98-100. 
) "9 facto · ;...:;;--
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De jure recognition is retroactive from the date 
of the actual independence of a state. De facto recognition 
is either expressed or implied, such as in an agreement with 
a limited or provisional purpose. 10 
Recognition is a matter not only in regard to new 
states and governments, but also to changes within 
governments. 
Normally a state does not concern itself legally 
with a change of government in another state. 
When a change of government occurs in a foreign 
state that is in accord with the domestic law of 
that state, the legal relationship between the two 
governments remains unaffected. For example, 
Great Britain does not recognize a new government 
in the United States whenever a new President is 
elected. 
However, under established principles of 
international law, the legal relationship between 
two states is affected if a government assumes 
power in a manner that violates domestic law. 
When such a change of government occurs, the 
question of recognition of the new government is 
said to arise. 
The line between a lawful and an unlawful 
is change of government 
problems may arise in 
particular change of 
question of recognition. 11 
not always clear, and 
determining whether a 
government raises the 
9 Institut de Droit International (Institute of 
International Law), Resolution, American Journal of 
International Law, 30 (1936), supplement, p. 185. 
10 Institut de Droit International, supplement, p. 
As the US did with Israel, it is possible to recognize 
state de jure, while granting de facto recognition 




11 Galloway, pp. 3-4. Galloway also writes that 
following the recognition of a state, it retains its 
identity regardless of any internal organizational or 
governmental alterations, even if extreme. In another 
technical point, he adds that recognition does not 
necessarily lead to diplomatic relations, though that is the 
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when an extra-constitutional change occurs, political 
factors often overshadow legal factors, depending upon the 
interests of the recognizing government. In practice, both 
}aw and politics are blended in a decision. The three major 
approaches to recognition reflect the interplay between 
politics and law. They are the traditional approach, the 
Estrada Doctrine, and the Tobar or Betancourt Doctrine. 12 
The traditional approach deals with the standard 
objective and subjective tests, namely control of territory 
and government, public acquiescence, and indication of 
willingness to discharge international obligations. This 
approach is flexible and depends mainly upon political 
interests. Recognition may either be deemphasized, or it 
may be used as a bargaining chip in seeking elections, 
economic advantage, or greater civil liberties. Recognition 
may even be withheld until certain conditions are met. An 
example is the US refusal to recognize the Albanian 
government after the Second World War, which is still in 
effect. 
The second approach to recognition was announced by 
Don Genaro Estrada, Mexico's foreign minister, in 1930. 
Under this approach, extra-constitutional acquisition of 
normal procedure. The United States has recently moved to 
merge the two actions in an effort to deemphasize 
recognition. See his p. 3. 
12 Galloway, p. 
from his pp. 5-10. 
5. The following passage is distilled 
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power is not subject to consideration. New states are 
recognized, but governmental changes of any kind do not 
affect inter-state relations. 
The Estrada Doctrine embraces the principle of 
unfettered national sovereignty and rejects 
interference with the domestic affairs of one 
state by another through the granting or 
withholding of recognition. States that have 
adopted the Estrada Doctrine often say they 
recognize states, not governments; however, as a 
practical matter, many states depart from the 
doctrine whenever they perceive a major political 
advantage in using the recognition instrument. 10 
Developed by a foreign minister of Ecuador, the 
Tobar Doctrine takes exactly the opposite approach. It 
refuses to recognize any government which comes to power 
through extra-constitutional means. Free elections must be 
held, for coups and revolutions are unacceptable, even if 
the citizenry constitutionally approves the change. Though 
operative for a time in South America -- and applied by the 
United States as the Wilson Doctrine from 1913 to 1929--
the Tobar Doctrine has met with little acceptance. 14 
For the most part, recognition has not been utilized 
as a moral tool to sanction unconstitutional behavior. 
Indeed, as far as the US Department of State and most 
international law texts are concerned, recognition does not 
necessarily translate into approval of a regime. 16 
10 Galloway, p. 9. 
14 Galloway, p. 10; von Glahn, p. 99. 
16 Galloway, p. 2. 
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No rule of law has ever ascribed anything like a 
sacred character to the constitution of any 
country. No rule of the law can be held to 
deprive a people of its right to change its form 
of government, whether by ballot or by bullet, nor 
does any existing rule maintain that such a change 
must be the handiwork of a majority in any 
nation. 16 
Most scholars assert, thus, that recognition is a matter of 
fact and politics, not of law or morality. In fact, 
relations and trade can exist between two governments that 
do not recognize each other. On the other hand, two 
governments that recognize each other may lack formal 
relations and even engage in trade interdiction and economic 
warfare. 17 
Recognition of foreign governments, for all its 
long history and frequent use, has little 
substantive content. One might logically 
inquire why states attach importance to 
[recognition]. The answer appears to be that the 
importance attached to recognition derives in part 
from the weight of tradition and in part from the 
sense of legitimacy recognition confers. 18 
This cursory look at the concept of recognition has 
paved the way for an examination of a matter more directly 
affecting relations between the United States and Lithuania 
since the summer of 1940, namely the explicit nonrecognition 
of the Sdviet occupation of Lithuania. The use of 
nonrecognition by the US did not begin with the Lithuanian 
occupation, but actually commenced about a decade earlier in 
16 von Glahn, p. 99. 
17 Galloway, pp. 11-12; van Glahn, p. 101. 
18 Galloway, pp. 11-12. 
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conjunction with events in Asia. It is this, in the context 
of the Stimson Doctrine, that we now turn to. 
c. THE STIMSON DOCTRINE 
In the early 1930s, Japan and China were at war. 
Japan had been the aggressor, attacking the Chinese province 
of Manchuria. The beginning of 1932 saw a culmination of 
the fighting. As Japan established effective control in 
Manchurian areas, it replaced Chinese authorities with 
puppet agencies acting as autonomous local administrative 
bodies. On 17 February, the "Supreme Administrative 
Council" was established at Mukden, which issued a 
declaration of independence the following day and 
established the new state of Manchukuo. Huan-tung, a former 
emperor of China who had been dethroned as a boy in 1912, 
was asked to become the leader of the new state; he 
accepted. 9 March 1932 saw an Organic Law promulgated as 
the Constitution. 19 
US Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson began 
responding to the Manchurian situation in January, prior to 
the official formation of Manchukuo. On 7 January, he 
dispatched a note to China and Japan, which stated that the 
19 Robert Langer, Seizure of Territory: The Stimson 
Doctrine and Related Principles in Legal Theory and 
Diplomatic Practice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1947), p. 57. His pp. 50-56 recount the troubled history of 
Manchuria in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, which involved competition among, and 
interference from, Russia, China, and Japan. 
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United States: 
cannot admit the legality of any situation de 
facto nor does it intend to recognize any treaty 
or agreement entered into between those 
Governments [of China and Japan], which may impair 
the treaty rights of the United States or its 
citizens in China, including those which relate to 
the sovereignty, the independence, or the 
territorial or administrative integrity of the 
Republic of China . and that it does not 
intend to recognize any situation, treaty, or 
agreement which may be brought about by means 
contrary to the covenants and obligations of the 
[Kellogg-Briand] Pact of Paris of August 27, 1928 
20 
16 January saw the Japanese reply, which asserted that 
treaties relative to China must occasionally be applied with 
an eye toward the changing situation. Tokyo added that the 
confusing state of affairs in China could not have been 
foreseen by diplomats signing international agreements. 21 
The following month saw the Assembly of the League 
of Nations responding to events in Manchuria. On 24 
February, the Assembly adopted the Lytton Report on 
Manchuria, which contained a statement of recommendations 
based upon the idea that China possesses sovereignty over 
Manchuria. In addition, the recommendations dealt with 
behavior toward the new regime in Manchuria: 
20 Langer, p. 58. See also Bronis J. Kaslas, The 
Baltic Nations - The Quest for Regional Integration and 
_Political Liberty (Pittston, PA: Euramerica, 1976), p. 276; 
E . Kr e p p , .::S...:e:....:c::..u=r-=i:-t::..Y..____:a::.:n::.:...::d'---'N:..:....:00...:.n=---=A=g'-'"g'-=r'-e::...::s-=s:...:i=-o::;...:;.::n...::_-=B-"a;;..;;l=-t.;;;..:;;.i-=c'---=-S-=t:...:a::..t..;;...;:.e-=s-a=n..;.;;.d 
_u_.-'s'-'-. ~s...:.·...:.R~. _...::T~r~e~a:...:t::..1::..· ::::.e~s~_o::::...:of_....:N:c:..:::o...:.n:...-....:A=gc!:r...::ro_e=s....::s:....:1::..' o:::..!!.n ( Stockholm : Es ton i an 
Information Centre I Latvian National Foundation, 1973), p. 
30. 
21 Langer, p. 60. 
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The recommendations made do not provide for a mere 
return to the status quo existing before 
September, 1931. They likewise exclude the 
maintenance and recognition of the existing regime 
in Manchuria, such maintenance and recognition 
being incompatible with the fundamental principles 
of existing international obligations . The 
Members of the League . . will continue not to 
recognize this regime either de jure or de 
facto. 22 
League actions were based upon Article Ten of the 
organization's Covenant which read, in part, that "the 
Members . . undertake to respect and preserve as against 
external aggression the territorial integrity and the 
existing political independence of all Members "23 
With Japan abstaining, on 11 March 1932 the League 
unanimously resolved "that it is incumbent upon the Members 
. not to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement 
which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenant 
. or to the Pact of Paris." 24 On the following day, 
Secretary Stimson stated that "this action will go far 
towards developing into terms of international law the 
principles of order and justice. 11215 




Vairio J. Rusmandel, "The Continued Legal Existence 
Baltic States," Baltic Review, 12 (7 November 1957), 
24 Kaslas, The Baltic Nations, p. 276. 
215 Kaslas, The Baltic Nations, pp. 276-277. See also 
Edgars Dunsdorfs, The Baltic Dilemma: The case of the de 
jure recognition by Australia of the incorporation of the 
Baltic States into the Soviet Union (New York: Speller, 
1975), p. 286; Quincy Wright, "The Legal Foundations of the 
Stimson Doctrine," Pacific Affairs, 8 (1935), 439-446. For 
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As far as the development of nonrecognition is 
concerned, the Latin American nations have taken the lead in 
incorporating "the principles of order and justice" into 
international law. This is most probably rooted in Latin 
America's general approach to its own regional law. 
[Former Chilean member of the World Court 
Alejandro Alvarez] mentions some five principal 
characteristics of American international law. 
These are: 1. a sentiment of continental 
solidarity; 2. an American juridical conscience; 
3. an American moral conscience; 4. pacifism, 
idealism, and optimism; and 5. 'Respect for law 
and international morality, condemning all 
violation of their precepts. 120 
Indeed the years immediately following the Stimson Doctrine 
saw Latin American diplomats embracing it in actual regional 
conflicts. 27 During the 1933 Chaco War between Bolivia and 
the historic development of the law prohibiting forcible 
seizure of territory from its European origins up to the 
Stimson Doctrine, see William J.H. Hough III, "The 
Annexation of the Baltic States and its Effect on the 
Development of Law Prohibiting Forcible Seizure of 
Territory," New York Law School Journal of International and 
Comparative Law, 6, 2 (Winter 1985), 305-351. 
The US maintained its stance with regard to 
Manchuria. In a 6 October 1938 note from Washington to the 
Japanese government citing Japanese violations of the open 
door policy in Manchuria, the phrase " the regime now 
functioning in Manchuria . " was utilized. See Press 
Bureau of the Chinese Delegation [to the League of Nations], 
Japanese Aggression and the League of Nations, 1939, IV 
(Geneva: Press Bureau, 1939), p. 47. See also p. 57. 
26 H.B. Jacobini, A Study of the Philosophy of 
International Law as Seen in the Works of Latin American 
Writers (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1954), p. 128. 
27 However, it was actually the League of Nations which 
first intervened in a Latin American dispute by invoking the 
Stimson Doctrine. In a dispute between Peru and Colombia 
over the Leticia district, the League Council on 18 March 
1933 adopted a report which recommended that Peru evacuate 
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paraguay, the representatives of the other nineteen American 
states issued the following statement: 
The American nations . . declare that they will 
not recognize any territorial arrangement of this 
controversy which has not been obtained by 
peaceful means nor the validity of territorial 
acquisitions which may be obtained through 
occupation or conquest by force of arms. 28 
The Chaco Declaration inspired Argentina's foreign 
minister, Dr. Saavedra Lamas, who suggested that a formal 
treaty be constructed. On 10 October 1933 at Rio de 
Janeiro, the "Anti-War Treaty of Non-Aggression and 
Conciliation" was signed by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Mexico, Paraguay, and Uruguay. The first two articles of 
what is usually referred to as the Saavedra Lamas Anti-War 
Treaty spell out the nonrecognition of territorial and 
juridical arrangements carried out through the use of 
force. 29 Two months later, the Seventh Inter-American 
Conference met at Montevideo and signed the "Convention on 
the Mights and Duties of States." Article Eleven broadened 
the meaning of the use of force: 
. whether this consists in the employment of 
arms, in threatening diplomatic representations, 
or in any other effective coercive measure. The 
territory of a State is inviolable and may not be 
the object of military occupation nor of other 
measures of force imposed by other States directly 
the district and urged League members not to recognize "any 
situation, treaty or agreement" contrary to the Covenant or 
the Kellogg-Briand Pact. See Langer, pp. 69-70. 
28 Langer, p. 68. 
29 Langer, pp. 75-76. 
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or indirectly or 
temporarily. 30 
for any motive whatever even 
The Eighth Inter-American Conference in 1938 at Lima 
reaffirmed the principle of nonrecognition. However, this 
time the Latin American diplomats went one step further, not 
merely stating that nonrecognition was a duty, but also 
declaring on 22 December that it is "a fundamental principle 
of the Public Law of America." 31 "It can therefore be 
maintained that the Stimson doctrine of nonrecognition 
represents a basic principle of regional inter-American 
law. 1132 
D. NONRECOGNITION 
Nonrecognition has usually been employed as an 
expression of moral disapproval. It is rarely concretely 
disruptive to the recipient or indicative of the actual 
strength of the nonrecognizing government. However, the act 
30 Langer, p. 77. See also Kaslas, The Baltic Nations, 
p. 277. 
31 Langer, p. 79. 
32 von Glahn, p. 325. See also Stasys Backis, 
"Lietuvos valstybes tarptautine teisine ir politine 
padetis," in Lietuva okupacijoje: Pranesimai Pasaulio 
Lietuviu Bendruomenes Seimui apie okupuotos Lietuvos 
gyvenimo kaikurias sritis (Lithuania Under Occupation: 
Reports to the Congress of the Lithuanian World Community on 
Several Aspects of the Life of Occupied Lithuania), ed. 
Jonas Balkunas (New York: Organizing Committee, 1958), p. 
122. 
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possesses definite legal and political consequences. 33 
"While non-recognition assumes in specific instances a 
negative form, it is in fact a positive affirmation of the 
validity of the existing legal order, as contrasted with 
acts of violence destructive of that order." 34 
Under nonrecognition, acts contrary to international 
law are null and void, and cannot be a source of 
justification for the aggressor. Illegality cannot be a 
source of legality (ex iniuria non oritur). Such a policy 
"is an attempt to carry over into the domain of 
international law viewpoints and judgements of a moral or 
ethical character which have become deeply rooted in 
municipal and constitutional law." 30 In the global arena, 
nonrecognition "prevents any law-creating effect of 
prescription. 1136 In other words, the occupation of 
territory, for example, does not necessarily lead to title 
of ownership. 
Nonrecognition is applied in several ways. 37 First, 
33 William L. Tung, International Law in an Organizing 
World (New York: Crowell, 1968), p. 54; von Glahn, pp. 107-
108. 
34 Mal bone W. Graham, "What Does Non-Recognition Mean?" 
Baltic Review, l, 4-5 (July-August 1946), 171. 
30 Graham, p. 171. See also H. Lauterpacht, Recognition 
in International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1947), p. 420. 
36 Rusmandel, p. 49. 
37 The following passage is derived from Graham, pp. 
171-174. 
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it maY be applied to subjects of international law, either 
new states or new regimes in old states, when their 
existence is brought about by illegal means. For the 
latter, both international and the municipal law of the 
country in question must be examined in order to determine 
if succession has been properly executed. 38 Second, 
nonrecognition may also be directed against treaties or 
agreements if it is determined that they violate 
international norms. This is especially true if one of the 
parties to an agreement is, itself, unrecognized. 
Third, it may also be applied to situations. An 
objective legal criterion must be examined in this case. 
For example, violations of treaty provisions would bring 
about a situation wherein norms have been broken. Accepted 
principles of international law, in the absence of specific 
treaty obligations, could also be utilized to examine a 
situation to determine if it is illegal and, hence, subject 
to nonrecognition. 39 As a corollary, nonrecognition has 
been expanded to cover treaties, persons, consular 
exequaturs, currency, passports, postage stamps, membership 
in international public unions, prize court decisions, and 
38 von Glahn writes that nonrecognition of a state 
itself is ineffective and disadvantageous, in that one's 
interests and citizens cannot be adequately protected in the 
nonrecognized state. See his p. 92. 
59 As will be seen in the next chapter, the US invoked 
the principle that it is opposed to the threat or use of 
force. The Welles statement of 23 July 1940 did not cite 
any specific treaties. 
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assets. 
It should be noted that nonrecognition of a lawful 
act does not impair its validity or render it legally 
ineffective. It is significant only in regard to unlawful 
acts, "to prevent the validation of what is a legal 
nullity." 40 Also, while "logically and practically it 
is not possible to recognize more that one government at a 
time in one state, " 41 it is often unavoidable to continue 
personal and business relations, as well as some official 
contact with the unrecognized regime. 42 Further, an 
unrecognized power still possesses obligations in the 
occupied territory. Langer draws an analogy between hostile 
territorial transfer and belligerent occupation. The 
occupant possesses no sovereignty over the area in question 
and cannot annex it during wartime. However, it is 
incumbent upon him to continue competent administration and 
normal existence. 43 
There is no obligation of nonrecognition in general 
international law. Concomitantly, silence in the face of an 
annexation, for example, does not necessarily imply 
40 Lauterpacht, p. 413. 
41 Thomas M. Franck and Michael J. Glennon, Foreign 
Relations and National Security Law: Cases, Materials and 
Simulations (St. Paul, MN: West, 1987), p. 431. 
42 This even for the sake of possessing an observation 
Point or for staging underground action against the 
occupant. See Langer, p. 287. 
43 Langer, p. 106. 
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recognition of the new situation. "International law does 
not recognize the formula of qui tacet, consentire videtur 
(he who is silent seems to agree). " 44 
As long as recognition has not been 
withdrawn [from the old regime], it is still 
effective. The withdrawal of recognition must not 
necessarily be explicit; however, because of its 
far-reaching consequences, it may be inferred only 
from acts which are unequivocally, and not by mere 
implication, expressive of the intention of the 
state in question. Of course, de jure 
recognition, but not de facto recognition, of the 
new authority replacing the state from which 
recognition is withdrawn, has also the effect of a 
withdrawal of recognition. 46 
There are several effects which flow from a policy 
of nonrecognition. The legal status of the government of 
the still recognized regime, its treaties with the non-
recognizing government, and diplomatic and consular 
representation is preserved. Legal acts are accorded full 
legitimacy and, conversely, the legal acts of the 
unrecognized regime are not. The recognized power is thus 
guaranteed legal continuity. Nationals of the recognized 
regime are accorded separate status and the protection of 
their governmental and diplomatic authorities. Property is 
also protected from claims by the unrecognized regime. 46 
44 Boris Meissner, Die Sowjetunion, die Baltischen 
Staaten und das Voelkerrecht (The Soviet Union, the Baltic 
States, and International Law) (Cologne: Verlag Politik und 
Wirtscahft, 1956), reviewed by Jonas Maziulis, Baltic 




46 Graham, p. 174. 
49-50. Also Lauterpacht, pp. 406, 
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In the North Sea Continental Shelf case, 47 the 
International Court of Justice formulated the conditions 
necessary to create a positive rule of customary 
international law: 
First, it must be ascertained whether there has 
been a constant and uniform usage. Such usage 
must include consistent repetition, a sufficient 
degree of generality and a certain lapse of time. 
Second, those states acting in accordance with the 
claimed precription must do so because they regard 
their adherence to it as being a legal duty 
incumbent upon them as members of the 
international community, that is, in conformity 
with the ancient Roman maxim "opinio iuris sive 
necessitatis." ... 8 
Nonrecognition of territorial acquisition through 
conquest has seen consistent repetition by states. This is 
visible, for example, in the postwar reconstitution of 
Albania, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, and Poland. The 
United Nations has also reacted negatively to postwar 
territorial occupations by Israel in 1967, by Morocco and 
Mauritania in the Western Sahara in 1975, by Indonesia in 
East Timar in 1976, by Vietnam in Cambodia in 1979, and by 
the USSR in Afghanistan that same year. Further, 
nonrecognition as a principle has been adopted by the Inter-
American Conference on Problems of War and Peace in its 
Declaration on Reciprocal Assistance and American Solidarity 
in 1945, by the Organization of American States and the 
... 
7 North Sea Continental Shelf (W.Ger. v. Den.; W.Ger. 
v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3 (Judgement of February 20) . 
... 
8 Hough, p. 449. 
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organization of African Unity in their charters, and by the 
UN General Assembly in 1970, acting upon a recommendation by 
the UN Special Committee on Principles of International Law 
concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation. 49 
To see if nonrecognition meets the requirement for a 
of generality, one can examine the sufficient degree 
practice of states and discover that the principle is 
universally applied. It is not limited to a specific group 
of states. The lapse of time can be seen in view of the 
fact that no major nation has yet recognized the legitimacy 
of the Soviet occupation of Lithuania since 1940. In 
addition, there are now about six other areas of controversy 
where the legality to territorial title has been denied for 
a decade or more.ao 
The World Court's second major point is that a rule 
must be considered legally incumbent, not merely politically 
expedient. Nonrecognition had, indeed, been mainly a 
political instrument through the Ethiopian and Manchurian 
controversies of this century. However, in view of the 
above discussion, especially when the policy has been 
applied for more than ten years, it is difficult to see it 
as politically expedient. In most cases, including that of 
the Baltic States, it would be politically more convenient 
Hough, pp. 449-450' 460' 465. 
ao Hough, pp. 466-467. 
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r ecognize the new status quo. 01 tO 
Thus, recent state practice, measured by the 
standards of the International Court of Justice, 
backed by the generally conforming practice of 
international organizations, expressed in 
conventional law such as the U.N. Charter, and 
supported by a considerable volume of national 
court decisions, would form a strong case for 
asserting the existence of a new customary rule in 
international law proscribing the forcible seizure 
of territory and requiring the nonrecognition of 
any claim to title based uniquely on such a tour 
de force. 02 
E. NONRECOGNITION AND LITHUANIA 
If indeed the events described in chapter two 
happened as they did, then the incorporation of Lithuania 
into the Soviet Union occured via facti, that is without any 
legal foundation whatsoever. Thus the incorporation is null 
and void (nul et non avenue). International law does not 
allow one state to eliminate the constitution and laws of 
another; the former cannot occupy the latter without freely 
given consent. 
It is of no consequence that the Soviets claim 
"historical importance" to the previous union of Lithuania 
to Russia. Further, the true national will and sovereign 
aspirations of the citizenry have been expressed in the 
emergency diplomatic powers conferred upon the Lithuanian 
ts 1 Hough, p. 467. 
"'
2 Hough, p. 468. See also Baltic Committee in 
Scandinavia, Memorandum Regarding the European Security and 
Cooperation Conference and the Baltic States (Stockholm: 
Bes, 1972). p. 4. 
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minister in Rome, Stasys Lozoraitis, shortly before the 
occupation, the president's exit from the country, the 1941 
revolt, the eight year postwar partisan movement, and 
Lithuanian diplomatic protests and activities to the present 
day. Meissner writes that the Soviet argument that Russia 
was too weak in 1920 not to recognize Lithuanian 
independence is fiction. Many times the Soviet Union 
expressis verbis (with clear words) stated its recognition. 
Even on 13 July 1940, before the formal incorporation, 
soviet President Kalinin greeted President Justas Paleckis. 
The illegal aggression cannot easily be hidden.as 
By way of nonrecognition, Lithuania has not 
disappeared in the juridical sense and has retained some 
vestige of international personality, subject to 
international rights and obligations. No international act, 
no formal treaty or agreement, and no peace or armistice has 
legally changed the status of independent Lithuania. 04 This 
has come about not merely because of the Lithuanian actions 
as Backis, pp. 119-120; Meissner, in Maziulis, pp. 77-
78; Hugo Vitols, "L'Annexion de la Lettonie par L'Union 
Sovietique et le Droit" ("The Annexation of Latvia by the 
Soviet Uniori and Law"), Baltic Review, 1, 4-5 (July-August 
1946), 199. See also Supreme Lithuanian Committee of 
Liberation, Memorandum on the Restoration of Lithuania's 
Independence (np: Lithuanian Executive Council, 1950), pp. 
58-82. 
04 Backis, p. 118; Meissner, in Maziulis, p. 309; Kazys 
Sidlauskas, "Supreme Committee for Liberation of Lithuania 
As Representative of Lithuanian National Interests," in 
Twenty Years' Struggle for Freedom of Lithuania, ed. Juozas 
Audenas (New York: ELTA, 1963), p. 97; von Glahn, p. 118. 
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cited above, but because of the attitude of the members of 
the world community: 
By its refusal to recognize the Soviet rule in 
Lithuania as legal, the family of Western nations 
has assumed quasi-judicial rights "as bearers of 
international functions." not only in the interest 
of Lithuania and their own political expediency 
but also in the interest of the international 
community as a whole and the law which regulates 
the intercourse among nations. The Western 
nations are thereby applying "a rule protecting 
the continual existence of states against illegal 
acts," thus "upholding the principle of the legal 
continuity of an illegally suppressed state even 
as a mere ideal notion" a practice which 
"acquires a wider meaning of action not only in 
defense of an individual state, but, indeed, of 
international law itself." 66 
However, in the final analysis, the arbitrary act of 
nonrecognition on the part of the international community is 
not sufficient to guarantee legal continuity. The legal 
principle that prevents the fruits of illegal acts to be 
legalized is really the foundation of nonrecognition and the 
continued existence of Lithuania. 66 
66 Martin Brakas, "Lithuania's International Status: 
Some Legal Aspects 2," Baltic Review, 38 (August 1971), 12. 
See also Hough, p. 481. Graham, p. 173, writes: 
A special situation arises when third parties, which 
have conformed their foreign policy to the relations 
established between two countries by treaty, are faced 
by a unilateral violation of such treaty by one of the 
contracting parties. The mere fact of such unilateral 
violation does not require the party to conform its 
policy to the accomplished fact. Such is believed to 
be the situation confronting the United States in the 
light of the violation of the fundamental treaties of 
peace between the [USSR] and the three Baltic States. 
66 Krystyna Marek, Identity and Continuity of States in 
Public International Law (Geneva: Librairie E. Droz, 1968), 
p. 414. 
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Finally, a number of commentators have pointed out 
that Lithuania, notwithstanding the formal annexation, is 
}egallY still under occupation by the Soviet Union's armed 
forces. The occupation, whether one considers it of the 
military or belligerent (enemy) variety, must be recognized 
as fact. The annexation, however, is null and void.n 7 No 
occupational authority possesses the legal competence to 
transfer sovereignty over the area in question. 
International law does not permit annexation, even where 
domination is effective, for effectiveness is a necessary, 
but not sufficient precondition for absorption; it requires 
finality: 
Of the three stages of the process of final 
conquest which are distinguished by international 
law -- namely, invasion, occupation, and transfer 
of sovereignty over occupied territory by a treaty 
n 7 Vytautas Vaitiekunas, Lithuania (New York: Assembly 
of Captive European Nations, 1965), pp. 19-21. Marek, p. 
398, writes that Lithuania, occupied before war touched her 
territory, is under a military, not belligerent, occupation. 
On the other hand, Brakas, p. 38, writes that "Lithuania was 
annexed during the war and on the basis of the events of the 
German-Russian war, the Hague Regulations apply." Brakas 
asserts that the Hague Convention V of 1907 regarding the 
Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in War on 
Land should be applied to Lithuania because she was a 
neutral, not an enemy, country before and during the German 
occupation~ The occupant's rights in such a case are not as 
great as they are when occupying enemy territory. Citizens 
and official organs abroad, as well as the state itself, are 
beyond the occupant's reach. The right of annexation is not 
acquired over neutral territory, only enemy territory, 
unless a treaty is duly executed. With the end of war comes 
the end of the occupant's rights and obligations. Though 
the status quo ante bellum should have been restored, the 
Soviets are still present in Lithuania. See Martin Brakas, 
"Lithuania's International Status: Some Legal Aspects 1,'' 
Baltic Review, 37 (October 1970), 48-54. 
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of cession concluded with the legitimate sovereign 
or by subjugation of an enemy state in war without 
such a treaty of cession Lithuania's present 
status still is in the stage of war occupation, no 
transfer of sovereignty having taken place by any 
legally valid means. 08 
In creating a quisling government, the Soviets were 
responsible for a misrepresentation of sovereignty 
(detournement de souverainete). The rights and obligations 
of that government do not extend beyond those enumerated for 
an occupant in the Hague Convention. The rights of an 
occupant certainly do not extend to a new oath of 
allegiance, the holding of elections, introduction of new 
criminal and civil law, expropriation of property, 
conscription, and deportation. Thus the 3 August 1940 
decision by the USSR Supreme Soviet transforming the 
occupation into an act of internal Soviet public law was an 
exercise in illegal annexation.~° Further, as Marek points 
out: 
for the continuity of a State, as for its birth, 
its reason of validity must be directly rooted in 
international law; it cannot be situated within 
the legal order of another State. Its basic norm 
cannot be the concretisation on a lower level of a 
08 Brakas, p. 14. Also Backis, p. 120; Conference of 
Free Byelorussians, Estonian World Council, Lithuanian World 
Community, World Congress of Free Ukrainians, World 
Federation of Free Latvians, To the United Nations General 
Assembly: A Resolution With Appended Documents Concerning 
the Decolonization of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (Toronto I New York: Joint Committee I Ucrainica 
Research Institute, 1978), p. 19. 
00 Meissner, in Maziulis, pp. 76-77; Konstantinas 
Rackauskas, "Power Politics vs. International Law," Baltic 
Review, 14 (1 August 1958), 72-73. 
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basic norm of that other State. 60 
In sum, then, the military occupation of Lithuania 
did not confer any title of territory to the Soviet Union 
and did not legally extinguish the independent government of 
the nation, despite the proclamation of annexation, which, 
itself, overstepped the authority of the occupant. 
sovereignty persists as long as it is evident that the 
occupation is challenged by those living under it. In turn, 
sovereignty can be effectively exercised as soon as the 
occupying forces are withdrawn from the country. 61 
60 Marek, p. 396. 
61 Sidlauskas, P,· 96; Vitals, pp. 202-203. Marek, p. 
416 writes that should: 
effective restoration take place within a reasonable 
time, this would not mean the creation of new states; 
on the contrary, it would mean the restoration of the 
old, pre-annexation States which would have survived 
the illegal acts committed against them, with their 
full international standing -- rights and obligations-
- unimpaired. 
Now, of course, almost a half century after the occupation, 
it would be impossible to actually restore the independent 
state of Lithuania as it existed before World War II, with 
authority flowing back from the Lithuanian Diplomatic 
Service to a newly reconstituted government. Regardless of 
nationalist aspirations toward independence, a whole new 
state would be created, possessing a socio-economic 
orientation different from its predecessor. It is doubtful 
that the current head of the diplomatic service in exile, 
whose authority ultimately stems from a May 1940 
presidential order, would be obeyed by officials in 
Lithuania. Most likely, he, along with Lithuanian 
diplomatic and consular personnel, would submit to the 
direction of Lithuanian officials. 
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F. SOVIET PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 
While the principle of nonrecognition helps 
determine the legal view toward the situation in occupied 
Lithuania, the Soviets have not always interpreted 
international law in the same manner, especially when 
dealing with its own foreign and military actions. It 
should thus not be surprising that the USSR disagrees with 
the current US policy toward Lithuania. 
Formally, of course, when examining the ideological 
roots of the Soviet regime, one finds a benign 
interpretation of foreign relations. On 14 June 1902, 
Lenin's program for the Russian Social Democratic Party 
appeared in Iskra. Among other planks in the platform, 
Lenin wrote of "the acknowledgement of the right to self-
determination for all nations entering into the composition 
of the state. 1162 By self-determination, he meant a separate 
political existence. Fourteen years later, in 1916, Lenin 
wrote that "a victorious proletariat cannot impose happiness 
on any nation whatever without thereby undermining its own 
victory. " 63 
Appropriate for this study is a quote from Lenin 
wherein he specifically mentioned annexation and 
incorporation: 
62 Albert N. Tarulis, 
States 1918-1940 (Notre 
Press, 1959), p. 5. 
63 Tarulis, p. 7. 
Soviet Policy Toward the Baltic 
Dame: University of Notre Dame 
65 
If a small or weak nation is not accorded the 
right to decide the form of its political 
existence by a free vote implying the complete 
withdrawal of the troops of the incorporating or 
merely strong nation -- then the incorporation is 
an annexation, i.e. an arbitrary appropriation of 
a foreign country, an act of violence. 64 
Even following the Russian Revolution, L. Kamenev, one of 
the founders of the Soviet state, wrote in Izvestiia on 24 
January 1918 that "Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and the 
Ukraine answered this definition [of illegal annexation] 
perfectly; these territories were forcibly annexed and 
forcibly detained by Tsarist Russia." 60 
One of the most famous of Lenin's pronouncements is 
his Decree on Peace issued 8 November 1917, which echoed 
previous utterances: 
By annexation or seizure of foreign territory the 
government understands, in accordance with the 
sense of justice of democracy in general, and of 
the laboring classes in particular, the 
incorporation into a large or powerful state of a 
small or weak nationality, without the definitely, 
clearly, and voluntarily expressed consent and 
desire of this nationality 
If any nation whatsoever is retained as part of 
64 Kaarel R. Pusta, "The Problem of the Baltic States," 
Baltic Review, 1, 2-3 (March 1946), 111. 
60 Tar1.ilis, p. 8. Tarulis, p. 6, writes: 
Evidently Stalin, too, was a "chauvinist," since Lenin 
accused Stalin of a spiteful attitude toward "social 
nationalism" and laid squarely in his lap the blame for 
harsh measures against nationalism in Georgia in 1922. 
Lenin called it a "truly Great Russian nationalist 
campaign." Finally, he undoubtedly referred to Stalin 
when he spoke of "brutal Great Russian Derzhimordas" 
and Russified non-Russians who like to exaggerate when 
it comes to 100% Russian attitude. In general, 
Lenin was strongly critical of hypocrisy in the matter 
of national self-determination. 
66 
a given state by force, if despite its expressed 
desire whether expressed in the press, in 
popular assemblies, in the decisions of the 
political parties, or by rebellions and 
insurrections against national oppression -- it 
has not the right of choosing freely -- the troops 
of the annexing or, generally, the more powerful 
nation being completely withdrawn and without any 
pressure being brought to bear the 
constitutional forms of its national existence, 
then its incorporation is an annexation, that is, 
seizure and coercion. 66 
one week later, on 15 November, Lenin as chairman of the 
council of Commisars and Stalin as commisar for 
nationalities issued a Declaration on the Rights of 
Nationalities, which recognized equality, sovereignty. and 
the right of self-determination, secession, and possession 
of separate statehood by national minorities. 67 
Even during the heat of the Second World War, after 
the Nazis had forced the Soviets to retreat from Lithuania, 
Moscow criticized Hitler for dictating the terms of the 
treaty transferring Klaipeda to Germany in March 1939 under 




during the last years of their existence the 
Governments of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia 
showed by all their behaviour that they were 
prepared to aid Hitler in every way, and to make 
it easy for him to seize the Baltic States. 
Although the separation of the Baltic States from 
Russia [following World War I] had resulted in 
Tarulis, p. 11. 
Trimakas, p. 39. See also Kazimierz Grzybowski, 
Soviet Public International Law: Doctrines and Diplomatic 
Practice (Leyden, The Netherlands: A.W. Sijthoff, 1970), pp. 
130-131. 
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considerable political, economic and strategic 
inconveniences, the Soviet Government had loyally 
recognised and given juridical sanction to this 
separation with equal loyalty and respected the 
independence and the integrity of these States. 68 
Finally, Article Seventy of the Soviet Constitution 
states that "the [USSR] is an integral, federal, 
multinational state formed on the principle of socialist 
federalism as a result of the free self-determination of 
nations and the voluntary association of equal Soviet 
socialist Republics." Article Seventy Two guarantees that 
"each Union Republic shall retain the right freely to secede 
from the USSR." 69 
Notwithstanding the expressed Soviet attitudes 
above, there is another side to the ideological foundation 
of Soviet foreign policy. Going back to Lenin's work at the 
turn of this century, one can see qualifications to a policy 
of national self-determination. In Iskra in 1903, Lenin 
60 Soviet Information Bureau, The Soviet Union, Finland 
and the Baltic States (np: Soviet War News, 1941), pp. 1, 3, 
5. The 2 August 1940 issue of Pravda reproduced an address 
by People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov before the 
Seventh Session of the Supreme Soviet the previous day. He 
said that Russia acted under duress in 1920 when signing the 
Baltic peace treaties. Russia was militarily weak and the 
Western imp~rialists had separated the Baltic States from 
their homeiand. 
69 Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, adopted at the Seventh (Special) 
Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Ninth 
Convocation, on October 7, 1977 (Moscow: Novosti, 1977). 
See also Jaan Pennar, "Reflections on Union Republics in the 
New Soviet Constitution With Special Reference to Their 
Sovereignty and National Language," Lituanus, 25, 1 (Spring 
1979), 15. 
68 
wrote that "unconditional acknowledgement of the struggle 
for the freedom of the right to national self-determination 
does not obligate [the Social Democrats] to support all 
demands for it . . A Marxist cannot acknowledge the demand 
for national independence unconditionally." 70 New "class" 
states were to be created as sparingly as possible. Indeed, 
Lenin spoke out against secession and nationalism, because 
class conscious workers would not desire it. Lenin 
suggested a "voluntary union" during World War I. 71 
Finally, after the Bolsheviks had been in power for about 
one year, Izvestiia published a rather menacing statement on 
25 December 1918: "Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are 
directly on the road from Russia to Western Europe and are, 
therefore, a hindrance to our revolution [T]his 
separating wall has to be destroyed." 72 
70 
Soviet official, Victor P. Karpov, has written: 
From its very inception the Soviet state 
proclaimed peaceful coexistence as the basic 
principle of its foreign policy. The 
policy is not a tactical move on the part of the 
Soviet Union. Our desire for peace and peaceful 
coexistence springs from the very nature of our 
socialist society in which there are no social 
groups interested in profiting by means of war or 
by the arms race. 73 
Tarulis, p. 21. 
71 Tarulis, p. 22. 
72 Tarulis, p. vii. 
73 Victor P. Karpov, "The Soviet Concept of Peaceful 
Coexistence and Its Implications for International Law," in 
The Soviet Impact on International Law, ed. Hans W. Baade 
69 
However. Lerner writes that the Soviet Union did not 
willingly give birth to the policy of peaceful coexistence. 
In April 1920, Poland invaded the Ukraine at a time when the 
soviets wished to install their own government in Poland. 
The Russians drove the Poles back, crossed into Polish 
territory, and installed its own regime in Bialystok. In 
August, the Red Army was in sight of Warsaw when Marshal 
pilsudski drove it back to White Russia. The following 
month saw an armistice agreement, which led to the Treaty of 
Riga the next year. It was this failure which brought about 
the idea of peaceful coexistence. Further, Lipson adds that 
peaceful coexistence is not tantamount to pacifism. Wars of 
national liberation, revolutionary civil war, and wars 
against counter-revolution are still permitted. 74 
Five years prior to the occupation, Moscow 
(Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana, 1965), p. 14. Karpov was first 
secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Washington at the time he 
wrote those words. 
74 Warren Lerner, "The Historical Origins of the Soviet 
Doctrine of Peaceful Coexistence," in Baade, pp. 23-24; 
Leon Lipson, "Peaceful Coexistence," in Baade, p. 31. 
Lipson, p. 28, writes: 
Western scholars have recalled that it was Chicherin, 
the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, who 
referred to the peace treaty with Estonia in 1920 as 
the first experiment in peaceful coexistence with 
bourgeoise states. Twenty years later, the bourgeois 
state of Estonia having been rescued by Soviet forces, 
it became unnecessary to coexist with her except in the 
sense that the robin in Don Marquis' poem coexisted 
with the worm it had swallowed. The first experiment 
in peaceful coexistence had been unilaterally 
successful. 
70 
approached Berlin with a proposal to create a joint tutelage 
Finland and the Baltic States. Hitler's government 
rejected this overture and informed the governments in 
question. By the time of the occupation, the Baltic States, 
according to the Kremlin's public perception, were preparing 
to act in concert against the USSR. Thus Moscow was 
compelled to demand the formation of governments willing to 
carry out the provisions of the Baltic mutual assistance 
pacts, and able to appeal to the people and hold 
"democratic" elections. Following World War I I , the 
imperialist countries' "special services" helped activate 
anti-Soviet elements in Lithuania who were supported by 
"remnants'' of the bourgeoise Lithuanian diplomatic service, 
maintained by policies of nonrecognition. 7 ~ 
7 ~ Antanas Barkauskas, Manoji respublika (My republic) 
(Vilnius: Mintis, 1980), p. 63; Alfred Bilmanis, A History 
of Latvia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951), p. 
385; Soviet Information Bureau, p. 4. V. Stanley Vardys, 
"The Baltic Peoples," Problems of Communism, 16, 5 
(September-October 1967), 61, writes: 
In the USSR, historiography fulfills primarily 
political purposes. Present interpretations of Baltic 
history, for instance, rest on two simple propositions: 
first, that Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia "joined" the 
Soviet Union voluntarily (in Premier Kosygin's words, 
as "a natural result of historic development"); and 
second, that these countries have no other logical 
political alternative but to remain within the borders 
of the USSR. Since the period of Baltic independence 
has shown the viability of another alternative, Soviet 
leaders and historians have bent every effort to prove 
that this independence was bogus, imposed from abroad, 
and furthermore, that the Baltic people never desired 
it in the first place." 
For accounts in this vein, see K. Domasevicius, Tarybinio 
y_alstybingumo vystymasis Lietuvoje (The Development of the 
Soviet State in Lithuania) (Vilnius: Mintis, 1966), pp. 57-
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During his October Revolution anniversary speech in 
1949, soviet Premier Georgii Malenkov declared: "Never in 
our history have the borders of our Motherland been so well 
and correctly laid down," and went on to describe the 
expanse from East Prussia in the West to the Kurile and 
Sakhalin Islands in the Far East. 76 At a conference in 
Kuala Lampur in the spring of 1958, Australia's foreign 
minister, Richard Casey, overheard a Soviet delegate state 
that "an elephant cannot pay attention to the barking of a 
dog. 1177 
Soviet scholars defend the actions of the USSR 
before and during World War II, including the collaborations 
with Hitler and, later, the Allies. The Baltic annexations 
are also justified as having advanced the cause of peace and 
the cultural interests of the people involved. The Baltic 
99; K. Kalni uviene and D. Melyniene, eds., Uz atei ti 
sviesia: ls atsiminimu I 1918-1940 (For a Brighter Future: 
Reminiscences I 1918-1940) (Vilnius: Mintis, 1980), pp. 
190-207; Vytautas Kancevicius, "Lietuvos istojimas i Tarybu 
Sajunga" ("Lithuania's Entry Into the Soviet Union"), 
Lietuvos istorijos metrastis 1972 (Yearbook of Lithuanian 
History 1972) (Vilnius: Mintis, 1973), 119-128; J. 
Macijauskas, Saule leidzias, saule teka: Atsiminimai (The 
Sun Sets, The Sun Rises: Reminiscences) (Vilnius: State 
Literary Press, 1961), pp. 124 ff.; J. Ziugzda, ed., 
Lietuvos T~R istorija nuo seniausiu laiku iki 1957 metu 
(History of the Lithuanian SSR From Ancient Times to 1957) 
(Vilnius: State Political and Scientific Press, 1958), pp. 
393-398; Ziugzda, ed., Lietuvos TSR istorija III: 1917-1940 
(History of the Lithuanian SSR III: 1917-1940) (Vilnius: 
Mintis, 1965), pp. 338-361. 
76 Backis, p. 121. 
77 Backis, p. 118. 
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proletariat had unsuccessfully struggled against the 
domestic bourgeoise and the foreign imperialists who 
employed terrorism and armed force. The occupation helped 
bring about a proletarian revolution, whose will was 
expressed during the elections of July 1940. The dates of 
these elections are considered the official beginnings of 
the Soviet system in the Baltic. 76 
F.l. Kozhevnikov remarks that the Soviet annexations 
were different from imperialist annexations: 
Thus, 
Joining territory to the Soviet Union in 
application of socialist principles, i.e., in the 
interest and with the consent of the working 
masses of these territories, is a totally legal, 
perfectly natural process, as it assures the 
population of these territories a quick economic 
development, a full growth of natural culture, and 
increases their security, contributing at the same 
time to the increase of power of the great Soviet 
Union, and thus is in the interest of the working 
masses of the entire world. [A] territorial 
question -- in view of the security of the USSR--
may be resolved by resorting to a just war, which 
is regarded as a utilization of self-defense for 
the socialist state. We must stress, however, 
that the annexation of territory into the Soviet 
Union, even in [the] case [of Finland], had 
nothing in common with the acquisition of a 
foreign territory. 79 
for example, despite the principle of peaceful 
coexistence, Soviet practice allows the use of superior 
force to coerce a state to accept the terms of a treaty. 
The 1940 ultimatum stated that the 1939 mutual assistance 
76 Grzybowski, p. 42; Lothar Schultz, "The Soviet 
Concept of the Occupation and Incorporation of the Baltic 
States," Baltic Review, 10 (29 March 1957), 8-9. 
79 Quoted in Grzybowski, p. 37. Vitas' emphasis. 
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pact had been violated; therefore, Soviet demands were 
legitimate.so 
During the period of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, 
Kozhevnikov stated that international law was the result of 
the bourgeoise victory over the feudal order. It was 
progressive to the extent that it declared principles of 





financial interests had 
creation of spheres of 
influence, and the division of markets and raw materials. 
This resulted in competition and conflict, while 
international law attempted to stabilize and legalize 
capitalist victories. World War I was the first imperialist 
war. The subsequent peace treaties, along with the 
Washington Naval Treaty, the Covenant of the League of 
Nations, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact, legitimized the 
victories, and utilized capitalist pacifism to protect gains 
and possessions. 
It was at this time that Soviet foreign policy 
sought to avoid entanglements which would lead to war. By 
freeing the USSR from the Anglo-French bloc, the Molotov-
Ribbentrop pact had been an act of peace. 
peace was not equivalent to the status 
ao Grzybowski, p. 449. 
This policy of 
quo oriented 
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bourgeoise pacifism. 81 
Though Soviet scholars find fault with capitalist 
treaties, such pacts -- bilateral and multilateral -- form 
the foundation of relations with other governments and are 
subject to unconditional observance (pacta sunt servanda). 
However, if treaties are unequal, non-observance is allowed, 
as when the Bolsheviks repudiated the Czarist debt. As far 
as Soviet international law is concerned, an unequal treaty 
includes the exercise of power on another's territory in the 
form of military bases, collective security agreements 
between capitalist states, and unfair economic 
arrangements. 82 
As applied to the Baltic States, 
it was not the nature of isolated actions but the 
final goal that provided a dialectical 
justification for Soviet policies. Although the 
Kellogg-Briand Pact was classified by learned 
Soviet professors as bourgeois pacifism, the 
Soviet pacts of nonaggression and repudiation of 
war were evidence of the peaceful policy of the 
Soviet Union. Only in the hands of the socialist 
81 Grzybowski, pp. 11-12. Communist commentators write 
that socialist internationalism is compatible with state 
sovereignty. Concomitantly, the interests of individual 
states are subordinated to those of the socialist system. 
This system allows a larger economic organism, mutual 
assistance~ a more efficient division of labor, and improved 
economic planning. While capitalist sovereignty is 
divisive, socialism is unifying. See Grzybowski, p. 38. 
82 Wolfgand Friedmann, The Changing Structure of 
International Law (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1966), pp. 333-335; Grzybowski, p. 41. See also G.I. 
Tunkin, Theory of International Law, trans. William E. 




In other words, as 
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nonaggression pacts the tools of 
far as Soviet inperpretations are 
concerned, the actions of the summer of 1940 were both 
necessary and legal. They were to the benefit of all 
parties concerned. Non-Soviet law, which views the 
circumstances differently and states that the application of 
the Stimson Doctrine of nonrecognition in the case of 
Lithuania was appropriate, is itself illegitimate. 
This chapter has attempted to lay the legal 
foundation for the rest of the study, taking into account 
the principles of self-determination, recognition, 
nonrecognition, and their implications for the Lithuanian 
situation. As Soviet scholars and officials have 
demonstrated, international law, whether customary or 
statutory, is not carved in stone but is interpreted 
individually by each national capital. Washington's 
interpretation of the Soviet occupation of Lithuania is the 
subject of the following chapter. 
as Grzybowski, p. 12. 
CHAPTER IV 
GENESIS OF THE U.S. NONRECOGNITION POLICY 
A. LITHUANIAN-AMERICAN ACTIONS 
From the inception of an independent state of 
Lithuania. Lithuanian-Americans had come to the country's 
aid. The years 1918-1922 were crucial in Lithuania's 
development. Having declared its independence from the 
Russian empire, it was still forced to fight the Germans, 
Poles, and Bolsheviks in order to assure that the 
declaration of 16 February 1918 would not be hollow. 
Lithuania naturally sought support from Britain, France, and 
the United States. Over one million signatures requesting 
de jure recognition of Lithuania by the US were presented to 
President Warren G. Harding during a campaign by Lithuanians 
aimed at the US government. Their goal would become a 
reality in 1922. 1 
1 Constantine R. Jurgela, Lithuania and the United 
States: The Establishment of State Relations (Chicago: 
Lithuanian Research and Studies Center, 1985), pp. 184-198; 
Antanas Kucas, Amerikos lietuviu istorija (American 
Lithuanian History) (South Boston: Lithuanian Encyclopedia 
Press, 1971), pp. 354-388. During the recognition campaign, 
the Lithuanian Information Bureau published a book to 
publicize the Lithuanian cause. It contained statements by 
76 
77 
During the period of independence, Lithuanian-
A Ille r icans remained active. Lithuanian lawyers, bankers, and 
organizers were politically prominent in both major parties. 
Further, Lithuanian journalists were adept at using the non-
Lithuanian media to publizice their causes. As David Truman 
writes: 
A primary concern of all organized political 
interest groups in the United States is the 
character of the opinions existing in the 
community. Group leaders, whatever else they may 
neglect, cannot afford to be ignorant of widely 
held attitudes bearing upon the standing and 
objectives of their organizations. Estimating the 
direction and incidence of public opinions, 
moreover, goes hand in hand with more or less 
continuing efforts to guide and control them. In 
fact, almost invariably one of the first results 
attorney William G. McAdoo, writer Dr. Herbert Adams 
Gibbons, and New York City Congressman Walter M. Chandler. 
See Lithuanian Recognition (Washington: Lithuanian 
I n f o rm a t i o n Bu r e au , c . 1 9 2 1 ) . F o. r a n a c c o u n t o f L i t h u a n i an -
American activities before and during Lithuania's wars of 
independence, see Vincentas Liulevicius, Iseivijos vaidmuo 
nepriklausomos Lietuvos atkurimo darbe (The Emigrants' Role 
in the Reconstitution of Independent Lithuania) (Chicago: 
Lithuanian World Community, 1981); Albert N. Tarulis, 
American-Baltic Relations 1918-1922: The Struggle Over 
Reco~nition (Washington: Catholic University of America 
Press, 1965). 
In his "Postscript on U.S. Recognition of the 
Baltic States in 1922," Lituanus, 12, 1 (Spring 1966), 91, 
Malbone W. Graham recounts the following incident: 
President Harding called Secretary of State 
Charles Evans Hughes on the phone. He had 
discovered apparently for the first time that 
Lithuania was not recognized by the United States. 
"Don't we recognize Lithuania?" the President 
asked the Secretary of State. 
"No", said Hughes. 
"Well, why in the Hell don't we?" the President 
queried. 
Hughes was stumped for an adequate reply. To 
cut short the conversation Harding said, "We'll go 
ahead and recognize them then." 
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of the formal organization of an interest group is 
its embarking upon a program of propaganda, though 
rarely so labeled, designed to affect opinions 
concerning the interests and claims of the new 
group. 2 
If this sort of work had been important during the interwar 
period, it became critical beginning with the events of 
1940. 3 Of prime importance at this time was the 
establishment of the Lithuanian American Council. 4 
On 15 June 1940, the same day the Soviet Union 
occupied Lithuania, community leader Leonardas Simutis 
convened a meeting of Chicago's Lithuanian activists to 
discuss what measures should be taken. The first meeting 
took place in the Plaisance Hotel, where the participants 
formed a committee to file a protest with Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull, and to request that the United States take 
steps to require the occupant to evacuate Lithuania. 
The special committee, consisting of Dr. Antanas 
2 David B. Truman, The Governmental Process: Political 
Interests and Public Opinion, 2nd ed. (New York: Knopf, 
1971), p. 213. See also Vytautas Alantas, ed., Antanas 
Vanagaitis) (Sodus, MI: J.J. Baciunas, 1954); Leo J. 
Alilunas, ed., Lithuanians in the United States: Selected 
Studies (San Francisco: R & E Research Associates, 1978), 
pp. 148-164; J.J. Bachunas, Antanas Olis (Sodus, MI: Author, 
1953); David Fainhauz, Lithuanians in Multi-Ethnic Chicago 
Until World War II (Chicago: Lithuanian Library Press I 
Loyola University Press, 1977), pp. 77-90. 
3 For a short summary of Lithuanian-American action at 
that time, see Kucas, pp. 276-277. 
4 The following passage is taken from Leonardas 
Simutis, Amerikos Lietuviu Taryba: 30 metu Lietuvos laisves 
kovoje 1940-1970 (Lithuanian American Council: 30 Year 
Struggle for the Liberation of Lithuania 1940-1970) 
(Chicago: LAC, 1971), pp. 16-25, 458. 
79 
Rakauskas, attorney Kazys Cesnulis, Dr. Stasys Biezis, and 
simutis, dispatched a telegram to Secretary Hull, with a 
coPY forwarded to the Lithuanian minister in Washington, 
povilas Zadeikis. 
June. The 21st 
actions. 
The idea 
Other consultations took place on 16-18 
saw a public rally protesting the Soviet 
to form a unitary Lithuanian-American 
organization for the purpose of liberating Lithuania was 
raised by Simutis during a conference of Lithuanian leaders 
at the editorial offices of the daily Draugas newspaper. 
This meeting was attended by Dr. Antanas Rakauskas, the 







Dr. Jonas Navickas, MIC, the 
Marian Fathers, Frank Mast 
(Mastauskas), an attorney, Rev. Dr. Kaz imieras Reklai tis, 
and Rev. Dr. Juozas Vaskas. The idea was received with 
uncertainty, thinking that such a unitary organization, 
because of political differences, could be formed only with 
great difficulty. 
On 25-27 June, 
board of directors of 
in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, the 
the Lithuanian Roman Catholic 
Association of America (LRCAA) met. Simutis raised the idea 
of an umbrella group. Since he was the president of the 
LRCAA, as well as the executive secretary of the ALRCF, he 
recommended that the officers of the ALRCF be invited to the 
LRCAA meeting. This was approved and the ALRCF vice 
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president, Juozas B. Laucka, 
organizational step in the 
arrived. This was the first 
formation of the Lithuanian 
American Council. Some were of the opinion that the new 
organization should be made up solely of Catholic leaders; 
others fought to include all factions. 
The latter proposal won out, negotiations took 
place, and a delegation consisting of Simutis, Laucka, and 
Rakauskas was appointed to meet with Minister Zadeikis in 
Washington. Zadeikis agreed to the consultation, which 
occured at the Lithuanian Legation on 29 June, lasting all 
day. At first, it appeared that Zadeikis was hesitant to 
speak out against the government of Justas Paleckis, not yet 
being certain as to what exactly was transpiring in 
Lithuania. The delegation stated that it would vigorously 
oppose the occupation, and would protest against Lithuanian 
diplomatic and consular personnel who would not break ties 
with the new government. It was noted that the legation had 
assisted the Paleckis regime in relaying communiques to the 
Lithuanian-American media. The consultation ended with a 
consensus that the Soviet regime in Lithuania would be 
opposed. Minister Zadeikis gave his blessing to the 
formation of a unitary Lithuanian American Council. 
A general meeting of Lithuanian-American groups met 
at Pittsburgh on 9-10 August. The provisional by-laws of 
the Lithuanian American Council and the Lithuanian Rescue 
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Board (Lietuvos Gelbejimo Taryba) were approved. 0 
An idea to send a delegation to President Franklin 
o. Roosevelt germinated. A telegram was dispatched to US 
Representative A. Sabath, a Roosevelt supporter, raising the 
idea. A letter to that effect was sent to Minister 
zadeikis. Both responded that the president was too 
occupied to receive a delegation. Assistance was then 
rendered by Viktoras Solis (Sholis), a journalist and 
assistant to Secretary of Commerce Harry Hopkins. Solis 
made the necessary arrangements, and President Roosevelt 
received the delegation on 15 October 1940. It presented 
the following memorandum: 
The delegation before you, Mr. President, 
represents most of the Lithuanian people of the 
United States; it is here to encourage you in the 
0 Of course, Lithuanian-American communists viewed the 
situation differently. They produced books and articles 
supporting Soviet actions in Lithuania and condemning 
Lithuanian-American "anti-communists" who "falsified and 
slandered the activity of progressive, revolutionary current 
and its communist leaders." See Leokadija Petkeviciene, 
Didvyriskos kovos avangarde: JAV lietuviu komunistu veikla 
1919-1969 metais (In the Vanguard of a Noble Struggle: 
Lithuanian-American Communist Activity 1919-1969) (Vilnius: 
Mintis, 1979), p. 24. See also Antanas Bimba, Naujoji 
Lietuva faktu ir dokumentu sviesoje (New Lithuania in Light 
of Facts and Documents) (Chicago: Lietuvos draugu komitetas 
I Friends of Lithuania Committee, 1940); Bimba, Prisikelusi 
Lietuva: Tarybu Lietuvos liaudies ir vyriausybes zygiai 
ekonominiam ir kulturiniam salies gyvenimui atstatyti (Risen 
Lithuania: Steps Taken by the Masses and Leadership of 
Soviet Lithuania to Restore Economic and Cultural Life) (New 
York: American-Lithuanian Workers' Literary Society, 1946); 
Rojus Mizara, Zvilgsnis i praeiti (Glance at the Past) 
(Vilnius: State Literary Press, 1960), pp. 288-290; 
Petkeviciene, pp. 143 ff.; L. Pruseika, Teisybe apie Lietuva 
(The Truth About Lithuania) (Chicago: Apsvietos fondas I 
Education Fund, 1940). 
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task of bringing reason and law to reign again in 
a distracted world. With the world aflame, with 
ruthless might attempting to conquer the [E]arth, 
the Lithuanian people were moved to great depths 
of sorrow when their native land and land of their 
forbears lost her freedom. When Lithuania fell, 
it seemed that the nations of the [E]arth, 
particularly those who had recognized her as 
independent, were disinterested, none condemned 
the act of extirpation which to the Lithuanians of 
America seemed so needful of condemnation. Then, 
on the twenty-third day of July, 1940, your State 
Department, Mr. President, announced the [Welles 
declaration]. 6 • 
That was a clear, understandable, and 
unequivocal statement of policy. It was an act of 
condemnation of a wrong committed by a great power 
against a weak nation. At last the clamor of 
destruction was overcome by the call to reason and 
justice, and our people were glad that voice came 
from the greatest liberty-loving nation on the 
[E]arth -- the United States of America. We are 
proud that our [US] stands firmly behind a policy 
that knows no compromise with aggression. Your 
courageous stand, Mr. President, on the side of 
justice, law and reason enkindled the flame of 
hope -- a hope that Lithuania may again take her 
place amongst the nations of the [E)arth. 7 
Roosevelt responded that Lithuania had not lost her 
independence, but that it had merely been suspended: 
The address mentioned that Lithuania had lost its 
independence. That is a mistake. The 
independence of Lithuania is not lost but only put 
temporarily aside. The time will come when 
Lithuania will be free again. This may happen 
sooner than you may expect. 8 It was a mistake on 
behalf of one of the speakers to say that 
Lithuania is a small country. In Latin America 
there are states even smaller than Lithuania, but 
they live a free and happy life. 
Even the smallest nation has the same right to 
6 See below for details of the Welles statement. 
7 Simutis, p. 458. See also p. 24. 
8 History would prove Roosevelt wrong. 
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enjoy independence as the largest one. 9 
Though Roosevelt was speaking in October, the policy of the 
us toward the Soviet occupation had been decided in July. A 
central figure in this episode was Loy Wesley Henderson, a 
career diplomat who prodded the US government into taking a 
firm stand with regard to the Lithuanian situation. 
B. THE HENDERSON MEMORANDUM 
Prior to entering into a discussion of events 
surrounding the memorandum itself, it is useful to look at 
Henderson's biography to see why he would be motivated to 
come to Lithuania's aid. 
Loy Wesley Henderson was born a twin to a Colorado 
Methodist minister and his wife in 1892. He grew up in 
Montana and Arizona, in addition to his native state. He 
graduated Northwestern University and the University of 
Denver Law School. Because of an injured hand, he was not 
accepted for military service during World War I, and thus 
joined the American Red Cross in October 1918, in which he 
assisted prisoners of war in France, Russia, Germany and the 
Baltic States. In 1919 and 1920 he served at the American 
mission to the Baltic States in Riga, Latvia, where he 
9 Simutis, p. 458. See also Algirdas M. Budreckis, 
ed., The Lithuanians in America 1651-1975: A Chronology and 
Fact Book (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana, 1976), pp. 109-110; E.J. 
Harrison, Lithuania's Fight for Freedom, 3rd ed. (New York: 
Lithuanian American Information Center, 1948), p. 28; 
Simutis, p. 25. 
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married a Latvian woman, Eliza Marija Heinrichson. 
Henderson completed the requirements for entering 
the us consular service in 
Ireland as a vice consul. 
1922, when 
In 1925 he 
he 
was 
was posted to 
transferred to 
Washington to work in the State Department's Division of 
East European Affairs. In 1927 he returned to Riga to be a 
member of a group of diplomats which studied languages, 
observed the situation in the Soviet Union, prepared for the 
normalization of US relations with the USSR, and opened the 
us embassy in Moscow. From 1938 to 1942, Henderson was 
assistant chief of European Affairs in Washington. In 1942 
he served as inspector and charge d'affaires in Moscow. 
Henderson was appointed US minister to Bhagdad, Iraq 
in 1943. He was named chief for East Central Africa and 
South Asia in 1945. He served as ambassador to India and 
Nepal in 1948-1951, and to Iran in 1951-1954. Henderson 
represented the United States at the Suez Canal Conference 
of 1956, and at the Bhagdad Pact in 1955-1957 and 1959. 
Following thirty nine years of service to his 
country, which included participating in the unification of 
the US diplomatic and consular services, Henderson retired 
from the Foreign Service on 30 January 1961. From then 
until 1969 he taught international relations and diplomacy 
at the American University. 
It was Henderson who wrote the US statement of 
nonrecognition of the Soviet occupation of Lithuania, 
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received approval from President Roosevelt, and arranged for 
its release by Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles. 
Henderson also helped in the establishment of the Voice of 
America10 and urged Representative Charles Kersten to 
conduct an investigation into the occupation of the Baltic 
states. His sister-in-law, who was deported to Siberia by 
the soviets, testified at those hearings. Henderson was 
able to win her release while serving as ambassador in 
Teheran. 
Loy Wesley Henderson died in Washington on 24 March 
1986 at the age of ninety three. Several hundred 
dignitaries, including former president Richard Nixon, 
attended a memorial service for him in Washington on 3 May 
1986. Henderson's name is carved in the walls of the main 
hall at the US State Department, along with other 
distinguished Americans who served the US in a diplomatic 
capacity. 11 
Actions outside American control were certainly the 
10 In fact, when Henderson discovered that the VOA 
offices displayed a map which placed the Baltic States 
inside the Soviet Union, he severely reprimanded a State 
Department policy official. The map was quickly replaced. 
Constantine R. Jurgela, letter to the author, 22 May 1986. 
11 Constantine R. Jurgela, "Loy Wesley Henderson: 
Lietuvos, Latvijos ir Estijos gynejas" ("Loy Wesley 
Henderson: Defender of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia"), 
Draugas, 3 April 1986, p. 3; Pov. J. Labanauskas, "Sostine 
atsisveikino su Loy Wesley Hendersonu" ("The Capital Bids 
Farewell to Loy Wesley Henderson"), Draugas, 15 May 1986, p. 
5; "Mire pabaltieciu draugas" ("A Baltic Friend Has Died"), 
Draugas, 5 April 1986, p. 4. 
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aggression upon their neighbors[?) 13 
Not being one to ignore practical consequences, Henderson 
added: 
It seems likely that the assets of all three 
countries in the United States will not amount to 
much more than 12 or 13 million dollars. In this 
connection it will be observed that if the three 
countries in question are absorbed into the Soviet 
Union, the United States will probably not receive 
one cent of the several million dollars which the 
governments of these three countries owe us. 
Furthermore, American interests in those three 
countries will probably be a total loss. 14 
Henderson concluded the memorandum by urging the US to move 
swiftly in this regard, before the Soviets gained possession 
of the Baltic funds. He added that the US Maritime 
commission should look into the matter of Baltic vessels in 
the same manner. 1 ~ 
Though it is uncertain whether any of Henderson's 
actions prior to writing the memorandum had any influence 
upon the matter, the US Treasury Department decided that the 
13 US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1940, vol. I, General 
(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 390. 
14 US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1940, I, General, pp. 390-391. A note by 
Dunn at the beginning of the document states: "I feel funds 
of all 3 of these countries should be blocked on same basis 
as those of countries occupied by Germany." Seep. 389. 
1 ~ US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1940, I, General, p. 391. See also Algirdas 
Budreckis, "Liberation Attempts From Abroad," in Lithuania 
700 Years, 2nd rev. ed., ed. Albertas Gerutis (New York: 
Manyland, 1969), p. 384; Evald Roosaare, "Consular Relations 
Between the United States and the Baltic States," Baltic 
Review, 27 (June 1964), 24-25. 
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measures outlined by Henderson should be implemented. On 
the same day that Henderson dispatched his memorandum, 
president Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8484: 
By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 
5 (b) of the Act of October 6, 1917 (40 Stat. 
411), as amended, and by virtue of all other 
authority vested in me, I, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, 
PRESIDENT of the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, do 
hereby amend Executive Order No. 8389 of April 10, 
1940, as amended, 16 so as to extend all the 
provisions thereof to, and with respect to, 
property in which Latvia, Estonia or Lithuania or 
any national thereof has at any time on or since 
July 10, 1940, had any interest of any nature 
whatsoever, direct or indirect 17 
The actions of 15 July 1940, that is the Henderson 
memorandum and the Roosevelt order, were the first official 
responses to the occupation. In order for the 
nonrecognition policy to be fully framed, however, it was 
necessary for the United States to formally act on the 
diplomatic front. This task fell to Acting Secretary of 
State Sumner Welles who, in applying the Stimson Doctrine of 
nonrecognition to the European continent, in general, and to 
the Baltic States, in particular, forged a new trail in the 
US interpretation of international law. 
16 This order froze Norwegian and Danish assets 
following the German occupation of those countries. See US 
Office of the Federal Register, Code of Federal Regulations, 
Title 3 -- The President, 1938-1943 Compilation (Washington: 
US Government Printing Office, 1968), pp. 645-647. 
17 US Office of the Federal Register, Code of Federal 
Regulations, Title 3, 1938-1943, p. 687. In 1950, acting on 
the advice of the State Department, the Treasury Department 
modified its regulations implementing Executive Order 8484, 
so as to allow the Baltic funds to be invested in certain 
securities. 
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c. THE WELLES DECLARATION AND ITS AFTERMATH 
One week following Henderson's and Roosevelt's 
measures, on 23 July 1940, the US State Department announced 
to the global community the American policy regarding the 
occupation, which is reproduced in its entirety: 
During these past few days the devious processes 
whereunder the political independence and 
territorial integrity of the three Baltic 
Republics Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania--
were to be deliberately annihilated by one of 
their more powerful neighbors, have been drawing 
rapidly to their conclusion. 18 From the day when 
the peoples of these Republics first gained their 
independence and democratic form of government, 
the people of the United States have watched their 
admirable progress in self-government with deep 
and sympathetic interest. The policy of this 
Government is universally known. The people of 
the United States are opposed to predatory 
activities, no matter whether they are carried on 
by the use of force or by the threat of force. 
They are likewise opposed to any form of 
intervention on the part of one State, however 
powerful, in the domestic concerns of any other 
sovereign State, however weak. These principles 
constitute the very foundation upon which the 
existing relationship between the twenty-one 
sovereign republics of the New World rest. The 
United States will continue to stand by these 
principles, because of the conviction of the 
American people that unless the doctrine in which 
these principles are inherent once again governs 
the relations between nations, the rule of reason, 
of justice, and of law in other words, the 
basis of modern civilization itself -- cannot be 
preserved. 19 
Though seemingly vague and obfuscating, the 
18 Two days prior to the Welles declaration, the 
Lithuanian "People's Seimas'' had voted to enter the USSR. 
19 US Department of State, Department of State 
Bulletin, 3, 57 (27 July 1940), 48. 
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declaration is pregnant with meaning. Welles does not 
mention nonrecognition per se, but, in the context of the 
Baltic States, the phrase "doctrine in which these 
principles are inherent" refers to the Stimson Doctrine. 20 
BY making this statement, and backed by the actions of the 
Treasury Department, the United States came out foursqaure 
in favor of a nonrecognition policy aimed at Soviet actions 
in the Baltic States. The US did not consider the USSR to 
be a legitimate successor state in the area and, at least in 
Washington's eyes, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia maintained 
some vestige of international personality. 21 
Needless to say, the American actions brought a 
storm of protest from the Soviet Union and from the new 
Soviet regimes in the Baltic States. 22 On 27 July 1940, 
Welles met with Soviet ambassador Constantine A. Oumansky: 
The Ambassador went on to say that the action 
20 Robert Langer, Seizure of Territory: The Stimson 
Doctrine and Related Principles in Legal Theory and 
Diplomatic Practice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1947)' pp. 263-264. 
21 Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations: An 
Introduction to Public International Law, 4th ed. (New York: 
Macmillan, 1981), p. 118, cf. pp. 119-123. Shortly before 
Germany attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, President 
Roosevelt had a conversation with General Sikorski, the 
premier of the Polish government-in-exile. One year after 
the fact, Roosevelt still maintained his stance toward the 
Baltic: "As far as the United States is concerned, we stand 
by [the Welles declaration]. It is one of our basic 
Policies· not to recognize unilateral changes brought about 
by force or threat of force." See Jan Ciechanowski, Defeat 
l_n Victory (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1947), p. 20. 
22 Cf. Budreckis, pp. 384-385. 
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taken by the Soviet [sic] should have been 
applauded by the [US] since it had obliterated the 
growth of "fascism" in the three Baltic republics 
and had made it possible for the suffering peoples 
. to come under the sheltering protection of 
the Soviet Government as a result of which they 
would obtain the blessings of liberal and social 
government. 23 
Welles responded that he could not discuss the matter with 
the ambassador, because the US would stand by its stated 
policy. The ambassador stated that the US appeared to be 
viewing Soviet actions as being similar to German invasions 
in western European countries. Welles made it clear that 
the US "saw no difference in principle between the two 
cases." 24 
In addition to the continuity of Baltic 
diplomatic and consular functions in the US, the Soviets 
took particular umbrage at the freezing of assets. In a 
conference with Welles, Henderson, and Acting Chief of 
European Affairs Ray Atherton, Oumansky remarked that: 
So long as the [US] Government addressed 
communications to the Soviet Government of such a 
nature as that stick of dynamite on the subject of 
the frozen Baltic funds which had been given to 
him an improvement in the relations 
between the two countries would not be easy to 
achieve. He noticed in one of these 
communications such offensive expressions as 
23 US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
.!!._nited States, Diplomatic Papers 1940, vol. III (Washington: 
US Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 329. 
24 US Department of State, 
United States, 1940, Ill, p. 330. 
Foreign Relations of the 
f, 
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"duress", "force", etc. 2 ts 
The US charge d'affaires in Moscow, Thurston, in a 20 July 
conversation with Assistant Commisar for Foreign Affairs 
Lozovski received a strong protest against Executive Order 
8484. In defending Roosevelt's action, Thurston said that 
it was not illegal, as Lozovski had said. 26 The formal US 
reply to the Soviet protest included mention of US losses in 
soviet-controlled territories due to nationalization and 
confiscation. 27 
In addition to these protests, US diplomats in the 
Baltic also received expressions of disapproval from the new 
governments there. The evening before the Lithuanian 
People's Seimas met, US Minister Owen J.C. Norem was called 
to the foreign ministry in Kaunas to receive a protest which 
stated that responsibility for losses due to Executive Order 
8484 would fall to the US government. However, the 
representative of the ministry quietly added: "Please 
disregard all of our protests. We do not act independently 
anymore. We appreciate what Washington is doing more than 
20 US Department of State, 
United States, 1940, III, p. 379. 
Foreign Relations of the 
26 US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1940, I, General, p. 395. According to Edgar 
Anderson, Soviet Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs Andrei 
Vishinsky admitted on 14 September 1940 that the Soviet 
government possessed no legal claims to Baltic gold. See 
his "British Policy Toward the Baltic States, 1940-41," 
Journal of Baltic Studies, 11, 4 (Winter 1980), 330. 
27 US Department of State, 





we dare tell. People are listening and I cannot say any 
more. 
ll 28 
As the events of the Second World War and thereafter 
would demonstrate, it was not always practically possible or 
desirable to maintain an ironclad interpretation of the 
nonrecognition policy. Indeed before the year was out, 
there was already some questioning of the policy by senior 
officials in the context of Western war aims; one of them 
was Secretary of State Cordell Hull. In a conversation with 
the British ambassador and his counselor of embassy, Hull 
said: 
that if Russia should show a real disposition to 
move in our common direction with respect to the 
axis countries, then I would be disposed to deal 
with the Baltic assets and ships on a sort of quid 
pro quo basis rather than to adhere inflexibly to 
our non-recognition policy in this case. 29 
In other words, it was clear from its inception -- at least 
privately in government circles -- that the nonrecognition 
policy would never be allowed to harm American interests. 
20 US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1940, I, General, p. 397. The protest by the 
Estonian government contained some of the same passages as 
the one issued in Lithuania. See pp. 398-399. Following the 
freezing of the assets, there was some confusion among US 
diplomats in the Baltic regarding specifics of 
implementation of Executive Order 8484. See p. 395. 
For further discussion of this issue, see vol. I, 
PP. 430-431; vol. III, pp. 327, 331, 340, 348, 362, 371, 
388, 403, 413, 438. 
29 US Department 
United States, 1940, I, 
of State, Foreign Relations of the 
General, pp. 439-440. 
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D· THE UNITED STATES WITHDRAWS FROM THE BALTIC 
Already four days following the occupation, American 
diplomats in the Baltic were considering the future of the 
us presence in the Baltic. On 19 June 1940, John C. Wiley, 
the us minister in Riga, Latvia cabled Washington: 
It might be well for the [State] Department to 
foresee the possibility that the Soviet 
authorities might shortly assume charge of the 
diplomatic and consular representation of the 
Baltic States. [US missions] might have to 
be liquidated on fairly short notice unless the 
Embassy in Moscow could obtain a special 
dispensation for the maintenance of a Consulate. 30 
on 5 July, Wiley asked his superiors for instructions 
regarding the disposition of US property, codes, archives, 
and staff. 31 
Soviet intentions of a permanent presence soon 
became obvious. To avoid formal diplomatic gaffes, Wiley 
was instructed by Secretary Hull on 17 July to return to 
Washington for consultations, and to no longer meet with the 
authorities of the new government. In the meantime, US 
consular officers were to protect American interests and 
property. Wiley would soon depart; the minister in Kaunas, 
30 US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1940, I, General, p. 377. As will be seen, 
the idea that the US could maintain consulates in the Baltic 
was extensively discussed. There was no mention, however, 
that this would potentially undercut the nonrecognition 
Policy. 
31 US Department of State, Foreign Relations 
Qnited States, 1940, I, General, pp. 384-385. 
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Norem, would leave Lithuania on 30 July. 52 
Following the formal admission of the Baltic States 
into the USSR, US authorities there and in Moscow were 
informed that there were no more formal governmental 
relations between the Baltic States and other countries. 
consular exequaturs issued by the former governments were no 
longer valid, and foreign consuls were to liquidate their 
offices. The Soviet commissariat for foreign affairs would 
now assume control over Baltic missions whose property 
would be transferred to Soviet facilities -- and foreign 
affairs. The US was to liquidate its missions by 25 August. 
In all, the US was given about two weeks' notice to 
leave the area. Discussions continued among foreign 
diplomats with the hope that consulates might remain open, 
especially in Riga if the Latvian port were to be used in 
future foreign trade. The Soviets, though, would allow no 
consular representation. US officials complained that the 
Soviets were not cooperating in the procurement of adequate 
packing and transportation services. Customs duties would 
be waived only for those on the diplomatic list, and Baltic 
nationals who had worked for the American missions would not 
be allowed to leave. 
Three US officials were dispatched to the Baltic 
States to assist in the process of liquidation, hoping to 
32 Roosaare, p. 22; US Department 






meet the extended deadline of 5 September. This was not to 
be. however, and the Americans would only leave the area at 
the end of the month. Evidently, contrary to expressed 
soviet intentions, no duty was collected on the vans that 
were processed through customs. 33 
Thus ended the official US presence in the Baltic 
states. As far as the Soviets were concerned, this also 
closed a chapter of diplomacy. Lithuania, Latvia, and 
Estonia no longer existed, and they possessed no 
governmental ties to the outside world, except through the 
Soviet government. For the US, on the other hand, this was 
the beginning of a new chapter. There was no separate 
Lithuania, Latvia, or Estonia, and yet the United States 
33 US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1940, I, General, pp. 384-385, 409-410, 416-
426, 431-439. The State Department lists the official 
status of the missions as follows: 
Estonia Legation at Tallinn closed. 
Latvia Legation at Riga closed. 
Lithuania Legation at Kaunas closed. 
See US Department of State, "List of Foreign Service Posts," 
revised July 1970, pp. 1-2. 
In response to a query from President Roosevelt, 
Welles authored a memorandum on Soviet consulates in the US. 
The US possessed a consular section at the Moscow embassy, 
while the Soviets had such a section at their Washington 
embassy, in addition to consulates in New York, San 
Francisco, and Los Angeles. The principle of reciprocity 
would allow the US to close an appropriate number of Soviet 
consulates in response to the liquidation of US missions in 
the Baltic. Another alternative would be permission to open 
new US consulates in the USSR. Welles recommended, however, 
that the US take no action against the Soviet consulates. 
He felt that this would neither help Baltic nationals, nor 
obtain new consulates for the US in Riga or Vladivostok. 
See US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United 
~tates, 1940, I, General, pp. 424-425. 
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they still existed, with both national 
interests and representation. The events of the next few 
years would demonstrate that this policy was far from empty, 
for it possessed very real political, 
consequences. 
economic, and legal 
CHAPTER V 
POLITICAL AND LEGAL EFFECTS OF NONRECOGNITION 
A. THE STATUS OF THE LITHUANIAN GOVERNMENT 
As spring turned to summer in 1940, the atmosphere 
on the European continent was tense. Poland had been 
eliminated from the political map by Germany and the Soviet 
Union the previous September. Germany was rapidly preparing 
to strike west toward France and Great Britain. In the 
East, Finland had been forced to negotiate an unequal peace 
treaty following the attack by the USSR. Finally, the 
Baltic States, who now had Soviet troops on their soil 
thanks to the mutual assistance pacts, sensed that the 
Kremlin was not satisfied with just that arrangement. 
In order to be prepared for any contingency, 
Lithuanian Foreign Minister Juozas Urbsys, acting on 
presidential authority, dispatched telegram number 288 to 
Lithuanian diplomats abroad on 2 June 1940, just a scant two 
weeks prior to the occupation. It stated that in case of 
emergency, the chief of the remaining Lithuanian Diplomatic 
Service outside Lithuania would be Stasys Lozoraitis, former 
foreign minister and minister of Lithuania in Rome. His 
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first deputy would be Petras Klimas, minister in Berlin, and 
the second deputy would be Jurgis Saulys, posted in Berne, 
switzerland. 1 
Following the resolution by the People's Seimas to 
join the Soviet Union, Lozoraitis spoke out as the 
representative of the Lithuanian diplomats. Ironically, his 
first protest, on 1 August 1940, was directed against the 
foreign ministry in Kaunas: 
In view of the resolution of July 21, passed by 
the so-called Seimas and incorporating Lithuania 
into the Soviet Union I declare: 
primo: the so-called Seimas, constituted under 
military occupation, oppression and terror of a 
foreign country which had broken treaties and 
principles of international law and committed an 
act of aggression, is not a representative body, 
but a tool in the hands of oppressors; 
secundo: its resolutions do not express the 
will of the Lithuanian nation, and bind neither 
the people of Lithuania nor myself, the legal 
representative of the independent and sovereign 
state of Lithuania; 
tertio: I protest with horror against the 
treacherous resolution 2 
1 Algirdas Budreckis, "Liberation Attempts From 
Abroad," in Lithuania 700 Years, 2nd rev. ed., ed. Albertas 
Gerutis (New York: Manyland, 1969), p. 380; Albertas 
Gerutis, Petras Klimas (Cleveland: Viltis, 1978), p. 198; 
Aleksandras Merkelis, Antanas Smetana: Jo visuomenine, 
kulturine ir politine veikla (Antanas Smetana: His Social, 
Cultural and Political Activity) (New York: American 
Lithuanian .National Association, 1964), p. 630. Juozas 
Audenas writes that the Cabinet had not been informed of 
this move. He is uncertain whether Smetana and Prime 
Minister Antanas Merkys knew of Urbsys' action. See his 
Paskutinis posedis: Atsiminimai (Final Conference: 
Reminiscences) (New York: Romuva, 1966), pp. 205-206. 
2 US House of Representatives, Third Interim Report of 
the Select Committee on Communist Aggression. Report of the 
Select Committee to Investigate Communist Aggression and the 
Forced Incorporation of the Baltic States into the U.S.S.R. 
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One may ask what became of President Antanas Smetona 
during this period. When he left Lithuania following the 
soviet ultimatum, Smetana entered East Prussia, where he and 
his party were interned as guests of the German government. 
His Lithuanian diplomatic passport identified him as 
president. Constitutionally, Smetona was still president, 
though having temporarily relinquished acting powers to 
Prime Minister Antanas Merkys. Shortly thereafter. the US 
charge d'affaires in Berlin issued Smetona a visa to enter 
the United States, but only on the condition that he not 
represent himself as acting in an official capacity. He had 
to declare: "While 1 am in the U.S. I shall not be 
considered as the head or member of any government." In 
return. the US government referred to Smetona as the 
"distinguished guest, the President of the Republic of 
Lithuania in exile, residing in the U.S. in private 
capacity," while State Department correspondence addressed 
him as "His Excellency. " 3 
By way of South America, Smetana arrived in New York 
City on 10 March 1941. On 1 April he paid a visit to Acting 
Secretary of State Sumner Welles, and on the 18th he met 
with President Roosevelt. Roosevelt advised Smetana to work 
among Lithuanian-Americans for Lithuania's cause, which he 
(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1954), 
375. 
3 Merkel is, pp. 644-645, 657. 
pp. 364-
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did until his untimely death in a fire at his son's home in 
c1eveland on 9 January 1944. 4 
Smetona's odyssey is related to the question of a 
Lithuanian government-in-exile. In September 1940, 
Lithuanian diplomats met in Rome to discuss the future of 
the nation's independent government. On the 25th, they 
endorsed a resolution which created the Lithuanian National 
committee. Ernestas Galvanauskas, a former prime minister, 
was invited to be its president, Lozoraitis was appointed 
deputy _i_ ~o_s_o_~j~u_r_e . Diplomats Eduardas Turauskas, Kazys 
Ski rpa, and Pov i 1 as Zadeikis would have a hand in the 
committee's work. The committee's task was "to care for the 
interests of the Lithuanian State and Lithuanian nation. 116 
The Lithuanian National Committee never practically 
functioned. 
The Supreme Committee for the Liberation of 
Lithuania has often represented itself as a quasi-
government-in-exile, complete with parliamentary organs and 
political parties: 
It is true that certain ministers plenipotentiary 
and other diplomatic representatives of Lithuania 
are still recognized and are continuing to fulfill 
""Merkelis, p. 652. See also J.J. Bachunas, 
Jokubynas (Sodus, MI: Author, 1954), pp. 10-11. 
Vincas S. 
6 Bronis J. Kaslas, ed., The USSR-German Aggression 
Against Lithuania (New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1973), 
p. 314. In an editor's comment on pp. 314-315, Kaslas notes 
that the committee never aspired to be a government-in-
exile, but wished to preserve the Lithuanian Diplomatic 
Service, as well as to organize Lithuanian-Americans. 
Indeed, 
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certain functions deriving from the state 
sovereignty. But they are only executive bodies, 
and not sovereign political representatives. 
Hence the necessity arose for headquarters of some 
kind, vested with proper authority, to direct and 
coordinate Lithuanian activities and 
provisionally to fulfill the tasks which otherwise 
would be a matter for the government. 6 
in 1947, the Supreme Committee concluded an 
agreement with the Polish government-in-exile regarding the 
formulation of a treaty on the common struggle against the 
soviet Union. Lithuanian diplomats, however, declined to 
endorse the draft treaty and the project was ultimately set 
aside. 7 
In July 1946, at a conference of the Supreme 
committee and Lithuanian diplomats in Berne, Switzerland, it 
was decided to form the nucleus of a Lithuanian delegation 
to the upcoming peace conference. In a merger of the state 
and the resistance to the Soviets, an executive council of 
the committee was formed. Stasys Lozoraitis accepted the 
invitation to take charge of foreign affairs in the 
executive council, while the Supreme Committee would remain 
6 Kazys Sidlauskas, "Supreme Committee for Liberation 
of Lithuania As Representative of Lithuanian National 
Interests," In Twenty Years' Struggle for Freedom of 
Lithuania, ed. Juozas Audenas (New York: ELTA, 1963), p. 
100. On pp. 102-108, 115, Sidlauskas, a long-time official 
of the committee, cites legal precedents of the recognition 
of national committees during wartime, and states that the 
committee should be recognized as representing the 
Lithuanian people. 
7 Juozas Audenas, "The Activities of the Supreme 
Committee for Liberation of Lithuania," in Twenty Years' 
Struggle for Freedom of Lithuania, ed. Juozas Audenas (New 
York: ELTA, 1963), pp. 78-79. 
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as a parliamentary and study institution. This arrangement 
was never ratified, and Lozoraitis later pulled out in order 
to retain his independence.a 
The question was never seriously addressed in the 
united States. On 18 December 1941, the Lithuanian minister 
in Washington, Povilas Zadeikis, following prodding by 
smetona, transmitted a note to Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull on the matter of a Lithuanian National Council and 
government-in-exile. On 12 January 1942, Zadeikis informed 
Smetana that Hull had stated that consideration of those 
a Vytautas Alseika, Trys desimtmeciai emigrac11oje: Nuo 
Roitlingeno iki Niujorko (Three Decades in Emigration: From 
Reutlingen to New York) (Vilnius: Mintis, 1977), pp. 120-
121; Audenas, pp. 76-77. See also Comite Supreme de 
Liberation de la Lithuanie (Supreme Committee for the 
Liberation of Lithuania), Memorandum Relatif a la 
Restitution de !'Independence d L'Etat Lithuanien 
(Memorandum on the Restoration of the Independence of the 
Lithuanian State) (Fulda, West Germany: Le Conseil Executif 
Lithuanien I Lithuanian Executive Council, 1946); Algirdas 
J. Kasulaitis, Lithuanian Christian Democracy (Chicago: Leo 
XIII Fund, 1976), p. 163; Antanas Kucas, Amerikos lietuviu 
istorija (American Lithuanian History) (South Boston: 
Lithuanian Encyclopedia Press, 1971), pp. 587-593. 
This conference saw an interesting incident finally 
make itself public. At the Berne conference, Lozoraitis 
revealed the existence of the Acts of Kybartai, which were 
dated 15 June 1940 and supposedly signed by Smetana just 
before he crossed the border out of Lithuania. The first 
act removed. Antanas Merkys as prime minister and replaced 
him with Lozoraitis. The second act asked Lozoraitis to act 
as president. This fact was communicated to the US State 
Department in 1944 and, indeed, Lozoraitis signed some of 
his official papers as prime minister and acting president. 
It later became apparent that the acts were, indeed, signed 
by Smetana in Switzerland on 23 November 1940. This in an 
attempt to create a legal basis for the formation of 
governmental organs outside Lithuania. See Alseika, p. 119; 
Albertas Gerutis, "Kybartu aktai" ("Acts of Kybartai"), 
Aidai, 4 (April 1976), 164-171. 
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questions was postponed. It is quite possible that wartime 
politics, specifically the Soviet Union's participation 
against the Axis, was instrumental in this. This 
notwithstanding, even during the Cold War, the US did not 
wish to commit itself to the idea of recognizing an extra-
territorial sovereign body. To this day, the Baltic 
legations in Washington are not recognized as governments-
in-exile. The role of the charges d'affaires "is to uphold 
the ideal of a free Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. " 9 
B. STATUS OF TREATIES AND DIPLOMATIC PERSONNEL 
As far as the United States is concerned, its 
treaties with the government of independent Lithuania are 
9 US Department of State, Statement by Robert L. Barry, 
Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, before the 
Subcommittee on International Organizations of the House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, 26 June 1979, pp. 4-5. Also 
Edgar Anderson, "British Policy Toward the Baltic States, 
1940-41," Journal of Baltic Studies, 11, 4 (Winter 1980), 
327; Merkelis, p. 659. See also Johannes Klesment, The 
Estonian Soldiers in the Second World War (Stockholm: 
Estonian National Council, 1948), p. 15; Krystyna Marek, 
Identity and Continuity of States in Public International 
Law (Geneva: Librairie E. Droz, 1968), pp. 410-411; 
Sidlauskas, p. 107. 
Vaino J. Rusmandel incorrectly writes that the 
functions of a government-in-exile, limited to foreign 
affairs, are being carried out by the Lithuanian and Latvian 
diplomats who received emergency powers prior to the 
occupation. Indeed their respective governments never 
intended for them to represent extra-territorial sovereign 
bodies. He gives a rather interesting account of two 
Estonian groups who, due to different interpretations of the 
Estonian Constitution, both claim to possess the authority 
of a government-in-exile. See his "The Continued Legal 
Existence of the Baltic States," Baltic Review, 12 (7 
November 1957), 52-53. See also Estonian National Council 
!_947-1957 (Stockholm: ENC, 1957). 
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iegallY still in force. They deal with matters of customs, 
extradition, finance, nationality, postal affairs, trade, 
and other forms of international intercourse. Only 
abrogation by the executive terminates the validity of a 
treaty, and no Lithuanian executive recognized by the US 
government has done so. Of course, the treaties are now 
suspended, for there is no independent Lithuanian government 
to implement them. As far as the Soviets are concerned, the 
treaties are no longer valid, since all meaningful foreign 
affairs dealing with Lithuania must pass through the 
Kremlin. 10 In addition, since official contact with the 
sending state was severed, the Lithuanian minister in 
Washington could no longer conclude treaties or other 
agreements with the US government. The list of us-
Lithuanian treaties in force is reproduced in Appendix C of 
this study. 
10 B.R. Bot, Nonrecognition and Treaty Relations 
(Leyden: A.W. Sijthoff, 1968), pp. 224-226; Constantine R. 
Jurgela, Lithuania and the United States: The Establishment 
of State Relations (Chicago: Lithuanian Research and Studies 
Center, 1985), p. 221; Gerhard van Glahn, Law Among Nations: 
An Introduction to Public International Law, 4th ed. (New 
York: Macmillan, 1981), p. 110. 
On 10 May 1940, Secretary of State Cordell Hull and 
Lithuanian. Minister Povilas Zadeikis signed a consular 
convention at Washington. It never had a chance to be 
ratified. See US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, 
Lithuania -- Consular Convention, Executive Report No. 8, 22 
May 1940 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1940). 
Minister Zadeikis acquiesced in the application of 
trade controls while Lithuania is under occupation on 11 
July 1951. See US Department of State, Treaties in Force, 1 
January 1966 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 
1966), pp. 122-123. 
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Though President Smetona's fate, personally and 
politically, was not a happy one, Lithuanian diplomatic and 
consular personnel were more fortunate. Their status as 
representatives of the independent Lithuanian government 
remained unaltered. lt was obvious that the US government 
considered the preservation of the Lithuanian Diplomatic 
service a minor and relatively harmless matter. Granting 
status to a chief executive and government-in-exile, though, 
would have possessed far-reaching political implications, 
tying Washington's hands in its relations with Moscow. 
Popular lore has it that the Lithuanian legation in 
Washington refused to carry out the orders of the Lithuanian 
government as of 15 June 1940. However, as was indicated in 
the previous chapter, Minister Zadeikis and his staff were 
confused as to the situation in Lithuania due to Smetona's 
departure, Merkys' efforts to return him to Kaunas, the 
reports of his de facto resignation, and the presence of 
Foreign Minister Juozas Urbsys in Moscow. Compounding this 
was the fact that members of the new government, including 
President Paleckis, themselves were uncertain about the 
future. Zadeikis was receiving no information or responses 
to inquiries. The picture became more clear when it was 
learned that the known communist, Mecislovas Gedvilas, had 
been appointed interior minister, and that the first 
secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party, Antanas 
Snieckus, was now the director of the internal security 
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t 11 departmen . 
By 13 July 1940, Zadeikis was able to write to 
secretary Hull that "From the information available, it 
that the scheduled elections [to the People's 
seimas) will be carried out exclusively under the aegis of 
the communist party . " 1 2 On 3 August, after the Supreme 
soviet admitted Lithuania into the USSR, Zadeikis reaffirmed 
both his own status and his protest: 
As the duly accredited representative of the 
Sovereign Republic of Lithuania near the 
Government of the United States of America I 
repeat my protest against the unprovoked 
aggression and illegal incorporation of Lithuania 
into the Soviet Union and at the same time express 
the hope of the Lithuanian nation that no State in 
the world will recognize this international 
outrage as having any legality or bona fide 
excuse. I . hope that the American Government 
will continue to refuse legal recognition of the 
Soviet's aggressive acts against Lithuania's 
integrity and independence. 13 
11 Domas Krivickas, "Lithuania's Struggle Against 
Aggression and Subjugation," in Twenty Years' Struggle for 
Freedom of Lithuania, ed. Juozas Audenas (New York: ELTA, 
1963), p. 139; Merkelis, pp. 630-631; US House of 
Representatives, Select Committee to Investigate the 
Incorporation of the Baltic States into the U.S.S.R., Baltic 
States Investigation I (Washington: US Government Printing 
Office, 1953), p. 10. 
12 US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1940, vol. I, General 
(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1959), p. 387. 
See also US House of Representatives, Third Interim Report 
of the Select Committee on Communist Aggression. Report of 
the Select Committee to Investigate Communist Aggression and 
the Forced Incorporation of the Baltic States into the 
U.S.S.R. (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1954), 
pp. 365-366. 
13 US House of Representatives, 
pp, 366-367. 
Third Interim Report, 
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It became abundantly clear to Zadeikis where he 
stood with the new government in Kaunas when a decision of 
the Lithuanian Council of Ministers was published on 14 
Retroactive to 26 July, it stripped Zadeikis of his 
Lithuanian citizenship, confiscated his property, and 
forbade him to return to Lithuania. This notwithstanding, 
there was never any Soviet attempt to assume control of the 
legation, located at 2622 16th Street NW in Washington. 
zadeikis continued to issue formal protests to the US State 
Department during the occupations of World War II, and 
disseminated information regarding the Lithuanian situation. 
Then, as now, the legation was listed in the State 
Department's annual Diplomatic List. 14 
14 Appeal of the Representatives of the Baltic Nations 
to the General Assembly of the United Nations. Jointly 
presented on November 24, 1947 by the Envoys of the Three 
Baltic States Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in 
Washington To His Excellency Dr. Osvaldo Aranha, President 
of the General Assembly of the United Nations (Flushing 
Meadows, NY: np, 1947); Kaslas, pp. 361-364; US House of 
Representatives, Baltic States Investigation I, p. 11; US 
House of Representatives, Third Interim Report, p. 375; US 
Department of State, Diplomatic List, August 1987 
(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1987). 
Latvian and Estonian diplomats behaved in similar 
fashion to Minister Zadeikis. See Latvian Legation Press 
Bureau, Latvia in 1939-1942: Background; Bolshevik and Nazi 
Occupation; Hopes for Future (Washington: Latvian Legation, 
1942), pp. 105-106, 108-110; Krystyna Marek, Identity and 
Continuity of States in Public International Law (Geneva: 
Librairie E. Droz, 1968), p. 410; US House of 
Representatives, Baltic States Investigation I, pp. 14, 21, 
24; US House of Representatives, Select Committee on 
Communist Aggression, Communist Takeover and Occupation of 
Estonia, Special Report No. 3 (Washington: US Government 
Printing Office, 1955), p. 13; US House of Representatives, 
Select Committee on Communist Aggression, Communist Takeover 
and Occupation of Latvia, Special Report No. 12 (Washington: 
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The following consular personnel continued to 
function in the US, representing the interests of Lithuanian 
nationals and their property: 
consul Vytautas Stasinskas, 
Consul General Jonas Budrys, 
Vice Consul Anicetas Simutis, 
New York; Consul Petras Dauzvardis, Chicago; Honorary Consul 
Julius J. Bielskis, Los Angeles; Honorary Consul Anthony 0. 
shallna, Boston. However, the trade, economic, cultural, 
and scientific functions of the consulates practically 
ceased. The consuls were left in the unusual position of 
defending the interests of their nationals vis-a-vis the 
United States and the factual authorities of the sending 
state, Soviet Lithuania. "[Consular] representation may. 
be urgently needed in the interest of those whom non-
recognition is intended to protect . 11 1 lS 
Baltic consuls possess standing (locus standi) in US 
courts. 16 A court case confirming the status of the 
Estonian consul general in New York, but also applicable to 
US Government Printing Office, 1954), pp. 6-7, 11; US House 
of Representatives, Third Interim Report, pp. 309, 407-409, 
412, 433, 435, 439; US Department of State, Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1940, I, pp. 400-401, 406-407. 
1
a Robert Langer, Seixure of Territory: The Stimson 
Doctrine and Related Principles in Legal Theory and 
Diplomatic Practice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1947), p. 102. Also Evald Roosaare, "Consular Relations 
Between the United States and the Baltic States," Baltic 
Review, 27 (June 1964), 26. For US-Lithuanian consular 
relations prior to the occupation, see Roosaare, pp. 12-19. 
16 Marek, p. 403; Vytautas Vaitiekunas, 





Lithuanian consuls, was Buxhoeveden v. Estonian State Bank, 
l 17 The plaintiff, Buxhoeveden, contended that he was ~
entitled to certain payments under an Estonian will written 
in 1837. On 3 December 1941, he obtained a warrant of 
attachment and caused it to be levied on funds of the 
Estonian State Bank deposited at the National City Bank of 
New York. 
The Estonian consul general, Jaakson Kaiv, asserted 
that it was his right under international law, the US-
Estonian consular convention, and Estonian municipal law to 
protect property interests of nationals of the sending state 
where no power of attorney has been granted to another 
party. Buxhoeveden maintained that Kaiv did not have the 
authority to represent the Estonian State Bank as a consular 
official. The New York Supreme Court stated the problem: 
The basic quest of law presented by this 
application is the extent of the right of a Consul 
General of a foreign nation, at peace with this 
country, but completely occupied by an enemy, to 
protect and guard in our courts the rights and 
property of one of his own nationals, an Estonian 
corporation in which the said Republic owns a 
majority share interest, and which, if indeed it 
has knowledge of this action, is itself manifestly 
unable, because of present unprecedented world 
conditions, to defend the same or to take any 
steps specifically to authorize such defense. 10 
Kaiv's consular status was affirmed on the basis of both 
17 The New York Supreme Court, Special Term, Queens 
County, April 21, 1943; 41 N.Y.S. (2d) 752-757; Ibid., Part 
I, October 8, 1948; 84 N.Y.S. (2d) 2. 
10 Buxhoeveden v. Estonian State Bank, 41 N.Y.S. (2d) 
753. 
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international law and US-Estonian agreements. In other 
words, he acts in an official capacity, not as a private 
agent, when he defends the property interests of his 
nationals. He also possesses the right to move and take 
action without authorization from, or communication with, 
the defendant. 19 
This leads us to a discussion of the notarial acts 
of unrecognized governments. 20 All governments perform 
routine notarial acts, such as the issuance of birth, death, 
and marriage certificates. US courts have been faced with a 
dilemma when dealing with the acts of unrecognized 
governments, and have responded in various ways. Courts 
which have accepted their validity have indicated the non-
political nature of such acts, and the fact that citizens 
have no choice but to accept the acts of a government in 
actual control of territory. They state that acceptance 
does not undercut a policy of nonrecognition. Courts which 
have invalidated such acts stress that executive 
nonrecognition must lead to judicial nonrecognition, for the 
19 Buxhoeveden v. Estonian State Bank, 41 N.Y.S. (2d) 
757. On 26 March 1948, the US State Department sent a 
letter to all state governors which stated that US-Baltic 
treaties were still in force, and that Soviet consular 
officers possessed no right to represent Baltic nationals in 
US probate proceedings. Only Baltic consular 
representatives were empowered to do so. See US 
Congressional Record, 1 May 1948, p. 6795. 
20 Unless otherwise indicated, the following passage is 
taken from Thomas M. Franck and Michael J. Glennon, Foreign 
Belations and National Security Law: Cases, Materials and 
.§_imulations (St. Paul, MN: West, 1987), pp. 494-497. 
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unrecognized government is not seen as possessing the legal 
capacity to act. 
Following World War II there occured a series of 
court decisions which grappled with these issues. Citizens 
in the Baltic States, who sought their legitimate share of 
estates in the United States, would sign letters of attorney 
so that American counsel could represent them. These 
letters were authenticated by officers of the unrecognized 
Soviet regimes in the Baltic. A US consul would, in turn, 
countersign, but add the note: "This authentication is not 
to be interpreted as implying recognition of Soviet 
sovereignty over [Lithuania, Latvia or Estonia]." The 
executor of the estate would typically object to these 
documents once introduced in court. Baltic consuls would 
also object. New York State surrogate courts tended to 
sustain these objections out of deference to determinations 
of the executive branch. 21 
21 Franck and Glennon, p. 496, note that these rulings 
were due partly to the prevailing Cold War atmosphere. They 
also write that: 
Some Baltic nationals attempted to evade this 
result by travelling to Leningrad or Moscow to 
have their letters of attorney authenticated in 
the Soviet Union proper. This strategem worked in 
Matter of Luberg's Estate, 19 A.D. 2d 370, 243 
N.Y.S. 2d 747 (1963), but failed in In re 
Mitzkel's Estate, 36 Misc. 2d 671, 233 N.Y.S. 2d 
519 (Sur. Ct. Kings 1962). See generally Matter 
of Adler's Estate, 197 Misc. 104, 93 N.Y.S. 2d 416 
(Sur. Ct. Kings), appeal dismissed, 279 App. Div. 
745, 109 N.Y.S. 2d 175 (1951), order vacated 110 
N.Y.S. 2d 283 (N.Y.A.D. 1952); In re Braunstein's 
Estate, 202 Misc. 244, 114 N.Y.S. 2d 280 (Sur. 
N.Y. 1952); In re Kapocius' Estate, 36 Misc. 2d 
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In In re Aleksandravicius, 22 a New Jersey court 
followed a different approach and ruled that only political 
acts are to be unrecognized in US courts. The court added 
that this did not violate the nonrecognition policy, for the 
American consul's countersigned statement explicitly stated 
official US policy. Thus private notarial acts were 
separated from political ones. A New York court had a 
similar ruling in In re Estate of Bielinis, and noted 
practical 
Lithuania: 
difficulties facing beneficiaries residing in 
There are no officials of the Republic of 
Lithuania in Lithuania. To require these legatees 
to go before a notary of the de jure Republic of 
Lithuania to prove their signatures is to deny to 
them the right validly to execute powers of 
attorney at all. To require them to travel to 
some part of the USSR where the USSR is 
recognized by our government as the de jure 
government in order to execute powers of attorney 
is to require them to do a useless act and one 
which, in the light of the small participation 
they have in the estate, may mean that they would 
forfeit their interest rather than try to prove 
it. 
It would appear self-evident that almost the 
last person in the world who would be able to 
communicate with the principals and to obtain 
appropriate evidence from the occupied territory 
of Lithuania would be the Lithuanian consul. 23 
Today, American courts generally distinguish between 
1087, 234 N.Y.S. 2d 346 (Sur. King's 1962). 
See also Roosaare, pp. 28-29. 
22 83 N.J. Super. 303, 199 A. 2d 662 (App. Div. 1964), 
cert. denied, 43 N.J. 128, 202 A. 2d 702 (1964). 
23 In re Estate of Bielinis, 55 Misc. 2d at 197-198, 
284 N.Y.S. 2d at 825-826. 
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notarial acts and acts which politically would violate the 
nonrecognition policy. This was reaffirmed in a relatively 
recent federal case, Daniunas v. Simutis: 
Even though the present government of Lithuania is 
not recognized by this country, since the powers 
of attorney relate to what has been determined to 
be solely a private, local and domestic matter, 
the inheritance rights of Lithuanian citizens, 
they will be given effect by the courts of this 
country. 24 
The question of specific consular actions is found 
in the general context of US-Baltic consular relations. 
Roosaare writes: 
[T]he [Vienna] Convention [on Consular 
Relations] 20 provides only that the functions of 
a member of the consulate come to an end "on 
notification by the sending state to the receiving 
state'' in that respect and implies clearly that 
recalling a consular official by the sending state 
is governed by domestic and not by international 
law. The only question which may arise, and 
indeed arose, is whether the action was taken by 
the proper authorities and under proper law. Not 
the refusal by Baltic consuls to follow the Soviet 
order, but the United States' refusal to recognize 
the Soviet Government in the Baltic states 
determined their status within the United 
States. 20 
Thus, Roosaare concludes, since the US has not changed its 
recognition of the independent Baltic governments, the legal 
status of Baltic consular officials and their ability to 
24 Daniunas v. Simutis, 481 F.Supp. at 134 (S.D.N.Y. 
1978). See also In the Matter of the Estate of Julius 
Yuska, 128 Misc. 2d 98, 488 N.Y.S. 2d 609 (Sur. Kings 1985). 
20 United Nations, Doc. A/Conf. 25/12, 23 April 1963. 
20 Roosaare, p. 32. For an account of how the Estonian 
consul general in New York City, Jaakson Kaiv, refused to 
obey Soviet orders, see pp. 23-24. 
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carrY out consular functions have not been altered. 27 
While today, as will be seen in the final chapter, 
the existence of Lithuanian consulates in the US is mainly a 
symbolic and informational enterprise, the war years saw the 
consuls actively exercising their role in defending the 
interests of their nationals. Though challenges to Soviet 
notarial acts were a part of this, the most important 
strides were made in response to Soviet property 
nationalization laws and decrees, which Washington did not 
view as legitimate. 
C. THE STATUS OF ASSETS AND PROPERTY 
In the four day period of 22-25 July 1940, the 
Soviet-run legislatures of the Baltic States carried out 
decrees nationalizing banking and credit institutions, as 
well as industrial enterprises. All orders of the previous 
owners and directors became invalid. According to the Act 
of State Doctrine in international law, one state respects 
27 During a conversation with the Soviet ambassador on 
25 February 1941, Sumner Welles reemphasized the continued 
US recognition of the independent Baltic diplomats and 
consuls. According to a memorandum of conversation by Loy 
Henderson: 
Mr. Welles said that . nothing could be gained 
from a conversation in which Mr. Oumansky would 
insist that black is white while Mr. Welles 
insisted that white is black. . Mr. Welles 
said that without arguing, he must again disagree 
with the statements which Mr. Oumansky had just 
made. 
See US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United 
States, Diplomatic Papers, 1941, Volume I (Washington: US 
Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 708. 
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the validity of another's public acts. As a corollary, 
courts are not to pass judgement on their legality or 
constitutionality. 28 In other words, had the executive not 
intervened in the case of the Baltic States, US courts would 
have routinely upheld the Soviet decrees in cases coming 
before them. 
However, the US nonrecognition policy did not permit 
this. Nonrecognition is a political relationship of which 
courts must take cognizance and, under the doctrine of 
judicial auto-limitation, must implement in line with stated 
executive policy. In such a situation, not only are the 
public acts of the unrecognized government viewed as 
illegal, but "a nonrecognized [de facto] government does not 
possess a right of access to the courts of such other states 
as deny it recognition; that is, an unrecognized government 
cannot sue in such courts." 29 In R.S.F. Soviet Republic v. 
Cibrario, 30 the court noted that no precedent existed 
whereby an unrecognized government could seek relief in US 
courts. The commom practice in such event is to freeze 
assets, as indeed the US government did vis-a-vis the Baltic 
States, South Vietnam, Cambodia, North Korea, Cuba, and 
28 Dietrich A. Loeber, "Baltic Gold in Great Britain," 
Baltic Review, 36 (October 1969), 15-17; Gerhard von Glahn, 
Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public International 
1~. 4th ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1981), p. 152. 
29 von Glahn, p. 108. 
30 N. Y. C. A., 1923, 235 N.Y. 255, 139 N.E. 259. 
. a s1 
chin · 
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At the time of the Soviet occupation, Gosbank, the 
official Soviet bank in Moscow, forwarded an order to US 
banks to transfer Baltic assets to it. This order, thanks 
to the presidential freeze of 15 July 1940, was not 
followed. All subsequent orders requesting the release of 
assets of nationalized Baltic business enterprises located 
in the US were ignored. The US Departments of State and 
Treasury began to jointly administer the frozen Baltic 
assets and gold reserves, which were used to maintain the 
"'
1 Malbone W. Graham, "What Does Non-Recognition Mean?" 
Baltic Review, 1, 4-5 (July-August 1946), 171; Marek, p. 
401; von Glahn, p. 109. See also Richard A. Falk, The Role 
of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order 
(Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1964). Franck and 
Glennon, p. 451, write: 
The method by which courts learn the executive 
branch's official recognition policy has changed 
from independent judicial determinations to 
specific State Department instructions. In the 
first half of this century, courts usually took 
"judicial notice" of official policy. Given the 
public nature of recognition, discerning the 
position of the Executive was not difficult. 
After World War II, perhaps to ensure that 
executive and judicial positions did not diverge, 
the State Department often issued specific 
"suggestions" or instructions to courts, 
frequently prompted by the requests of individual 
litigants. Courts sometimes compared these State 
Department submissions to public pronouncements 
. to see whether they were congruent. . Most 
cases, and al 1 recent ones, however, have relied 
on the Department's "suggestions" whenever these 
have been forthcoming. At times, the Department 
has acted to instruct the court on its own 
initiative, relaying its views through the 
Department of Justice. More often, 
individual litigants have requested the Department 
to provide information. Courts themselves 
rarely have solicited State Department positions. 
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still-recognized Baltic diplomatic and consular 
facilities. 32 
While the Soviet orders of the summer of 1940 did 
not explicitly state that Baltic assets abroad were covered 
by the nationalization decrees, this was clearly the intent. 
soviet juridical literature claims the positive 
extraterritorial effect of nationalization legislation. 
However, the US has refused to grant extraterritorial effect 
in this case. 
American courts have consistently concluded that 
such decrees had no extraterritorial effect, that 
is, the decrees do not in themselves change the 
status of property situated in the United States 
or temporarily outside the borders of the state, 
or located in a third state at the time of the 
decree. 33 
The United States has followed one concept in international 
law, namely that the deprivation of an entity of legal 
status by a state abroad is not recognized if 
nationalization injures the vested rights of third parties. 
The third party here is the US. 34 Further, Langer points 
32 Algirdas Budreckis, "Liberation Attempts From 
Abroad," in Lithuania 700 Years, 2nd rev. ed., ed. Albertas 
Gerutis (New York: Manyland, 1969), p. 400; Merkelis, p. 
661; US House of Representatives, Baltic States 
Investigation I, p. 32; von Glahn, pp. 110-111. The US 
State Department has periodically issued certificates which 
declare US nonrecognition of the Soviet occupation, as well 




33 Gerard J. Mangone, 
rev. ed. (Homewood, IL: 
Mangone's emphasis. 
34 Loeber, pp. 17-20. 
The Elements of International 
Dorsey Press, 1967), pp. 380-
See also p. 26. 
out that: 
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A certain safeguard against the danger of giving 
effect, on the part of the non-recognizing State, 
to such measures of spoliation and depredation may 
consist in the application of the principle . 
that acts of a foreign Power that are 
irreconcilable with the public policy of the State 
from which enforcement is sought, are disregarded 
in the courts of the latter. 30 
One of the more interesting episodes involving 
Baltic assets dealt with shipping. The "Baltic Ships Cases" 
were directly related to Soviet nationalization decrees. On 
this basis, the new governments in the Baltic could issue 
laws such as the following: 
. Any kind of leaving harbours or entering 
harbours without the permission of the Government 
of the Republic [of Estonia] is prohibited for 
Estonian ships in foreign waters. 
Masters of ships who transgress the 
orders of the Government of the Republic regarding 
the bringing back of Estonian ships to the home 
country will be treated as persons guilty of high 
treason, whereby responsible are also the members 
of their families and nearer relatives. 
Ships are prohibited to enter the 
harbours of the United States of America and 
Britain without the permission of the Government 
30 Langer, p. 108. Regarding the validity of acts of a 
recognized state before agencies of a receiving state, 
Langer, p. 113, writes that the effects of de jure and de 
facto recognition are identical. Hirsch Lauterpacht, 
however, appears to differ, when he writes that de facto 
recognition takes into account the "actuality of power," 
while refusing to admit its legality. It produces limited 
legal consequences. He adds: 
"that the government which is recognized de jure 
is entitled, as against the de facto government, 
to continued title in and control of the property 
of the State situated abroad such as legation 
buildings, archives, and so on." 
See his Recognition in International 
Cambridge University Press, 1947), p. 343. 
Law (Cambridge: 
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of the Republic. 36 
The soviet Union asserted that the vessels in question were 
now the property of the state. As such they were immune 
from the jurisdiction of foreign courts without the consent 
of the new sovereign power. This immunity existed whether 
the vessels were used for public or private purposes, and 
whether or not they were in the physical possession of the 
sovereign. 37 
The Soviet Union, thus, was attempting to gain 
possession of the vessels. Indeed, following World War II, 
it occasionally attempted to collect insurance payable for 
Baltic ships sunk during hostilities. 36 However, claims of 
ownership or insurance proceeds were rejected because such 
claims in each case were grounded upon some governmental act 
based on unrecognized Soviet sovereignty. 
[The] Baltic Ship Cases, reinforced by 
corresponding decisions in a number of other 
countries, including the United States, helped to 
establish the doctrine that nonrecognition of an 
alleged successor state or government resulted in 
a failure to create immunity claimed for vessels 
36 US House of Representatives, Baltic States 
Investigation 1, p. 182. See also US Department of State, 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1940, I, p. 408. 
37 von Glahn, p. 149. See also US House of 
Rep r e s e n t at i v e s , ;;;;;.B....;;a::...;1::--.::.t..:::i....;;c'----"-S-'t:...;a~t"""e-'s'--"'"I =n'-'v_e'--s_t_i_.g~a_t_i_o_n _ I , pp . 2 0 - 2 1 , 
207-209. 
38 von Glahn, p. 110. Richard A. Schnorf notes that 
Baltic ships transporting Allied war supplies across the 
Atlantic were decimated by German submarines. See his "The 
Baltic States in U.S.-Soviet Relations: The Years of Doubt, 
1943-1946," Lituanus, 12, 4 (Winter 1966), 67. 
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of that state or government. 39 
In 1,_atvian State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line v. McGrath, the 
us court of Appeals explicitly took this into account. The 
court decided that the US did not merely fail to recognize 
the soviet nationalization decrees, but deliberately opposed 
them. "We find ourselves in agreement with other courts 
which have either implicitly or explicitly recognized the 
policies of [the executive] in refusing to countenance the 
confiscation of vessels by the Soviet regime." 40 
In order to gain an idea of how these cases were 
conceived and proceeded, it is worthwhile to quote Langer's 
synopsis of three of them: 
In three cases, namely (1) the Kotkas, 41 (2) the 
Regent, 42 (3) the Signe (later renamed the 
Florida), 43 libels of persons acting on behalf of 
the Soviet Government had been filed in order to 
39 von Glahn, p. 149. Von Glahn, pp. 109-110, notes 
that not all legal scholars agree that a nonrecognized 
state is barred from access to the courts of nonrecognizing 
states. In turn, not all concur in the disposition of the 
Baltic ships cases. 
40 Latvian State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line v. 
McGrath, US Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, 
188 F 2d 1000 (1951). 
41 35 Federal Supplement Reporter 
District Court, E.D. New York, November 22, 
Supplement Reporter 835 ff., do. March 31, 
810, 983 ff., 
1940; 37 Federal 
1941. 
42 35 Federal Supplement Reporter 985 ff., District 
Court, E.D. New York, November 22, 1940. 
43 37 Federal Supplement Reporter 810 819 ff., District 
Court, E.D. Louisiana, New Orleans Division, March 4, 1941; 
39 Federal Supplement Reporter 810 ff., do. July 22, 1941; 
133 F 2d 719 ff., Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, 
February 20, 1943. 
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obtain possession of Baltic ships which their 
masters refused to surrender. The district courts 
had first to decide on motions of the libelants 
for letters rogatory to be issued to a competent 
court of the Soviet Union for the purpose of 
procuring testimony of parties residing in the 
respective Baltic countries. All these motions 
were denied on the ground that since the United 
States did not recognize the incorporation . 
no court of the latter could issue effective 
process to residents of those republics. 
Thereupon the libels were dismissed for failure on 
the part of the libelants to prove their right of 
possession. 44 
The Maret case dealt with the question of the 
validity of acts of an unrecognized occupant. 46 The Maret 
was a vessel of Estonian registry in the territorial waters 
of the US Virgin Islands at the time of incorporation. The 
captain was ordered to proceed to Murmansk. He was willing 
to comply and requested an advance to purchase supplies. 
The Amtorg Trading Company in New York, which was an agent 
of the Soviet government, obliged and provided the funds. 
However, while the vessel was in port at St. Thomas, the US 
Maritime Commission requisitioned it. The commission 
proceeded to deposit $25,000 with the US Treasury "on 
account of just compensation" for the Maret. The Amtorg 
44 Langer, p. 266. Further, the court in the Signe 
case noted the authority possessed by the Estonian consul 
general in charge of legation, Jaakson Kaiv, for the 
"temporarily supplanted government of the Republic of 
Estonia." Kaiv became involved in approximately twenty 
cases involving Estonian vessels. See Langer, pp. 266-267; 
US House of Representatives, Baltic States Investigation I, 
p. 32. 
45 145 F 2d 431, Circuit 
Circuit, October 17, 1944. 
Court of Appeals, Third 
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company then filed suit seeking a portion of that payment. 
The soviet action, in turn, was opposed by Estonian Consul 
General Jaakson Kaiv, acting for some of the co-owners of 
the vessel. 
Though a federal district court decided in favor of the 
soviets, a circuit court reversed the decision, writing that 
recognition is a political, not legal, question to be 
decided by the executive branch. The same applies to the 
validity of decrees of an unrecognized power. When Kaiv 
produced Acting Secretary of State Sumner Welles' 
certificate not recognizing the decrees of the regime 
functioning in Estonia, the circuit court decided that a 
domestic court cannot examine the decrees of such a 
sovereign and determine rights in property based on them. 46 
The consequences of these events were certainly not 
lost on Soviet officials, who complained bitterly that the 
US government was sanctjoning theft of Soviet property by 
aiding, as Soviet Ambassador Oumansky stated: 
the former Ministers and Consuls of the Baltic 
States who, in cooperation with the officials of 
the Department of State, local Customs 
authorities, and police officials, were continuing 
to arrest Captains and members of the crews of 
what are now Soviet vessels only because such 
46 Langer, pp. 267-268; Georg Schwarzenberger, A Manual 
of International Law, 5th ed. (New York: Praeger & London 
Institute of World Affairs, 1967), p. 433; William L. Tung, 
International Law in an Organizing World (New York: Crowell, 
1968), pp. 266-268. Franck and Glennon, p. 486, note that 
the court in the Maret did not consider the location of the 
Ship outside Estonia when determining whether to give effect 
to the decree of the Estonian SSR. 
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persons desired to go home. 
through fictitious means 
registry of these vessels 
movements. 47 
The Consuls 
were changing the 
and directing their 
people's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov complained to 
us Ambassador Steinhardt in Moscow that some of the Baltic 
vessels had been dispatched to South America, where the 
soviet Union possessed no diplomatic representation. 46 
The US nonrecognition policy possessed differential 
political and legal effects. On the one hand, the US would 
not commit itself to allowing a Lithuanian government-in-
exile function on her soil. On the other hand, treaties and 
diplomats retained complete status, albeit in a practically 
reduced role. The consuls were the most active and potent 
representatives of the success of the policy. The events 
surrounding the disposition of Baltic property, and the 
Kremlin's reaction, serve to demonstrate that the effect of 
the US nonrecognition policy, at least at its inception, was 
far from merely symbolic. Actual physical resources were 
involved -- and removed from the reach of the Soviets. 49 
47 US Department 
United States, 1941, I, 
of State, 
p. 708. 
Foreign Relations of the 
46 US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1940, Volume III 
(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 439. 
49 Other cases involving Baltic ships and nationals are 
Re Adler's Estate, 122 The New York Law Journal 1777, in the 
King's County Surrogate Court, New York; Re Braunstein's 
~state, 114 N.Y.S. 2d 280 (1952), in the New York County 
Surrogate Court; Estonian State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line 
~t a 1 . v . United St ates , 116 F . Supp . 4 4 7 ( Ct . of Cl . , 195 3 ) ; 
l.atvian State Cargo & Passenger S.S. Line et al. v. United 
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While the United States remains steadfast in its 
stated policy toward Lithuania and the other Baltic States, 
there have been occasions where the policy has been 
stretched -- or compressed, if you will -- to fit practical 
exigencies. The Second World War, along with the question 
of alliance with Stalin, would be the first major test of 
the resilience of the nonrecognition policy. These issues 
are addressed in the following chapter. 
States, 116 F.Supp. 717 (Ct. of Cl., 1953); A/S Merilaid & 
Co. v. Chase National Bank of City of New York, 71 N.Y.S. 2d 
377 (1947); The Matter of Mike Shaskus, 131 The New York Law 
Journal 12 (1954), in the King's County Surrogate Court, New 
York; United States v. Rumsa, 212 F 2d 927 (7th Cir., 1954), 
cert. denied, 348 U.S. 838. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE NONRECOGNITION POLICY & WARTIME POLITICS 
A. THE CHANGING NATURE OF THE WAR 
As the year 1940 gave way to 1941, the Soviets were 
still consolidating their occupation of Lithuania. 
Obviously, the US nonrecognition policy, while possessing 
definite political and legal consequences, had not caused 
their retreat. As the year wore on, however, the situation 
in the Baltic would change drastically, with great 
implications for US-Soviet relations. 
Historically, the Lithuanian people have always been 
caught between the Germans and Russians; World War II was no 
exception. Hitler's Operation Barbarossa, ending the 
charade of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, commenced 22 June 
1941. Thus began the Third Reich's campaign to become 
master of the East. The German occupation brought cautious 
hope to a people who had just lived under a regime which in 
twelve months had arrested, deported or killed some fifty 
thousand Lithuanians. The greatest horrors occured about 
one week prior to the Nazi attack when, during the night of 
14 June, 34,260 people were packed off in cattle cars to 
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prisons and hard labor camps 
deeP within the Soviet Union. 
in Siberia and other points 
rebellion temporarily reconstituting the 
Lithuanian government was carried out, but this received no 
support from the invading Germans. The affairs of the 
country were, instead, placed firmly under the control of 
the Reichskommissar fur das Ostland (Reich Commissar for the 
Eastern Territories), based in Riga, Latvia; terror and 
expropriation continued. For example, on 27 May 1942, four 
hundred Poles and Lithuanians were executed in retaliation 
for the murder of two German civilians. On 31 March 1943, 
in response to anti-German sentiments in Vilnius, a line of 
about two hundred men was formed -- and every fifth one was 
shot. 1 
1 For general accounts of Lithuania during World War 
II, see Zenonas Ivinskis, "Lithuania During the War: 
Resistance Against the Soviet and Nazi Occupants," in 
Lithuania Under the Soviets: Portrait of a Nation, 1940-65, 
ed. V. Stanley Vardys (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 61-84; 
Bronis Kaslas, La Lithuanie et la Seconde Guerre Mondiale: 
Recueil des Documents (Lithuania and the Second World War: A 
Documentary Collection) (Paris: G.-P. Maisonneuve at Larose, 
1981); Algirdas J. Kasulaitis, Lithuanian Christian 
Democracy (Chicago: Leo XIII Fund, 1976), pp. 149-166; 
Benedict V. Maciuika, ed., Lithuania in the Last 30 Years. 
Subcontractor's Monograph prepared in the Division of the 
Social Sciences at the University of Chicago. HRAF 
Subcontract HRAF-1 Chi-1 (New Haven, CT: Human Relations 
Area Files, 1955), pp. 70-76. 
rhe 1941 rebellion and provisional government are 
covered in Algirdas Budreckis, The Lithuanian National 
Revolt of 1941 (South Boston: Lithuanian Encyclopedia Press, 
1968), esp. pp. 102-125; Zenonas lvinskis, "The Lithuanian 
Revolt Against the Soviets in 1941," Lituanus, 12, 2 (Summer 
1966), 5-19; Domas Krivickas, "Lithuania's Struggle Against 
Aggression and Subjugation," in Twenty Years' Struggle for 
f..reedom of Lithuania, ed. Juozas Audenas (New York: ELTA, 
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B· CHANGING PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOVIET UNION 
Hitler, who was the declared enemy of the West, had 
now attacked the Soviet Union. As the wartime alliance 
became cemented, the US was forced to choose the lesser of 
tWO evils. In other words, any enemy of Hitler was 
considered an ally. The rocky course of this unnatural 
relationship can be traced in the official propaganda of the 
time. When Stalin was on the move against Poland, Finland, 
and the Baltic States, he was branded an international 
criminal and expelled from the League of Nations. Outcries 
were heard in the public and press. However, after the 
United States entered the war and the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 
Alliance was signed on 26 May 1942, attacks on the Kremlin 
1963)' pp. 137-139. 
The Nazi occupation is addressed in Adolfas 
Damusis, Antinacine lietuviu rezistencija (Anti-Nazi 
Lithuanian Resistance), offprint from a series in Teviskes 
ziburiai (Lights of Homeland), 1974, 13-16; Hans-Dieter 
Handrack, "The Cultural Policy of the German Administration 
in the Reichskommissariat Ostland, 1941-44," in Fourth 
Conference on Baltic Studies: Summaries of Papers (Brooklyn: 
Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies, 1974), p. 
24; Bronius Kviklys, Lietuviu kova su naciais 1941-1944 m. 
(Lithuanians' Fight Against the Nazis 1941-1944) (Memmingen, 
West Germany: Mintis, 1946); Mecislovas Mackevicius, 
"Lithuanian Resistance to German Mobilization Attempts 1941-
1944," Lituanus, 32, 4 (Winter 1986), 9-22; Julius P. 
Slavenas, "Nazi Ideology and Policy in the Baltic States," 
Lituanus, 11, 1 (Spring 1965), 34-47. 
The communist interpretation of events in 
Lithuania during this period is found in Mecislovas 
Gedvilas, Lemiamas posukis: 1940-1945 metai (Decisive Turn 
~940-1945) (Vilnius: Vaga, 1975). Literature produced by 
Lithuanian writers who fled to Russia during the Nazi 
occupation is found in E. Miezelai tis, et al., eds., Kovu 
.2._Uslapiai (Pages of Battles) (Vilnius: Vaga, 1974). 
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were toned down in an effort to construct a superficial 
working relationship and harmony during the course of 
hostilities. The Red Army was perceived as a friend in the 
battle against the Third Reich -- though, of course, the 
matter of postwar settlements was in the back of everyone's 
mind. 
In a poll released on 22 December 1939, seventy 
percent of those Americans questioned believed that 
communist activities in the US were more serious than nazi 
actions. However, less than two months following the 
commencement of Operation Barbarossa, thirty-eight percent 
of Americans favored the inclusion of the Soviet Union in 
the Lend-Lease program, while thirty-nine percent were 
opposed. 2 
Of course, there was a small vocal communist 
movement in the US which fostered such attitudes. Regarding 
the Soviet occupation of Lithuania, leftist author Anna 
Louise Strong wrote that "a sovereign state was changing 
from capitalism to socialism quite constitutionally without 
destruction of life or property." 3 Gregory Meiksins 
asserted that Lithuania had never been independent and 




Cantril, ed., Public Opinion 1935-1946 
Princeton University Press, 1955), pp. 164, 
3 Anna Louise Strong, 
Workers Library Publishers, 
The New Lithuania 




Yet, the communists' influence was negligible, for 
it was members of the American mainstream who were also 
becoming supportive of the Soviets -- and often overlooking 
their transgressions. Vice President Henry A. Wallace, 
Harold Ickes, Senator E.D. Thomas, Walter Lippmann, and news 
commentator Elmer Davis were among those influential in 
forming public opinion regarding Soviet intentions during 
the war. Americans were inclined to respect the Soviets 
thanks to their victories in the East, while the Western 
allies were still waiting to throw all their force against 
Hitler. Some American writers even supported Russian 
ethnographic claims to the Baltic States. Though 
individuals such as Herbert Hoover and Robert Taft cautioned 
Americans to be more realistic in their appraisal of the 
Soviets, the paramount concern of the time appeared to be 
the maintenance of allied unity. 0 
4 Gregory Meiksins, The Baltic Soviet Republics (New 
York: National Council of American-Soviet Friendship, 1944). 
6 Jan Ciechanowski, Defeat in Victory (Garden City, NY: 
Doubleday, 1947), p. 97. Richard A. Schnorf, "The Baltic 
States in U.S.-Soviet Relations, 1939-1942," Lituanus, 12, 1 
(Spring 1966), 52-53; Schnorf, "The Baltic States in U.S.-
Soviet Relations: The Years of Doubt, 1943-1946," Li tuanus, 
12, 4 (Winter 1966), 57-58. Schnorf also writes: 
In one respect it is fortunate that the Soviet 
Union did not invade the Baltic States later than 
it did. If the Soviet Union had invaded the 
Baltic States after it had been invaded by 
Germany, its argument that the occupation was a 
defensive move might have been accepted by the 
Western world. If the Soviet Union had forced 
anti-German treaties on the Baltic States, with 
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us officials were acutely aware of their 
predicament. Once the alliance was on its way to formation, 
an anti-communist or anti-Soviet message could have been 
construed as fascist. Officials were hard pressed to make 
statements on the Soviet occupation of Lithuania, for they 
would immediately be branded as harmful to the alliance and 
the war effort. 6 Other officials, though, urged greater 
support for the Soviets. In a letter to Breden Bracken, 
presidential advisor Harry Hopkins wrote: 
We are having some difficulty with our public 
opinion with regard to Russia. The American 
people don't take aid to Russia easily. [A] 
lot of people sincerely believe that Stalin 
is a great menace to the world. Still I think it 
will come out all right in the end. 7 
Another official with similar opinions was Joseph E. Davies, 
the US ambassador to Moscow, who wrote: 
In my opinion, the Russian people, the Soviet 
the right of free passage of troops, the situation 
could have been tolerated in the democratic states 
in spite of the infringement of Baltic 
sovereignty. 
See his "The Baltic States in U.S.-Soviet Relations: From 
Truman to Johnson," Lituanus, 14, 3 (Fall 1968), 58. 
6 Antanas A. Olis, "JAV uzsienio politika sarysy su 
("US Foreign Policy and the Lithuanian 
Amerikos lietuviu tarybos suvaziavimas 
Lithuanian American Council) (Chicago: LAC, 
Lietuvos klausimu" 
Question"), in 
(Congress of the 
1954), p. 40. Though some officials who voiced wartime 
the Soviets died a professional death, Loy 





an illustrious career. See Schnorf, "The 
in U.S.-Soviet Relations 1943-1946," p. 
75. 
7 Quoted in Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins 
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), pp. 372-373. 
In an 
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government, and the Soviet leaders are moved, 
basically, by altruistic concepts. It is their 
purpose to promote the brotherhood of man and to 
improve the lot of the common people. They wish 
to create a society in which men live as equals, 
governed by ethical ideals. They are devoted to 
peace. 8 
address to twenty thousand people in Chicago in 
February 1942, Davies asserted that "by the testimony of 
performance and in my opinion, the word of honor of the 
soviet Government is as safe as the Bible." 9 Though perhaps 
oavies' confidence in the Kremlin was greater than that of 
most Americans, it, at least in part, reflected the currents 
of opinion in the United States during the course of World 
war I I . 
C. THE ATLANTIC CHARTER 
The Atlantic Charter, signed by President Roosevelt 
and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill on 14 August 
8 Joseph E. Davies, Mission to Moscow 
& Schuster, 1941), p. 511. 
(New York: Simon 
9 Quoted in William C. Bullitt, The Great Globe Itself 
(New York: Scribner's, 1946), p. 22. In the historical 
section of a handbook issued to US military personnel toward 
the end of hostilities, there was no mention of the Soviet 
aggression .of 1939-1940. See The USSR: Institutions and 
People. A brief Handbook for the use of Officers of the 
Armed Forces of the United States (Washington: US Government 
Printing Office, 1945). 
Even Sumner Welles, who had issued the 
nonrecognition declaration on 23 July 1940, incorrectly 
spoke of the "plebiscites of 1939," and added that "perhaps 
the peoples of the Baltic States desire to form an integral 
Part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." See his 
!..he Time for Decision (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1944), 
PP. 330, 333. 
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194 1, was a stirring declaration stating that neither the US 
nor Great Britain would seek increases in territory during 
and after hostilities. Further, territorial changes and 
forms of government would be determined in accordance with 
the wishes of the people of Europe. In addition, the 
signatories hoped "to see sovereign rights and self-
government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived 
of them. " 1 0 The Atlantic Charter was a moral pronouncement 
reminiscent of Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points. 
Nevertheless, it was not a formal treaty and did not possess 
binding force. 
By September 1941, Stalin had formally subscribed to 
the provisions of the Atlantic Charter, telling Anthony Eden 
that "he thought the Charter was directed against those who 
10 See The Atlantic Charter. or The Lifeboat of 
Millions of People who Lost Their Homes (Amberg: C. Mayr, 
1941); Algirdas Budreckis, "Liberation Attempts from 
Abroad," in Lithuania 700 Years, 2nd rev. ed., ed. Al bertas 
Gerutis (New York: Manyland, 1969), p. 379; E. Krepp, 
Security and Non-Aggression: Baltic States and U.S.S.R. 
Treaties of Non-Aggression (Stockholm: Estonian Information 
Centre I Latvian National Foundation, 1973), p. 30; US 
Department of State, In Quest of Peace and Security: 
Selected Documents on American Foreign Policy 1941-1951 
(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1951), p. 2. 
Assistant Secretary of State Adolph Berle 
responded to a note from Estonian Consul General Kaiv on 18 
September 1941 regarding the German presence in Estonia. In 
reiterating US policy, Berle referred Kaiv to the principles 
of the Atlantic Charter. See Policy of the United States of 
A.merica Towards Estonia (New York: Consulate General of 
Estonia, n.d.), p. 4. 
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were trying to get world domination. "
11 Roosevelt, and 
especially Churchill, were wary of Stalin's true intentions, 
on several occasions commenting that Stalin's actions were 
not consistent with the Charter. 12 Specifically, Stalin had 
agreed to the document on the basis of boundaries existing 
at the time of Hitler's move east, that is, with the Baltic 
states within the Soviet Union. British officials and some 
American pragmatists, such as Assistant Secretary of State 
Adolph Berle, were willing to concede this point, since 
Roosevelt had put off boundary settlements until after the 
war. 13 
While, on the one hand, Churchill sincerely declared 
that the 1941 boundaries were illegally constructed, 14 he 
could not realistically trade British interests for the 
Baltic. Early in 1942, Churchill wrote to Roosevelt: 
The increasing gravity of the war has led me to 
11 Herbert Feis, Churchill-Roosevelt-Stalin: The War 
They Waged and the Peace They Sought (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 27. 
12 Bullitt, p. 16; Winston S. Churchill, The Grand 
Alliance (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1950), p. 630. See also 
Latvian Legation Press Bureau, Latvia in 1939-1942: 
Background; Bolshevik and Nazi Occupation; Hopes for Future 
(Washington: Latvian Legation, 1942), pp. 58-59. 
13 Earl W. Jennison, Jr., Review Essay, Journal of 
l!_altic Studies, 6, 2-3 (Summer-Fall 1975), 223-224. Bernard 
Newman points out that even the Russian emigre liberal 
leader, Alexander Kerensky, defended the incorporation of 
the Baltic States because it was achieved prior to the 
Atlantic Charter. See his Baltic Background (London: Robert 
Hale, Ltd., 1948), p. 164. 
1
"" Churchill, The Grand Alliance, pp. 584-585. 
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feel that the principles of the Atlantic Charter 
ought not to be construed as to deny Russia the 
frontiers she occupied when Germany attacked her. 
This was the basis on which Russia acceded to the 
Charter. 1 ts 
churchill further was of the opinion that II in the deadly 
struggle it is not right to assume more burdens than those 
who are fighting for a great cause [the British] can 
bear. II 16 
Granted, Stalin's public statements expressed 
adherence to the Atlantic Charter's principles. But when 
the scales of war began tipping in his favor, he changed his 
posture and brought forth a list of territorial claims. As 
will be seen below, while hardly taken aback by this action, 
the West was forced to actively reassess its perception of, 
and position vis-a-vis, the Soviet Union. The realization 
that Moscow would be a power to contend with after the war 
was unsettling, to say the least. With this grew distrust 
and ambiguity regarding Soviet behavior following the 
10 Quoted in Fe is, p. 60. 
16 Quoted in Feis, p. 60. Schnorf, "The Baltic States 
in u.s.-soviet Relations, 1939-1942," p. 48, writes: 
Although Churchill's concern with Britain's self-
interest can be appreciated, exclusion of Russia 
from the principles of the Charter deprived the 
Baltic peoples of sorely needed support during a 
period when prospects for success could have been 
most favorable. If Britain had been able to hold 
firm regarding application of the Charter's 
principles to the Soviet Union, and if the United 
States had chosen to bargain, Lend Lease to the 
Soviet Union would have been an excellent vehicle 
for the improvement of the Baltic situation as 
well as for the post-war status of eastern Europe. 
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cessation of conflict. Be that as it may, the Western powers 
were still concerned with successfully concluding the war, 
and decided to place the issue on the backburner; boundaries 
•ere to be settled at a forthcoming peace conference -- a 
conference which was never formally completed. 
Following the Axis declaration of war on the US on 
11 December 1941, the Soviet Union attempted to utilize its 
new, good relations with the West. In the spring of the 
following year, the Kremlin requested that the US and 
Britain recognize Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia as 
incorporated components of the USSR, but both powers refused 
to do so. On the other hand, while the US was willing to 
symbolically support the Baltic cause, it realized that 
practical exigencies dictated a cautious approach, knowing 
full well that the US could not completely influence events 
in Eastern Europe -- and that the American people would not 
support a war with the Soviets following the defeat of the 
Nazis. 
What was the fate of the Atlantic Charter? Though 
the protocol of proceedings of the Yalta Conference of 
February 1945 reaffirmed the Charter's principles, on 19 
December 1944, President Roosevelt stated that it had never 
been formally signed, so that it did not have to be 
implemented. 17 
17 Aleksandras Merkelis, Antanas Smetana: Jo 
~uomenine, kulturine ir politine veikla (Antanas Smetana: 
!!...u Social, Cultural, and Political Activity) (New York: 
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American diplomacy sought and obtained repeated 
Soviet promises that governments and boundaries in 
liberated areas would be determined 
democratically, but at the price of avoiding 
further mention of past unpleasantries such as the 
Soviet annexation of the Baltic States and a chunk 
of Finland. This was not a policy of 
confrontation, but rather one of accomodation. 
The dubious rationale for this policy was that the 
Soviets would not feel compelled to turn their 
weak neighbors into client states for security 
reasons if assured that American friendship and 
the new international organization would protect 
them instead. American diplomats in Soviet-
liberated countries seemed honestly surprised when 
in 1944 and 1945 the Soviets set about reordering 
boundaries and governments according to their own 
definition of (democracy] . 10 
Kaslas adds: 
Clemenceau said that Wilson talked like Jesus 
Christ and acted like Lloyd George; much the same 
can be said for Roosevelt. The dichotomy between 
lofty principle and mundane action is a 
traditional characteristic of American foreign 
policy, and the Atlantic Charter is one of the 
loftier enunciations of principles which American 
presidents have produced, but American governments 
have never implemented. 19 
Perhaps Schnorf sums up the results of the Atlantic Charter 
best when he writes that fl this famous manifesto is today 
virtually forgotten except by those whose hopes of freedom 
American Lithuanian National Association, 1964), p. 664; 
Leonardas Simutis, Amerikos Lietuviu Taryba: 30 metu 
Lietuvos laisves kovoje 1940-1970 (Lithuanian American 
Council: 30 Year Struggle for the Liberation of Lithuania 
1940-1970) (Chicago: LAC, 1971), p. 77; US Department of 
State, In Quest of Peace and Security, p. 14. 
10 Jennison, p. 224. 
19 Bronis J. Kaslas, 
Against Lithuania (New York: 
p. 364. 
ed., The USSR-German Aggression 
Robert Speller & Sons, 1973), 
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expressed in its provisions." 20 
8 re 
The Atlantic Charter was, of course, the first act 
in the play of diplomacy surrounding the Second World War. 
The west had adopted a policy of non-predetermination, that 
is that victory was the immediate priority. Territorial 
questions would be addressed at a postwar peace conference. 
on 4 February 1942, Secretary of State Cordell Hull penned a 
memorandum to President Roosevelt, where he asserted that 
permanent political and territorial agreements during the 
course of hostilities would be contrary to the Atlantic 
Charter, and a reversal of US policy not recognizing 
forcible annexation. 21 
Hull was an old-fashioned Jeffersonian liberal who 
remembered the problems Wilson had in 1919 when 
confronted with the secret treaties of the Allies. 
Hull would adamantly oppose any secret deals while 
the war was still in progress. He would strive 
mightily for an international organization that 
could maintain the peace after the war. 22 
Sumner Welles, Adolph Berle, and State Department careerists 
shared Hull's view and, further, were suspicious of both 
British and Soviet imperialism. Old World diplomacy, with 
its spheres of influence and balances of power, was to give 
20 Schnorf, "The Bal tic States in U.S.-Soviet 
Relations, 1939-1942," p. 47. 
21 Schnorf, "The Bal tic States in 
1943-1946," p. 57; I. Vizulis, 
Allied Powers Toward the Baltic States 
.!i_eview, 35 (August 1968), 52, 58-59. 
U.S.-Soviet Relations 
"The Diplomacy of the 
(1942-1945)," Baltic 
22 Edmund R. Padvaiskas, "World War II Russian-American 
Relations and the Bal tic States: A Test Case," Li tuanus, 28, 
2 (Summer 1982), 7. 
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waY to democratic diplomacy. Roosevelt was a politician who 
bad risen to power through dealing and trading. He was 
confident that his charm and negotiating skills would 
ultimately carry the day for a democratic Europe. 2 s 
Roosevelt's first wartime test would come during the Anglo-
soviet negotiations of 1941-1942. 
o. THE ANGLO-SOVIET TREATY OF ALLIANCE 
As noted above, Stalin pressed for Western 
recognition of Soviet gains in the Baltic. British Foreign 
secretary Anthony Eden spoke with him on this matter in 
December 1941. Stalin added that this was a condition for 
an Anglo-Soviet agreement. Eden replied that he could not 
commit to territorial arrangements. Churchill agreed, yet 
by early 1942 he did not feel "that this moral position 
could be physically maintained. " 24 Churchill wrote 
Roosevelt a letter on 7 March 1942 pleading: 
23 
The increasing gravity of the war has led me to 
feel that the principles of the Atlantic Charter 
ought not to be construed so as to deny Russia 
the frontier she occupied when Germany attacked 
her. This was the basis on which Russia acceded 
to the Charter . I hope, therefore, that you 
willbe able to give us a free hand to sign the 
treaty which Stalin desires [T]here is very 
little we can do to help the only country that is 
Padvaiskas, pp. 7-8. 
24 Winston S. Churchill, The Grand Alliance (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1950), pp. 558-559; Churchill, The Second 
~orld War (London: Cassel & Co., 1951), IV, 292-294. See 
also Merkelis, p. 664; Kaarel R. Pusta, "How Has Russia Been 
'Rewarded'?" Baltic Review, l, 4-5 (July-August 1946), 235. 
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heavily engaged with the German armies. 2 ~ 
Hull urged Roosevelt not to endorse such an arrangement. 
Roosevelt appealed directly to Stalin to omit territorial 
matters from the treaty. Stalin answered that he was merely 
taking note of the president's position. 26 
Though Roosevelt's motives appeared noble, George 
Kennan is of a different opinion: 
[O]ne does not get . the impression that 
Roosevelt had any substantive objections -- any 
real political objections to seeing these 
[Baltic and Polish] areas go Russian, or indeed 
that he cared much about the issue for its own 
sake. One gets the impression that it seemed to 
him of little importance whether these areas were 
Polish or Russian. His anxiety was rather that he 
had a large body of voting constituents in this 
country of Polish or Baltic origin, and a further 
number who sympathized with the Poles, and he 
simply did not want this issue to become a factor 
in domestic politics 27 
In a series of conversations in February-April 1942, 
Roosevelt, Sumner Welles, and British Ambassador Lord 
Halifax discussed the negotiations with the Kremlin. Among 
the options discussed were the right of the Soviets to 
2 ~ Churchill, The Hinge of Fate (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1950), p. 285. W. Phillips Davison attributes an 
utterance to Churchill, which states that if Hitler invaded 
Hell, he would speak favorably of the Devil in the House of 
Commons. See his "The Public Opinion Process," in Policy-
Making in American Government, ed. Edward V. Schneier (New 
York: Basic Books, 1969), pp. 17-18. 
26 Feis, p. 59; US Department of State, Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1942, III (Washington: US 
Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 505-512. 
27 George F. Kennan, Russia and the West Under Lenin 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
l!_ n d Stalin (Boston: Little, Brown, 1961), p. 357. See also 
Feis, p. 60; Vizulis, p. 53. 
141 
sess military bases in the Baltic following the war, or poS 
their right to control Baltic foreign and defense policy. 
implied that he favored the latter option. If 
this were done, Soviet demands for security could be 
reconciled with the Atlantic Charter. Halifax noted that 
the soviet demands could be greater. Further, the USSR's 
presence in the Baltic would translate into greater security 
against possible future German aggression. Welles countered 
by asking as to what kind of peace could be created if the 
us and Britain: 
agreed upon selling out millions of people who 
looked to us as their one hope in the future and 
if that new world order were based upon the 
domination of unwilling, resentful, and potent 
minorities by a State to which they would never 
give willing allegiance. 28 
Lord Halifax felt that Washington was not being realistic. 
For him, Baltic self-government did not outweigh having a 
friendly and cooperative Kremlin during and after the war. 
Soon thereafter, Welles transmitted an idea from Roosevelt. 
Roosevelt's offer was US approval of British acceptance of 
Soviet demands if Baltic residents who did not wish to live 
under a Soviet regime would be allowed to leave with their 
property. 29 
Assistant Secretary Berle forcefully condemned this 
28 US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
Q_nited States, 1942, III, pp. 519-520. 
29 US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
.!L._nited States, 1942, III, pp. 512-526, 538. 
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idea. He supported a US-style Good Neighbor policy in the 
Baltic, conceded that the Baltic States could not be 
springboards for invasion from the west, and felt that the 
soviets should have access to the Baltic Sea. 
urged observance of the Atlantic Charter, 
However, he 
saying that 
implementation of the proposed policy would be a "Baltic 
Munich." In such a case, the US: 
would have committed [itself] to the seizure of 
the territory, provided there is added some pious, 
and in the existing circumstances, meaningless 
phrase about free immigration of populations to 
places unknown, on conditions unspecified, and in 
any case, with the complete sacrifice of their 
tradition, their property, their habits, and 
possibly even their language and race. 30 
Evidently the Roosevelt property proposal was a trial 
balloon. Welles informed Berle that both he and the 
president were opposed to such a policy. If the current 
Kremlin demands were met, more would be sure to follow. 
Emigration would be a last resort to prevent complete 
enslavement if the Soviets remained in the Baltic. 31 Welles 
added: 
I have felt more strongly on this issue, namely, 
the conclusion of this treaty, than on any matter 
which has [come] before me in recent years. The 
attitude of the British Government is, in my 
judgement, not only indefensible from every moral 
30 US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1942, Ill, pp. 539-540. 
31 US Department of State, Foreign Relations 
!!.nited States, 1942, Ill, pp. 541-542. 
of the 
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standpoint, but likewise extraordinarily stupid. 32 
Roosevelt was not going to endorse any territorial 
agreement in the current negotiations, preferring a military 
alliance creating a second front. Indeed the president may 
have repudiated a territory-based agreement outright. The 
Kremlin gave up the territorial clauses, realizing that 
recognition of its conquests was not forthcoming. In 
addition, the Germans had halted the Soviet counter-attack 
in the eastern Ukraine, and the Kremlin was increasingly 
dependent upon American aid. Finally, a simple treaty of 
Anglo-Soviet alliance was signed on 26 May 1942. 33 
E. THE WARTIME CONFERENCES 
Though Roosevelt won this diplomatic battle, he 
could not ignore practical reality. In a March 1943 
conference with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, 
Roosevelt stated that American public opinion would be 
opposed to a final postwar absorption of the Baltic States. 
However, he could not force the Soviets to do anything. The 
president hoped that Stalin would, at least, go through the 
motions of a second plebisctite, and was confident that 
recognition of Soviet control in the Baltic could be 
32 US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1942, III, pp. 540-541. 
33 Feis, p. 61; Padvaiskas, pp. 21-22; Schnorf, "The 
Baltic States in U.S.-Soviet Relations, 1939-1942," pp. 51-
53; Vizulis, p. 54. 
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utilized as a bargaining chip for Soviet concessions in 
34 
other areas. In July of that year, Roosevelt told the 
polish ambassador: "The problem of the Baltic States, and 
particularly that of Lithuania will be much more difficult. 
What can we do if Stalin calmly announces, for 
instance, that the question of Lithuania must be left out of 
the discussion?" 315 
As the Moscow foreign ministers' conference of 
October 1943 approached, the Western allies were slowly 
proceeding up the Italian peninsula and Soviet troops were 
crossing the Dnieper River on a broad front. Secretary Hull 
did not receive instructions to discuss the Baltic. 
However, in a 5 October conference, President Roosevelt 
spelled out his plans for the upcoming Teheran conference: 
As for Poland and the Baltic States, the President 
said that, when he should meet with Stalin, he 
intended to appeal to him on grounds of high 
morality. He would say to him that neither 
Britain nor we would fight Russia over the Baltic 
States, but that in Russia's own interest it 
would be a good thing for her . to hold a 
second plebiscite in the Baltic countries. 36 
34 
.Feis, p. 122; Padvaiskas, pp. 23-24. Padvaiskas 
notes that the president informed W. Averill Harriman that 
he, Roosevelt, would personally negotiate matters involving 
the Baltic States. He also notes that Sumner Welles 
resigned in September 1943 over personality clashes with 
Secretary Hull. Thus was lost a strong defender of the 
Atlantic Charter. 
3 l5 Ciechanowski, p. 186. 
36 Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, ed. 
Walter Johnson (New York: Macmillan, 1948), p. 1266; Arnolds 
Spekke, Latvia and the Baltic Problem (London: Latvian 
Information Bureau, 1952), p. 65. See also Schnorf, "The 
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·me Minister Churchill, though, did give Anthony Eden pre-
Prl 
Moscow advice on the Baltic. It turned out, though, to be 
"We 
an 
reaffirm the principles of the Atlantic 
charter, noting that Russia's accession thereto is based 
upon the frontiers of June 22, 1941. We also take note of 
the historic frontiers of Russia before the two [world] wars 
H,37 
When Hull returned from Moscow on 15 November, he 
declared that the Baltic and Balkan states deserve the right 
of self-determination. Each state, regardless of size, was 
sovereign and equal, according to Hull. Despite such high-
minded -- and vague -- pronouncements, true State Department 
opinions regarding Moscow were pessimistic. When 
encountering this, Jan Ciechanowski, Polish ambassador to 
the US, surmised "that, as far as could then be ascertained, 
America and Britain had had to sacrifice the three Baltic 
countries and half of Poland to Russia for the sake of 
understanding with the Soviets." 38 
A number of observers in official circles were not 
surprised by the outcome of the Moscow conference, and the 
direction that East-West relations appeared to be taking. 
Baltic States in U.S.-Soviet Relations 
59. 
3 7 Church i 11 , _C~l_o_s-'--i ___ n__.g..._ __ t_h_e __ R_i_n~g 
Mifflin, 1952), p. 283. 
1943-1946," p. 
(Boston: Houghton 
38 Ciechanowski, p. 228. See also Grigas Valancius, 
b.__ietuva ir Karaliauciaus krastas (Lithuania and Konigsberg) 
(Kirchheim-Teck, West Germany: Author, 1946), p. 7. 
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indeed, Admiral William Leahy expressed his pessimism 
shortlY before the conference: 
America's position at this conference might be 
very difficult because of our reputation for 
reliability and our previous announcement that the 
sovereignty of small nations should be 
reestablished after the war's end. It was 
inconceivable to me that Stalin would submit to 
the reestablishment of effective sovereignty in 
Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. 39 
It is not certain whether Hull ever discussed the Baltic 
with Stalin at Moscow. What is certain is that the Baltic 
states did not emerge in a more favorable position -- a 
pattern which was repeating itself. 40 
Direct discussion of the Baltic States was not on 
the agenda of the December 1943 Teheran conference, which 
was the first time that Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin met 
together. Yet, the issue did arise and Roosevelt 
immediately sought to appease Stalin. Roosevelt noted the 
historical place of the Baltic States as a part of Russia, 
and "jokingly" added that he did not intend to go to war 
over the territory. He was worried, however, about public 
opinion in the us vis-a-vis self-determination and 
referenda, specifically mentioning Baltic-American voters. 
He urged Stalin to carry out a plebiscite in the Baltic, for 
he was certain that Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians 
39 William D. Leahy, I Was There (New York: Whittlesey 
House, 1950), p. 185. 
"'
0 Schnorf, "The Baltic States in U.S.-Soviet Relations 
1943-1946," pp. 62-63. 
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would vote to join the Soviet Union. 
Stalin replied that there had not been any outcry of 
world opinion when the Czar did not grant autonomy to the 
Baltic States at the turn of the century. Further, the 
Baltic people had voted to join the Soviet Union in 1940. 
He also astonishingly suggested that the Western powers 
carry out a propaganda campaign in their countries to sway 
people to accept Soviet power in the Baltic. With that, 
Stalin closed the door on further discussion of the matter, 
and Roosevelt left it at that. 41 
Schnorf takes Roosevelt to task for this 
conversation. He cannot reconcile what the president said 
with the Atlantic Charter and the Declaration of the United 
Nations, though he admits that Roosevelt may have attempted 
false flattery to keep the Baltic issue alive. 42 Schnorf 
also finds a problem with Roosevelt's assertion that the 
Baltic States have traditionally been a part of Russia, 
noting that those territories have lived apart from Russia 
41 Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins (New York: 
Harper & Brothers, 1950), p. 796; US Department of State, 
Digest of International Law, ed. Marjorie M. Whiteman 
(Washington:. US Government Printing Office, 1964), III, pp. 
219-222; US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo 
and Teheran, 1943 (Washington: US Government Printing 
Office, 1961), pp. 594-595; Vizulis, p. 55. 
42 Vizulis, p. 56, writes that Roosevelt's proposal for 
a second plebiscite was based on genuine disinformation 
regarding the circumstances surrounding the 1940 
Plebiscites. Others contend that the president utilized it 
as a diplomatic tactic. 
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ionger than within it. 43 He summarizes the proceedings as 
follows: 
The conversation dulled to a great extent the keen 
moral edge of the United States policy of July 23, 
1940. Although the United States did not renounce 
that policy, it made no serious attempt to deter 
the Soviet Union from repeating its rape of the 
Baltic States. The diplomats from the Baltic 
countries had been powerless when the massive 
influence of the Soviet Union came to bear on the 
United States. Seized with fear of a separate 
Russo-German peace, the American Government no 
longer could afford the luxury of condemning 
devious processes. [T]he Teheran Conference 
marked the low point in relations between the 
United States and the Baltic States as represented 
by its diplomats. The slim thread of non-
recognition of the Soviet annexation was not 
broken, but it was tightly stretched. 44 
other commentators criticize President Roosevelt's actions 
at Teheran, noting that he explicitly stated that Stalin's 
position in the Baltic would not be challenged. The Soviets 
had made the Baltic a test case a test which the US 
failed. 40 
43 Schnorf, "The Baltic States in U.S.-Soviet Relations 
1943-1946," pp. 64-65. 
44 Schnorf, "The Bal tic States in U.S. -Soviet Relations 
1943-1946," p. 66. By using the phrase "devious 
processes," Schnorf is making a reference to words used in 
the Welles Declaration. 
40 Padvaiskas, p. 27; Vizulis, pp. 55-56. In a letter 
to a friend dated 2 September 1944, James V. Forrestal 
angrily wrote: 
I find that whenever any American suggests that we 
act in accordance with the needs of our own 
security, he is called a god-damned fascist and 
imperialist, while if Uncle Joe [Stalin] suggests 
that he needs the Baltic Provinces, half of 
Poland, all of Bessarabia, and access to the 
Mediterranean, all hands agree that he is a fine, 
frank, candid and generally delightful fellow who 
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world War I I did not stop for conferences. It 
ground on and the fortunes of the Allies gradually improved. 
stalingrad. where the Germans were dealt a crushing defeat, 
was the beginning of the end of the Third Reich. The Red 
ArmY began sweeping the Nazi armies back westward across the 
continent. In the West, plans were successfully implemented 
for the invasion of Europe on D-Day, 6 June 1944, opening a 
second major front. Coincidentally, the Germans retreated 
from Lithuania that same month. As the war's end came 
within sight, political and territorial settlements could no 
longer be ignored. The Allies would grapple with these 
matters at the final major wartime conference -- Yalta. 46 
The US and Britain entered the Yalta conference with 
no illusions as to the fate of the Baltic States, in 
is very easy to deal with because he is so 
explicit in what he wants. 
Quoted in Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New 
York: Viking, 1951), p. 14. 
46 Vizulis, p. 54. Sumner Welles, p. 333, though no 
longer in government, grappled with those issues at the same 
time, revealing the ascendancy of pragmatism over idealism: 
To remove all grounds for justifiable criticism 
and to make doubly sure that the frontiers of the 
future Russia will incorporate willing, rather 
than unwilling, Soviet citizens, the Soviet 
government would be well-advised to permit open 
plebiscites to be taken in every instance where 
there is a dispute as to the will of the majority, 
and to permit all individuals who do not wish to 
become Soviet citizens to depart freely with their 
possessions, and with due compensation for the 
real property they are obliged to abandon. 
Vitas' emphasis. This from the man who but two years 
earlier had emphatically rejected similar proposals as "not 
only indefensible from every moral standpoint, but likewise 
extraordinarily stupid." See this chapter, note 32. 
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particular, and Eastern Europe, in general. With the Red 
ArmY controlling half of the continent, there was little 
that the Western powers could do to restrain Stalin. 47 
Indeed during the planning for Yalta, John Hickerson, deputy 
director of European affairs at the State Department, wrote 
a secret memorandum to the secretary of state on 8 January 
1945 pointing this out and suggesting a solution: 
We know that the three Baltic States have been 
re-incorporated into the Soviet Union and that 
nothing which we can do can alter this. It is not 
a question of whether we like it . The point 
is that it has been done and nothing which is 
within the power of the United States Government 
to do can undo it. 
I would favor using any bargaining power that 
exists in connection with the foregoing matters to 
induce the Russians to go along with a 
satisfactory United Nations organization. I 
would favor . our recognition of these areas 
as Soviet territory. 48 
Thus some US officials were ready to concede everything to 
Stalin, even the nonrecognition policy, which had been an 
expression of American morality applied to the international 
arena. 
Yalta was also the place where the Soviets pressed 
for the admission of Soviet Lithuania, 
Ukraine to the new United Nations. 
47 Richard F. Fenno, Jr., ed., 
(Boston: D.C. Heath, 1955), p. 91. 
Byelorussia, and the 
The Soviet law of 1 
The Yalta Conference 
48 US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
~nited States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Malta 
and Yalta, 1945 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 
1955), pp. 94-95. Vitas' emphasis. Hickerson also noted 
the necessity of carrying out a program to prepare public 
opinion for recognition. 
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february 1944 gave each Union Republic the right to 
establish direct relations with foreign countries, conclude 
agreements, and exchange representatives. They were also 
authorized to establish their own ministries of foreign 
affairs. Such decisions belong to the Supreme Soviet of 
each Union Republic. However, concurrently, the USSR 
ministry of foreign affairs was transferred from the All-
union category of ministry to the Union-Republic class. 
Whereas the former means that it possesses no counterpart in 
the country, the latter class creates corresponding 
ministries with direction and control emanating from Moscow. 
Indeed while the war was still in progress, Lithuania, 
Byelorussia, and the Ukraine concluded exchange of 
population and repatriation agreements with the government 
reconstituted in Poland, the Lublin Committee. Despite the 
initial Soviet dream of having all Union Republics 
represented in the UN, ultimately only Byelorussia and the 
Ukraine were admitted. 49 
Though Churchill was more of a realist, Roosevelt 
and Secretary of State Edward Stettinius were of the opinion 
that friendly contacts led to successful diplomacy. Yet, 
Churchill achieved the same result in the Baltic, mainly 
49 Fenno, p. 12; Kazimierz Grzybowski, Soviet Public 
lnternational Law: Doctrines and Diplomatic Practice 
(Leyden, The Netherlands: A.W. Sijthoff, 1970), pp. 90-92. 
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because he saw no other alternative; it was too late. 00 
Roosevelt possessed a vision of a postwar world controlled 
bY benevolent powers. He brushed off warnings of Stalin's 
dubious intentions: 
I just have a hunch that Stalin isnt't that kind 
of man. Harry [Hopkins] tells me he's not and 
that he doesn't want anything but security for his 
country. I think that if I give him everything I 
possibly can and ask for nothing in return, he 
won't try to annex anything and will work with me 
for a world of peace and democracy. 01 
Four years prior to Yalta, Roosevelt condemned Stalin for 
the incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Now he 
saw only a benign Stalin, not merely as a diplomatic tactic, 
but seemingly privately, as well. 
The Yalta communique of 11 February 1945 professed 
adherence to the idealistic principles of the Atlantic 
Charter, but also confirmed the division of Europe into 
military zones. 02 By war's end, Roosevelt had abandoned 
principles of equality and sovereignty in favor of a 
sometimes arrogant view of smaller nations, whose 
sovereignties he easily traded. He would not bargain with 
them, but was prepared to dictate their place in the new 
5
° Fenno, pp. 41-49; 
U.S.-Soviet Relations 
Welles, Seven Decisions 
Harper & Brothers, 1951). 
Schnorf, "The Baltic States in 
1943-1946," p. 70; Sumner 
That Shaped History (New York: 
G1 Quoted in Fenno, p. 41. 
52 Budreckis, p. 379; 
Institutions and People, pp. 
Fenno, 
110-111. 
p. 52; The USSR: 
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d ts3 world or er. This was not just to placate Stalin, but 
simply because he no longer cared about Lithuania and other 
secondary powers. As such, the "Yalta decisions necessarily 
broke the back of opposition to Communist rule, not only in 
po land, but in every country that had been or was about to 
be overrun by Russian armies."ts 4 
Other observers felt that the West was not 
completely impotent at Yalta, and that it could have exerted 
its influence to change the situation in eastern Europe. 
Patrick J. Hurley, US ambassador to China during the 
conference, later testified: 
America was in a position at Yalta to speak the 
only language the Communists understand, the 
language of power. One quiet sentence to 
Marshal Stalin in that language could have 
indicated that America would require him to keep 
his solemn agreements. The sentence was not 
forthcoming. [At] the time of Yalta the 
tss Fenno, p. 40. See also Polish American Congress, A 
Memorandum to the Senate of the United States on the Crimea 
Decisions Concerning Poland (np: PAC, 1945). 
In February 1945, a delegation of the Lithuanian 
American Council visited the chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, Senator Thomas Connaly, who announced: 
You, the representatives of small nations, are 
wasting your own time and the time of others, as 
if not knowing that the small nations began the 
World War. We must see to it that such events do 
not repeat themselves in the future. 
Simutis, pp. 80-81. 
ts 4 Fenno, p. 44. .Fenno, p. 48, writes of an 
unidentified senior US official who commented on Roosevelt's 
health: 
The Presidnet looked physically 
Casablanca; but his mind worked well. 
there were signs of loss of memory. 




At Yalta he 
nor express 
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United States had unquestionable power to make 
Russia respect her agreements, but instead 
we surrendered them in secret. Russia did not 
have to break her agreements or commitments. 66 
F. THE WAR ENDS 
According to one scholar, Lithuanians "had the firm 
belief that Nazi Germany would first crush the Soviet Union 
and then, in turn, be defeated by the Anglo-American 
alliance, which would restore Europe on an ante bellum 
status. " 66 However, that was not to be, and the victorious 
powers met at Potsdam in July-August 1945. The Potsdam 
declaration of 3 August did not mention the Baltic States. 
However, certain inferences existed in Section VI, "City of 
Koenigsberg and the Adjacent Area," which grew out of 
Stalin's claim to the city. He said that this had been 
agreed to at Teheran by President Roosevelt and Prime 
66 US Senate, Committees on Armed Services and Foreign 
Relations, Hearings on the Military Situation in the Far 
East (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1951), 
quoted in Fenno, p. 57. 
Following Yalta, the State Department issued the 
following statement on 4 March 1945: 
. as far as the United States are concerned, 
the status of the Baltic States has not altered in 
any way, not even after the Yalta conference. 
the Baltic States Lithuania, Latvia, and 
Estonia were still acknowledged by the State 
Department. 
Budreckis, p. 393; Bruno Chevrier, "The International Status 
of the Baltic States," Baltic Review, 1, 6 (November 1946), 
p. 271. Vitas' emphasis. The emphasized portion implies 
the State Department's grave interpretation of Yalta vis-a-
vis the Baltic States. 
"a Budreckis, p. 379. 
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Minister Churchill. President Harry Truman did not oppose 
stalin's claim, but Churchill contended that the provision 
would imply recognition. He recommended that the question 
be deferred until a final peace settlement; Stalin assented 
to this.a 7 As a result, Section VI of the Declaration wrote 
that the US and Britain will support at the "forthcoming 
peace settlement" the Soviet proposal to transfer that area 
to the USSR. It appears to indicate that ultimately the 
western powers intended to agree to the Baltic 
incorporation, for it is difficult to discern how a transfer 
of the adjacent area of East Prussia could be accomplished 
without including Lithuania.as 
The Paris Peace Conference convened on 29 July 1946. 
Prior to this, the Soviets had attempted to place the 
foreign ministers of the Baltic SSRs in the Soviet 
delegation. This was met with protests by the Baltic 
diplomats in the US. Lithuanian Minister Povilas Zadeikis 
a 7 Harry S. Truman, 
Doubleday, 1955), p. 378. 
Memoirs I (Garden City, NY: 
aa Robert Langer, Seizure of Territory: The Stimson 
Doctrine and Related Principles in Legal Theory and 
Diplomatic Practice (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1947), pp. 283-284; Lithuanian Legation, Some Aspects 
of the Soviet Russian Rule in Occupied Lithuania June 15, 
1940 - June 15, 1950: Ten Years of Lithuania's Sufferings 
Under Foreign Tyranny (Washington: Lithuanian Legation, 
1950), pp. 24-25; William Tung, International Law in an 
Organizing World (New York: Crowell, 1968), pp. 283-284; US 
Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: 
Diplomatic Papers, The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam 
Conference), 1945 (Washington: US Government Printing 
Office, 1960), I, II. 
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wrote to Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson: 
It actually means that the Soviet Government still 
persists in selling to the Western Democratic 
Powers the false idea that the Lithuanian nation 
voluntarily discarded their hard-won independence 
[It] means that the Soviet dictatorship is 
in fact a foe of democracy, of the Four Freedoms, 
of the Atlantic Charter, and of the principle of 
self-determination. The bringing of 
[Lithuanian SSR Foreign Minister P.F.] Rotomskis 
to Paris appears to be the latest trick of the 
Soviet diplomatic game. I consider it my 
duty to register my protest against any attempts 
by Mr. Rotomskis to represent the Lithuanian 
people and against any move to consider him as a 
legal representative of the Lithuanian Republic. 09 
It was hoped by some that the US atomic monopoly would force 
the Baltic States onto the conference's agenda. This was 
not to be. Indeed the Paris conference reinforced the 
divided Europe created during the wartime consultations, for 
it never led to any formal peace treaty. 00 
09 Povilas Zadeikis, letter to Acting Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson, no. 1237, 29 July 1946, pp. 1-2. See 
also Martin Brakas, "Lithuania's International Status: Some 
Legal Aspects 2," Baltic Review, 38 (August 1971), 11. 
60 Budreckis, p. 395; James F. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly 
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), p. 114; Schnorf, "The 
Baltic States in U.S.-Soviet Relations: From Truman to 
Johnson," pp. 43-44; "The Soviet Baltic Quislings in Paris," 
Baltic Review, 1, 6 (November 1946), pp. 319-320. 
See also Lietuvos TSR Auksciausiosios Tarybos 
Prezidiumo organizacinis-informacinis skyrius (Lithuanian 
SSR Supreme Soviet Organization-Information Section), 
Lietuvos TSR administracinis-teritorinis suskirstymas 1959 
m. vasario 1 dienai (Lithuanian SSR Administrative-
Territorial Divisions as of 1 February 1959) (Vilnius: State 
Political and Scientific Press, 1959); Aleksandras Stromas, 
folitine samone Lietuvoje (Political Consciousness in 
Lithuania) (London: Nida, 1980); US Office of Military 
Government for Germany, Legal Division, Gesetzliche 
Yorschriften der Amerikanischen Militarregierung in 
Deutschland (Statutory Instructions of the American Military 
Q_overnment in Germany), Issue A, 1 June 1946 -- Issue H, 16 
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Vizulis writes: 
Were the Baltic countries the price the Western 
Allies had to pay the Soviet Union to win the war 
with Nazi Germany? . . The triumph of victory, 
as Winston Churchill has said, soon turned into 
the tragedy of the cold war, the cause of Berlin, 
Korea, and Vietnam. Nor was the cause of 
international justice served by the subjugation of 
the Baltic countries by Soviet tyranny. The 
tragedy now finished, all that was left was for 
the actors to leave the darkened stage. 61 
schnorf adds that there was less notoriety surrounding the 
Baltic absorption of 1944-1945 than the first one in 1940. 
At the end of the war, "there was no longer a real Baltic 
issue in the United States. " 62 
Many to this day criticize the West's diplomatic 
behavior during and after World War II. Sabaliunas points 
out that: 
the Baltic mentality has never fully 
understood the Anglo-Saxon conception of 
diplomacy, which Harold Nicolson has labeled as 
"mercantile." It rejects the notion that 
diplomacy is war by other means and, instead, 
stresses the need for a frank discussion, mutual 
concessions, conciliation, appeasement, credit, 
reasonableness. In general, the purpose of such a 
diplomacy is a peace of accomodation, not victory, 
and it is certainly more conducive to 
international stability than a theory which sees 
January 1948. Printed by Publishing Operations Branch, 
Information Control Division, Office of Military Government 
for Bavaria. 
61 Vizulis, p. 57. 
02 Schnorf, "The Baltic States in U.S.-Soviet Relations 
1943-1946," p. 74. 
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negotiation as a military campaign. 63 
others assert, however, that Stalin took advantage of 
western war-weariness 64 and utilized an approach to 
diplomacy far removed from the Anglo-Saxon model: 
Stalin was a survivor of the Bolshevik underground 
and tsarist prisons, the formidable victor in the 
power struggle and purge, the killer of Trotsky, 
Bukharin, and literally millions of others. Above 
all he understood power, how to seize, retain, and 
wield it. This was a different school than Groton 
or Harvard, and his political experience involved 
something more than defeating Republican ward 
bosses or presidential contenders. 65 
In the final analysis, the West could have pushed 
Stalin to make concessions at the height of the war when the 
USSR was at its weakest. A separate Soviet agreement with 
Hitler was a remote possibility. Hitler would never have 
retreated from captured territory, and by such an 
arrangement, Stalin would have had much to lose and little 
to gain. 
Yet, once Stalin possessed the ability to do so, he 
would have abrogated any agreement unfavorable to him. The 
presence of the Red Army in eastern Europe would have easily 
enabled him to do so. Be that as it may, such an abrupt 
63 Leonas Sabaliunas, "Baltic Perspectives: The 
Disillusionment With the West and the Choices Ahead," 
Lituanus, 14, 2 (Summer 1968), p. 11. See also Harold 
Nicolson, Diplomacy, 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1960), pp. 51-54. 
64 
"Kremlin Tactics in Converting the Baltic States 
Into Satellites," Baltic Review, 7 (16 June 1956), 13. 
65 Padvaiskas, p. 9. 
159 
Kremlin policy switch as the war progressed would have 
possessed two positive results. First: 
second: 
from the standpoint of international law and world 
opinion, the Soviets would have had to face the 
consequences of violating their own international 
pledges and commitments. The Baltic countries 
could have strengthened their international 
position by virtue of this legal commitment on the 
part of the Soviet Union to restore their 
independence. 66 
If the Soviet Union had demurred [in its 
international obligations), its refusal would have 
provided the United States with an early 
indication of Soviet 
self-interest, as well 
could then better have 
at ensuing conferences 
intentions; and American 
as international morality, 
influenced American conduct 
with the Soviets. 67 
Thus had the West remained firm in its commitment to 
Lithuania and the other Baltic States, Stalin's actions 
ultimately would have strengthened their status, as well as 
served to warn the US and Britain. That, of course, was 
never to be. The Truman Doctrine, the Cold War, and the 
policy of containment emerged not as a result of wartime 
planning -- but more as an unavoidable afterthought. 
The policy of nonrecognition had survived the Second 
World War, though some US officials had been willing to 
discard it. But its ultimate objects of concern, the Baltic 
States, were now firmly entrenched well beyond the Iron 
Curtain. Prospects for restored independence as a result of 
66 Vizulis, p. 59. 
67 Schnorf, "The Baltic States in U.S.-Soviet 
Relations: From Truman to Johnson," p. 59. 
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the war did not come to pass. What emerged was a hollow, 
symbolic independence hanging from the thin political thread 
of nonrecognition. 
CHAPTER VII 
EXTENDED IMPLEMENTATION OF NONRECOGNITION 
A. EXECUTIVE ACTION 
As noted in the previous chapter, the nonrecognition 
policy did indeed survive the trying times of World War II. 
on various occasions, the US government has reaffirmed the 
policy by way of public statements made by presidents and 
secretaries of state, 1 official certifications, 2 and 
1 Janis Skrundens, Latvia 1918-1968 (New York: American 
Latvian Association, 1968), p. 75; US Department of State, 
"For the Press No. 90: Statement by Secretary of State John 
Foster Dulles for Lithuanian and Estonian National Days," 16 
February 1953; US Department of State, "For the Press No. 
67: Statement by Acting Secretary of State Walter Bedell 
Smith on the 36th Anniversary of the Declaration of 
Lithuanian Independence," 15 February 1954. See also 
Algirdas M. Budreckis, ed., The Lithuanians in America 1651-
1975: A Chronology & Fact Book (Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana, 
1976), pp. 140-142. 
In one of Dulles' public statements, he wrote: 
The United States was quick to denounce this 
aggression, and refused to recognize the forced 
incorporation of the Baltic States into the 
U.S.S.R. 
Quoted in Policy of the United States of America Towards 
Estonia (New York: Consulate General of Estonia, nd), p. 11. 
Since it took about six weeks for the US government to 
formally condemn the occupation, it is questionable whether 
"quick" is an appropriate word. 
161 
162 
formal policy statements, the latest of which is reproduced 
in Appendix A. 3 Baltic affairs are monitored in the US 
state Department not by the Soviet desk, but by a separate 
Baltic desk. This is the official governmental watchdog 
over the nonrecognition policy. 
In addition, the Baltic charges d'affaires receive 
national day greetings from the secretary of state to 
coincide with their respective countries' independence days. 
This is the custom followed toward all accredited ministers 
in Washington. An example of such a greeting is the 8 
February 1968 letter of Secretary of State Dean Rusk to 
Joseph Kajeckas, the Lithuanian charge: 
On the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of 
Lithuania's independence, I am very pleased to 
extend to you best wishes on behalf of the 
Government and people of the United States. 
Throughout its long and proud history, the 
Lithuanian nation has endured with fortitude many 
periods of trial and alien rule. Unhappily, in 
our own time, Lithuania's re-establishment as an 
independent state was followed only twenty-two 
years later by its forcible incorporation into the 
Soviet Union. The Lithuanian people have 
responded to this situation through the years 
with unyielding courage and unfaltering hope for 
2 Leonardas Simutis, Amerikos Lietuviu Taryba: 30 metu 
Lietuvos laisves kovoje 1940-1970 (Lithuanian American 
Council: 30 Year Struggle for the Liberation of Lithuania 
1940-1970) (Chicago: LAC, 1971), p. 169; US Department of 
State, Status of the World's Nations, Geographical Bulletin 
No. 2 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1965), pp. 
1, 9; US Department of State, Treaties in Force, January 1, 
1966 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1966). 
3 US Department of State, "US Policy: The Baltic 
Republics," Gist, August 1984; Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among 
!i_ations: An ~oduction to Public International Law, 4th 
ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1981), p. 110. 
It 
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freedom and national independence. The firm 
purpose with which the Lithuanians both at home 
and abroad have struggled to preserve their 
national heritage is the best assurance of their 
survival as a nation. 
Americans look with understanding and sympathy 
upon the just aspiration of the Lithuanian people 
to determine freely their own destiny. The United 
States Government, by its continued non-
recognition of the forcible incorporation of 
Lithuania, affirms its belief in Lithuania's right 
of self-determination. 4 
is interesting to note that, though each 
successive administration since Roosevelt has explicitly 
supported the nonrecognition policy, its particular 
interpretation has been different depending upon who sits in 
the Oval Office. This is reflected in the national day 
greetings. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's letter to 
Lithuanian Charge Dr. Stasys Backis of 9 February 1978 
reveals a human rights oriented pre-Afghanistan Carter 
approach. The letter talks of courage, perseverance, 
national consciousness, and the maintenance of traditions. 
Secretary George Shultz's letter of 15 February 1983 
condemns outright the Soviet actions of 1940, a focus more 
in line with the foreign policy of Ronald Reagan. 0 
4 Repr~duced in Lithuanian Council of Chicago, Lietuvos 
nepriklausomybes atkurimo ir 717 metu karalystes isteigimo 
minejimas (Commemoration of Lithuania's Independence and 
the 717th Anniversary of the Establishment of the Lithuanian 
Kingdom) (Chicago: LCC, 1968), p. 14. For similar 
greetings, see Policy of the United States of America Toward 
Estonia, p. 12; Simutis, pp. 164-165. 
0 US Department of State, letter of Secretary of State 
Cyrus Vance to Lithuanian Charge d'Affaires Dr. Stasys 
Backis, 9 February 1978; US Department of State, letter of 
Secretary of State George P. Shultz to Lithuanian Charge 
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In both 1972 and 1982, Lithuanians in the United 
states addressed the US government on the subject of 
official maps and Lithuania's place in them. These 
encounters resulted in a more favorable depiction of 




(R-PA) successfully included the following 
in the Defense Department's authorization for 
None of the funds appropriated pursuant to an 
authorization of appropriations in this Act may be 
used to prepare, produce or purchase any map 
showing the [USSR) that does not --
( 1) show the geographic boundaries of 
Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania and designate 
those areas by those names; 
(2) include the designation "Soviet 
Occupied" in parenthesis under each of those 
names; and 
(3) include in close proximity to the area 
of the Baltic countries the following 
statement: "The United States Government does 
not recognize the incorporation of Estonia, 
Latvia, and Lithuania into the Soviet 
Union". 6 
The nonrecognition note is now placed near Latvia between 
Leningrad and Moscow; before it had been in the Indian 
Ocean. Concurrently, the State Department began listing the 
Baltic States within the East European section. They had 
been omitted before. 7 
d'Affaires Dr. Stasys Backis, 15 February 1983. 
6 Public Law 97-252, Department of Defense 
Authorization Act, 1983, 8 September 1982, section 1134. 
7 Budreckis, pp. 63-64; Vytautas Kutkus, JAV Lietuviu 
~endruomenes krasto valdybos veikla nuo 1979 m. gruodzio 
.!!!.__e_n~. --.::1~5::.____::d~·:...._~i.!:k~1~· _...;!1~9:.;8=2:.......:.m~. _ _:s~p~a..:!l:..::i~o~..:::m~e::..!n:.:...:.... __:2:..:3:::.__~d~. ( The A c t i v i t y o f 
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The first Lithuanian broadcast over the Voice of 
America was made on 16 February 1951. The Washington bureau 
began with twelve broadcasts daily, and the Munich bureau 
with three. At the request of Sen. Charles Percy (R-IL), 
chairman of the Senate foreign relations committee, an 
announcement was made on 2 October 1984 which altered the 
European service. The us Board for International 
Broadcasting unanimously voted to transfer the Baltic 
Language Services Division from Radio Liberty, which 
broadcasts to the Soviet Union, to Radio Free Europe, which 
transmits to east Europe. The changes in the flowchart and 
on-air identification were designed to better conform with 
US policy.a 
B. CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 
Of course, it has not only been the executive branch 
that has taken steps to reaffirm the nonrecognition policy. 
Indeed in the days following the Soviet invasion of 
Lithuania, which coincided with German adventurism in the 
West, the Congress passed a joint resolution geared to 
withholding _recognition of forcible territorial transfers in 
the Lithuanian-American Community of the USA from 15 
December 1979 to 23 October 1982) (np: LACUSA, 1982), p. 12. 
a Algirdas Budreckis, "Liberation Attempts From 
Abroad," in Lithuania 700 Years, 2nd rev. ed., ed. Al bertas 
Gerutis (New York: Manyland, 1969), pp. 402-403; US Senate, 
Committee on Foreign Relations, "Baltic Radio Service to be 
Transferred to Radio Free Europe at Percy Request," media 
notice, 2 October 1984, p. 1. 
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the western hemisphere. 9 
Legislators most often speak of Lithuania on or 
about 16 February of each year, which is Lithuanian 
independence day. Statements and, more frequently, 
extensions of remarks submitted in writing following a 
session abound in the Congressional Record in February. 10 
obviously, these actions serve to placate constituencies and 
possess little, if any, practical effect. One commentator 
is especially severe in her judgement of these rhetorical 
exercises: 
It is very doubtful that any Lithuanians have ever 
noticed this practice [of repeating speeches). On 
the contrary, they are lovingly grateful for these 
"forensic" crumbs which fall from the tables of 
the busy legislators. And the Lithuanian-
Americans of Racine and Linden and East St. Louis 
are voters, too, so the arrangement, though time-
9 US Congress, House Joint Resolution 556, Senate Joint 
Resolution 271, 76th Congress, 3rd session. See Robert 
Langer, Seizure of Territory: The Stimson Doctrine and 
Related Principles in Legal Theory and Diplomatic Practice 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1947), p. 82. 
10 On occasion, Lithuanian organizations have culled 
the Congressional Record for February statements and 
published them separately, greatly enhancing the public 
relations of the respective speakers. See Freedom for 
Lithuania:. Lithuania's Independence Day in the Congress of 
the United States. Excerpts from Proceedings of the United 
States Senate and House of Representatives, February-June 
1955 (np: np, 1955); Lithuania's Independence Day in 
Congress of the United States. Excerpts from Proceedings of 
the Senate of the United States and House of 
Representatives, February-May 1953 (np: np, 1953); Juozas 
Prunskis, ed., Lithuania Must Be Free: Congressional Voices 
Lor Lithuania's Independence (Chicago: Lithuanian American 
Council, 1981). 
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consuming, is not without mutual advantage. 11 
congress has taken other actions on behalf of the Baltic 
states. At various times, it has passed resolutions 
commending executive nonrecognition of the incorporation, 12 
and has called for the withdrawal of Soviet civilian and 
military personnel. 13 
In 1961, Leonardas Valiukas, a California 
Lithuanian, started the Americans for Congressional Action 
to Free the Baltic States, which sought passage of a 
resolution asking the president to raise the Baltic question 
in the United Nations. Ad hoc committees were established 
in Baltic communities in the US to raise funds and lobby 
legislators to this effect. By the first session of the 
89th Congress, there were seventy-three House and Senate 
11 Norma Krause Herzfeld, "The 
A government without a country," 
June 1961, section 2, p. 1. 
persistent Lithuanians: 
The Catholic Reporter, 9 
12 In order to clarify US policy regarding recognition, 
the US Senate on 25 September 1969 passed Senate Resolution 
205, which states, in part: 
Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that 
when the United States recognizes a foreign 
government and exchanges diplomatic 
representatives with it, this does not of itself 
imply that the United States approves of the form, 
ideology, or policy of that foreign government. 
The State Department completely concurred in the resolution. 
See Thomas M. Franck and Michael J. Glennon, Foreign 
Relations and National Security Law: Cases, Materials and 





Senate Resolution, 29 April 1954, quoted in 
the United States of America Toward Estonia, pp. 
House of Representatives, 
57, 4 February 1981, pp. 2-3. 
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resolutions with this purpose in mind. Finally, House 
concurrent Resolution 416 passed the House on 23 June 1966. 
senator Mike Mansfield asked the Senate to unanimously 
approve the resolution on 22 Obtober of that year. The 
senate consented and called on the president: 
(a) to direct the attention of world opinion at 
the United Nations and at other appropriate 
international forums and by such means as he deems 
appropriate, to the denial of the rights of self-
determination for the peoples of Estonia, Latvia, 
and Lithuania, and 
(b) to bring the force of world opinion to bear on 
behalf of the restoration of these rights to the 
Baltic peoples. 14 
This, however, was merely a Sense of the Congress resolution 
without the force of law. The State Department vaguely 
responded that the US ambassador to the UN would implement 
the resolution "at an appropriate time." 16 
Congress took more direct action at the October 
1970 Interparliamentary Conference at the Hague. One of the 
US delegates was Rep. Edward Derwinski (R-IL). A delegate 
from the Soviet Union was Justas Paleckis, head of the 
Lithuanian governmental apparatus since the occupation. 
When Derwinski pointed out the circumstances surrounding the 
Baltic incorporation, Paleckis replied: 
Mr. Derwinski's thinking had been too much 
influenced by the military criminals of the Baltic 
14 US Congress, House Concurrent Resolution 416, 22 




"Liberation Attempts From Abroad," pp. 
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countries who, together with Hitler's troops, had 
left their countries. The people there were a 
thousand times freer than they had ever been under 
the regimes of fascist dictatorship so strongly 
defended by Derwinski, who was sick with anti-
communism.16 
By the early 1980s, there was even an Ad Hoc 
congressional Committee on the Baltic States and Ukraine in 
the House, consisting of about forty members. The first co-
chairmen were Rep. Charles Dougherty (R-PA) and Rep. Brian 
J. Donelly (D-MA). In addition to sponsoring human rights 
related resolutions, the committee regularly called in 
Baltic and Ukrainian representatives for formal 
consultations. 17 However, by far the most important Baltic 
congressional committee, both in terms of publicity and 
substance, was the Kersten Committee of 1953-1954. 
In late 1952 and early 1953, an idea began brewing 
within the Lithuanian American Council that a formal 
committee with investigative capabilities and public 
relations potential be formed to examine the 
incorporation of Lithuania into the Soviet Union. The group 
advocating this route was encouraged by the congressional 
investigation of the Soviet Katyn Forest massacre of Polish 
officers, a~d by President-elect Dwight Eisenhower's remarks 
on the liberation of east Europe. The Council, following 
internal debates as to how to proceed, began lobbying the 
16 Rep. Edward J. Derwinski, "Derwinski-Paletskis [sic] 
Debate Again," news release, 16 October 1970, p. 1. 
17 Kutkus, pp. 14-15. 
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White House, Congress, the State Department, and the media 
seeking support and sponsors. 18 
Rep. Charles J. Kersten, a Republican from 
Milwaukee, had previously expressed his support for the 
liberation movement in east Europe. He had authored an 
amendment to the Mutual Security Act providing $100 million 
for resistance fighters behind the Iron Curtain. When Mary 
Kizis, director of the Lithuanian Information Center, a 
subsidiary of the Lithuanian American Council, asked if 
Kersten would take the lead in the establishment of a 
special committee, he immediately agreed. 
On 26 March 1953, a Council delegation met with 
President Eisenhower. The matter of the special committee 
was raised during the proceedings. When the president asked 
if such a committee had operated before, Kersten replied no. 
When the president inquired about a sponsor for the 
legislation, Kersten announced that he would take the lead. 
He subsequently drafted a resolution and dispatched it to 
the State Department for its comments. By mid-April 1953, 
the undersecretary had approved the resolution and pledged 
his department's cooperation. 
Rep. Kersten introduced House Resolution 231 on 7 
May 1953, but it was soon bogged down in the Rules 
18 Unless otherwise indicated, the passage on the 
Kersten Committee is taken from Kersteno rezoliucija ir 
~astangos ja pravesti JAV Kongrese (The Kersten Resolution 
~nd Efforts for its Passage in the US Congress) (np: 
Lithuanian American Council, c. 1953), pp. 1-10. 
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committee, whose chairman, Rep. Leo E. Allen (R-IL), 
appeared uncertain as to its utility. Following further 
lobbying by Lithuanian-American groups, Speaker Joseph 
Martin agreed to find the right moment to move the 
resolution out of committee. By July, however, no progress 
had been achieved and the session was drawing to a close. 
More lobbying was unleashed upon Capitol Hill. At a White 
House ceremony on 11 July marking the one year anniversary 
of Eisenhower's nomination to the presidency, Rep. Allen 
approached Kersten, informed him of consultations with 
Speaker Martin, and promised to place the resolution on the 
committee's agenda. 
Yet, when Rules Committee member Rep. Hugh Scott of 
Pennsylvania moved to consider the legislation, Allen 
appeared to change his position, reasoning that this was a 
matter for the United Nations to consider. He also noted 
that it was already thirteen years since the events of 1940, 
and questioned the need for an investigation following such 
a lapse of time. Majority Leader Rep. Charles A. Halleck (R-
IN) added that the legislation should first go to the 
Foreign Affairs Committee. By the morning of 20 July, 
telegrams began pouring into the offices of key congressmen 
from Lithuanian-Americans urging swift action on the 
resolution. Rep. Allen was also contacted by the Republican 
National Committee to end the delay. Finally, after a 
conference of Martin, Halleck, and Kersten, it was agreed to 
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e the resolution on the agenda immediately. plaC 
Due to revisions which had been made in the interim, 
the legislation was now known as House Resolution 346. It 
was considered in the Rules Committee on 23 July, which 
later unanimously recommended it to the full House. 
consideration. in the House had to come quickly, for money 
would still have to come from the Appropriations Committee 
in time to avoid delaying the hearings until the start of 
the next session. It was placed on the House's agenda for 
27 July. At 6:30 am, after considering the Korean 
armistice, Hugh Scott was finally able to sponsor the 
motion. Halleck seconded it, and Kersten spoke on its 
behalf. After one half hour of statements from thirteen 
other congressmen, HR 346 was unanimously approved. It 
read, in part, 
Whereas the Government of the United States 
maintains diplomatic relations with the 
Governments of Lithuania, Latvia, and 
Estonia and consistently has refused to recognize 
their seizure and forced "incorporation" into the 
[USSR]: Now, therefore, be it 
Resolved, That there is hereby created a select 
committee to be composed of seven Members of the 
House . . to be appointed by the Speaker, one of 
whom he shall designate as chairman. 19 
The committee is authorized and directed to 
conduct a full and complete investigation and 
study of said seizure and forced "incorporation" 
of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia by the [USSR] 
and the treatment of the said Baltic peoples 
during and following said seizure and 
19 C.J. Kersten (R-WI), chairman, A.M. Bentley (R-MI), 
E.J. Bonin (R-PA), F.E. Busbey (R-IL), T.J. Dodd (D-CT), 
T.M. Machrowicz (D-MI), R.J. Madden (D-IN). 
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"incorporation". 20 
$30,000 was appropriated to the special committee 
over a two year period. 335 witnesses testified before the 
committee, which also collected over two hundred documents, 
lists. and signed items of testimony. 21 The committee 
ultimately produced two major reports on the Baltic summer 
of 1940.22 The Kersten Committee hearings gave an 
opportunity to fully present, for the first time, the 
ultimate reason for the existence of the US nonrecognition 
policy, namely an objective account of the events in 
question directed and compiled by non-Baltics. In his own 
testimony, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles perhaps 
gave the most eloquent summary of both the hearings and the 
policy: 
Some may say that it is unrealistic and 
impractical not to recognize the enforced 
incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania 
into the Soviet Union. . We are not prepared 
to seek illusory safety for ourselves by a bargain 
with their masters which would confirm their 
captivity. We do not look upon the 
20 House Resolution 346, 27 July 1953 (legislative 
day). See also Simutis, pp. 180-181. 
21 Ant~nas Kucas, Lithuanians in America, trans. Joseph 
Boley (Boston: Encyclopedia Lituanica, 1975), pp. 279-280. 
22 US House of Representatives, Select Committee to 
Investigate the Incorporation of the Baltic States into the 
U.S.S.R., Baltic States Investigation I (Washington: US 
Government Printing Office, 1953); US House of 
Representatives, Third Interim Report of the Select 
£ommittee on Communist Aggression. Report of the Select 
Committee to Investigate Communist Aggression and the Forced 
Incorporation of the Baltic States into the U.S.S.R. 
(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1954). 
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conference table as a place where we surrender our 
principles, but rather as a place for making our 
principles prevail. 23 
c. NONRECOGNITION AND US-USSR RELATIONS 
Nonrecognition is not merely a piece on the 
chessboard of domestic politics, as outlined above. Its 
primary focus is outside the country as a message to the 
nations of the world community, specifically the Soviet 
union, of the American attitude toward aggression in the 
Baltic. The policy has certainly affected domestic 
political and legal affairs in the US. 24 It has also 
affected US-Soviet relations. 
Of course, the Soviets fought against the 
nonrecognition policy from its inception, stating that it 
would sour the course of US-USSR relations. The continued 
presence of the Baltic diplomats in the US, as well as the 
problems surrounding vessels in US territorial waters, were 
the most obvious manifestations of the policy against which 
the Soviets directed their attacks. Undersecretary of State 
Sumner Welles and Soviet Ambassador Constantine A. Oumansky 
discussed these matters on 27 February 1941. Welles noted 
that the US would not back down from its position, and that 
certain issues would have to remain in the realm of 
23 US House 




24 See chapter five above. 
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"unsolvable problems"; this is where the Baltic States were 
placed. Oumansky found this unacceptable. 26 
Public US proposals and statements regarding the 
Baltic States have always brought vehement reaction from the 
Kremlin. 26 Two general responses have been charges of US 
interference in Soviet internal affairs, and the contention 
that the Baltic States joined the Soviet Union voluntarily. 
A third response began surfacing in the 1960s in an attempt 
to turn the tables on the United States and the morality of 
its actions. Writing of respect for sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, Victor Karpov notes: 
This principle should be strictly observed; and 
26 US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1940, Volume I, General 
(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1959), pp. 708-
712. See also p. 785. 
Soviet Foreign Affairs Commissar Maxim Litvinov 
addressed the Council of the League of Nations on 12 May 
1938 after Britain recognized the Italian annexation of 
Ethiopia. His remarks were ironic in light of subsequent 
events: 
But, according to circumstances, non-recognition 
may be of vast importance, not only morally, but 
also politically -- particularly when the victim 
of aggression itself continues to fight for its 
independence and for the integrity of its 
territory. In such cases, the recognition of the 
results of acts of violent aggression, or the 
abandonment of the policy of non-recognition, 
would be equivalent to abetting the aggressor 
directly, and to stabbing his victim in the back 
by discouraging and demoralizing him. 
See Bronis J. Kaslas, ed., The USSR-German Aggression 
Against Lithuania (New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1973), 
pp, 424-425. 
26 Richard A. 
Soviet Relations: 
(Fall 1968), 54. 
Schnorf, "The Baltic States in U.S.-
From Truman to Johnson," Li tuanus, 14, 3 
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its observance is, of course, incompatible with 
some resolutions that have from time to time been 
adopted by the American Congress, as those calling 
for "liberation" of some integral parts of [the] 
Soviet Union -- of . Lithuania . I would 
say this is roughly the same as if the parliament 
of Mexico, for example, would have passed a 
resolution demanding that Texas, Arizona, and 
California be "liberated from American slavery." 27 
Following the completion of the Second World War, 
the first forum where the nonrecognition policy became a 
factor in terms of foreign affairs was Nuremberg. On 6 
October 1945, American, British, French, and Soviet 
representatives signed the indictments of German war 
criminals before the International Military Tribunal. Among 
the charges were atrocities committed in the "Lithuanian 
soviet Socialist Republic," the "Latvian Soviet Socialist 
Republic," and the "Estonian Soviet Socialist Republic." 
Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson, the US prosecutor 
at Nuremberg, signed the indictment, but also deposited a 
reservation with the Tribunal's secretary: 
reference is made to Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania and certain other territories as being 
within the area of the U.S.S.R. This language is 
proposed by Russia and is accepted to avoid delay . 
. The indictment is signed subject to this 
reservation and understanding: 
I have no authority either to admit or to 
challenge, on behalf of the United States, the 
Soviet claims to sovereignty over such 
territories. Nothing, therefore, in this 
indictment is to be construed as a recognition by 
27 Victor P. Karpov, "The Soviet Concept of Peaceful 
Coexistence and Its Implications for International Law," in 
The Soviet Impact on International Law, ed. Hans W. Baade 
(Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana, 1965), p. 20. 
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the United States of such sovereignty . 28 
Jackson's letter was made public in Berlin on 15 October 
1945.29 
The liberation espoused by President Eisenhower and 
secretary of State John Foster Dulles was welcomed by those 
28 The New York Times, 19 October 1945. The British 
Foreign Office announced on 19 October that the British 
signature on the indictments also did not imply recognition. 
The New York Times, 20 October 1945. See also Assembly of 
captive European Nations, International Agreements and 
Pledges Concerning East-Central Europe (New York: ACEN, 
1960), p. 45. 
The US government has usually been fairly 
scrupulous when discussing the Baltic States. In April 
1950, a US military aircraft allegedly flew over Baltic 
territory, which prompted a protest from the Kremlin that 
Soviet territory had been violated. The US State Department 
responded that "the United States Navy Aircraft in question 
did not fly over any Soviet or Soviet-occupied 
territory or territorial waters adjacent thereto." Quoted 
in Krystyna Marek, Identity and Continuity of States in 
Public International Law (Geneva: Librairie E. Droz, 1968), 
p. 403. Marek's emphasis. 
20 Langer, p. 284; Supreme Lithuanian Committee of 
Liberation, Memorandum on the Restoration of Lithuania's 
Independence (np: Lithuanian Executive Council, 1950), p. 
82. See also Robert H. Jackson, Grundlegende Rede 
vorgetragen im Namen der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika 
(Frankfurt am Main: Das Forum, 1946). 
Martin Brakas adds an interesting sidelight to the 
Nuremberg proceedings when he writes: 
In the terms of the Nuremberg Tribunal -- the so-
called Nuremberg Principles the Secret 
Supplementary Protocols to the German-Russian Non-
Aggression Pact of August 23 and September 28, 
1939, and the Decree of the Supreme Soviet of the 
Soviet Union on the "incorporation" of Lithuania 
would have to be qualified as instances of "crimes 
against peace," and the series of actions aimed at 
the annexation of Lithuania during the war and in 
its wake -- as violations of the Hague Regulations 
and, therefore, as "war crimes." 
See his "Lithuania's International Status: Some Legal 
Aspects 2," Baltic Review, 38 (August 1971), 17. 
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who viewed George Kennan's containment policy as one of 
tacitly recognizing spheres of influence between East and 
west. But those who thought that liberation was to be 
applied literally toward Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were 
sorely disappointed. American inaction during the East 
German and Hungarian uprisings of the 1950s demonstrated 
that liberation would not come easily. 30 
Be that as it may, the Eisenhower administration 
lost no opportunities to criticize the Kremlin for its 
behavior. At the Four Power Conference in Berlin in 
February 1954, Secretary Dulles cited the illegal tactics 
used in incorporating the Baltic States, which were 
replicated in eastern Europe at the close of World War Il. 31 
July of the following year saw the Big Four gather 
at Geneva, where the West desired to place the Baltic on the 
agenda. The proposal was rejected by the Soviets, though 
there were press reports that the matter was discussed aside 
from the formal talks. It was announced that the matter was 
postponed until the October 1955 conference, where it was 
once again blocked by the Kremlin's foreign minister. It is 
interesting .to note that Stasys Lozoraitis, chief of the 
Lithuanian Diplomatic Service, went to Geneva in case 
Lithuania would require formal representation, though this 
30 Schnorf, p. 46 ff. 
31 Antanas Trimakas, "Satellite Status for the Baltic 
States -- A Possible Opening for Freedom," Baltic Review, 7 
(16 June 1956), 7-8. 
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turned out to be a wasted -- and idealistic -- effort on his 
t 32 par . 
Greater controversy was generated during the 
ratification process for a new US-Soviet consular 
convention. Negotiations commenced in 1959 and the treaty 
was signed at Moscow on 1 June 1964. Among the provisions 
of the convention was Article VII, paragraph 3, which 
allowed consular officials to register nationals of the 
sending state residing in the receiving state. Other 
provisions included the customary notarial, commercial, and 
custodial functions of consulates. 33 
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee considered 
the convention the following year, and on 30 July 1965 voted 
7-1 to recommend it to the full Senate, which did not ratify 
it. The Johnson administration brought it up again in 1967, 
and the Foreign Relations Committee began considering it on 
23 January. 34 
Lithuanians in the United States were concerned over 
seemingly vague passages and possible double-meanings which 
could indirectly destroy the nonrecognition policy. When 
hearings commenced for the second time, Lithuanian-American 
32 Schnorf, p. 49; Trimakas, pp. 8-9. 
33 US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Consular 
Convention With the Soviet Union, Hearings on Executive D 
(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 283-
292. 
34 Simutis, p. 423. 
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groups began lobbying senators for its defeat, and collected 
documentation to back up their claims. Anthony J. Rudis, 
president of the Lithuanian American Council, testified 
against the treaty because it did not explicitly grant an 
exception to the Baltic States. He was especially concerned 
that the Soviet Union could claim Baltic nationals as 
nationals of the USSR under Soviet citizenship decrees. The 
convention would also have granted immunity to consular 
staffers, something which was usually granted only to 
embassy staff. Indeed, Rep. Edward J. Derwinski (R-IL) 
pointed out the implications of this provision vis-a-vis 
Americans who have relatives in Soviet-occupied territory: 
"The possibility of coercion, bribery, even blackmail are 
evident if Soviet consular officials have the freedom to 
roam throughout the United States." 30 
In an exchange between Rudis and committee member 
Sen. Eugene McCarthy, McCarthy pointed out that no treaty 
with the USSR distinguishes the Baltic States; this is done 
in separate statements. Rudis conceded this point, but 
added that he was concerned with possible harassment from 
staffers, for example, Vytautas Zenkevicius, who was second 
secretary at the Soviet embassy and who possessed immunity. 
McCarthy replied that the convention would not change this 
30 Edward J. Derwinski, "Remarks in the House of 
Representatives on Proposed Consular Convention with the 
Soviet Union," press release, 9 August 1965, p. 4. See also 
Simutis, pp. 423-424; US Senate, Consular Convention With 
.!_!le Soviet Union, p. 242. 
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arrangement, but noted that the matter could be helped if 
onlY ethnic Russians were allowed to assume immune 
diplomatic and consular positions. Rudis agreed, adding 
that it would be improper for the US to open a consulate in 
the Baltic States. 30 
The US State Department's legal adviser assured the 
committee that ratification of the convention would have no 
effect on nonrecognition. Further, in a 2 February 1967 
letter to the committee's chairman, Sen. J. William 
Fulbright, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations 
Douglas MacArthur II asserted: 
Recognition of the incorporation of Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania into the USSR would, like all 
cases of diplomatic recognition, require a 
positive statement or positive act by the United 
States. This Convention contains no such 
statement and provides for no such act. . The 
ratification of this treaty will not change this 
[nonrecognition] policy -- any more than did the 
signing of the more than 105 bilateral and 
multilateral agreements which we have entered into 
with the USSR. 37 
However, the State Department did acknowledge one problem, 
namely the establishment of US consular offices in the 
Baltic, and its potential for de facto recognition. In his 
testimony, Secretary of State Dean Rusk said, "We do have a 
36 us Senate, Consular Convention With the Soviet 
Union, pp. 250-252. 
37 us Senate, Consular Convention With the Soviet 
Union, p. 139. See also p. 248. 
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bit of a dilemma there, Senator." 38 Nonetheless, the issue 
of nonrecognition did not sufficiently overshadow the 
convention to cause its amendment or to prevent its passage. 
The Senate ratified it on 16 March 1967 by a vote of 66 to 
The United States and Soviet Union have grappled not 
only bilaterally, but also in the United Nations. us 
ambassadors to the UN have addressed UN bodies several times 
on the topic of Lithuania and the other Baltic States. 
Ambassador Adlai Stevenson utilized the Baltic as an example 
of Soviet colonialism. Ambassador Arthur Goldberg carried 
this point further on 31 August 1967 when he reiterated the 
US policy of nonrecognition. On 24 November 1976, 
Ambassador William Warren Scranton addressed the UN's Third 
Committee on the denial of freedom and religious expression 
in the Baltic. The Soviet representative replied that the 
Baltic States had a rightful place in the Soviet "family of 
republics." Finally, Ambassador Jeane J. Kirkpatrick 
delivered to UN Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar 
the text of a 26 July 1983 statement by President Ronald 
Reagan, which gave an overview of the occupation of the 
38 US Senate, Consular Convention With the Soviet 
Union, p. 331. See also Derwinski, "Remarks . on 
Proposed Consular Convention," p. 1. 
39 Simutis, p. 426. 
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saltic and reaffirmed nonrecognition. 40 
While such instances are somewhat routine and 
uneventful, an incident of greater consequence occured when 
Mrs. Leokadia Pilyushenko arrived at the 1967 fall session 
of the UN along with the rest of the Soviet delegation. 
This, in and of itself, meant nothing. However, Pilyushenko 
identified herself as Soviet Lithuania's foreign minister. 
when speaking before the Third Committee, she stated, "As a 
member of the Soviet delegation, I represent at the same 
time one of the fifteen sovereign republics, the Lithuanian 
soviet Socialist Republic," and went on to disparage 
Lithuania during the period of independence. The US 
representative to the committee, Patricia Roberts Harris, 
replied that Pilyushenko had no right to speak on behalf of 
Lithuania. 41 
40 Edgars Dunsdorfs, The Baltic Dilemma II: The case of 
the reversal of the de jure recognition by Australia of the 
incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union 
(Melbourne: Baltic Council of Australia, 1982), p. 425; 
Kaslas, p. 468; Schnorf, p. 53; US Mission to the United 
Nations, "The United States Reaffirms Recognition of 
Independence of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania," press 
release, 29 July 1983, pp. 1-3. 
41 In an address to the Lithuanian American Congress in 
Chicago, November 1953, Assistant Secretary of State Donald 
B. Lourie noted that the US delegation had worked 
successfully to block seating by the USSR of Baltic 
representatives at international meetings, for example, of 
the Postal Union Congress and the Telecommunications 
Conference. See Visuotinas Amerikos lietuviu kongresas 
(General Lithuanian American Congress) (Chicago: Lithuanian 
American Council, 1953), p. 70. 
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Despite requests from Congress, 42 however, neither 
the US nor any other member has ever sought to place the 
Baltic issue on the UN's formal agenda. 43 The US has, in 
fact, consciously done this in order to avoid embarassment: 
The question has been raised on various occasions 
about the desirability of United States 
initiatives in the United Nations calling for the 
restoration of independence to the Baltic 
countries. . At the present time, however, the 
great majority of the UN members do not adhere to 
the position of the US Government on this issue. 
We must recognize that any failure of such an 
initiative in the United Nations would be a severe 
rebuff to the United States and would seriously 
prejudice our position in the matter before the 
world. 44 
In addition to the explicit rejection of US action in the 
UN, the above statement went on to say that the US could do 
no more on behalf of the Baltic than it had already done: 
Any US initiatives in the United Nations of the 
nature described above could well be misleading in 
suggesting that more can be done than we are 
already doing in behalf of the Baltic peoples. 46 
In other words, the US government continues to embrace the 
policy of nonrecognition but also notes its practical 
limits. This is nothing new, for, as the previous chapter 
42 For example, see Edward J. Derwinski, 
Introduces N_ew Baltic States Resolution," news 
November 1977, p. 1. 
43 Schnorf, p. 48. 
"Derwinski 
release, 18 
44 US Department of State, "United States Policy Toward 
the Baltic States," Public Information Series, no. P-317-
870, c. 1970, p. 1. 
46 US Department of State, "United States Policy Toward 
the Baltic States," p. 1. 
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on wartime diplomacy described, the US recognized the 
policy's limitations almost from its inception. 
o. THE BALTIC AND IMPLICATIONS FOR US-USSR RELATIONS 
Sometimes, the routine of international intercourse 
forces the United States to deal fairly directly with 
Lithuania and the other Baltic States. Particular cases 
regarding individuals must be addressed, as well as those of 
family reunification, special visits, and other topics. 46 
US government personnel have been in the Baltic and have 
dealt with the Soviet regimes there. Effective foreign 
relations do not allow absolute isolation from even an 
unrecognized government. This, however, does not violate 
the nonrecognition policy. Gerhard van Glahn offers an 
explanation: 
it is quite possible for a given state to 
have dealings (relations officienses) with an 
unrecognized government without proceeding to 
recognition, provided the absence of intent to 
recognize is made clear. Thus the United States 
maintained agents in several Latin American 
republics before recognizing the latter as states 
independent from Spain, a course of action also 
pursued by Great Britain at the time. During the 
American Civil War, Great Britain sent a number of 
official agents to the Confederate States, yet did 
not recognize the latter as an independent entity. 
Many other governments have acted similarly in 
46 US Department of State, Statement by Robert L. 
Barry, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs 
before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, 
House Foreign Affairs Committee, 26 June 1979, pp. 2-3. 
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ties with the Lithuanian people without 
recognizing Lithuania's forcible incorporation 
into the Soviet Union. 00 
This, of course, occured during the period of 
detente. The mood of US-Soviet relations under President 
Reagan was considerably different when the US ambassador in 
Moscow, Jack Matlock, refused to receive a delegation from 
the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian SSR in December 1987. The 
delegation was protesting a US House of Representatives 
resolution on Latvia's independence day. The Latvians were 
kept waiting in the street for about one hour until the 
embassy's second secretary informed them that they could be 
received only as private citizens. When a similar 
resolution was passed for Lithuania's independence day two 
months later on 16 February 1988, Ambassador Matlock again 
refused a delegation from the Lithuanian SSR, which was 
protesting US interference in Lithuania's affairs. 01 
50 Henry M. Kissinger, letter to Sen. Hugh Scott, 28 
October 1972. Regarding a scheduled US-USSR conference for 
15-19 September 1986 near Riga, Latvia, US State Department 
representative John C. Whitehead assured a Latvian-American 
group that the meeting would not compromise nonrecognition. 
Mark Palmer, another State Department representative, added 
that the situation in Soviet occupied Latvia would be raised 
at the confe.rence by the US delegation, as, indeed, it was. 
See "Amerikos latviu sajunga apie JAV-SSRS konferencija 
Latvijoje" ("American Latvian Association on the US-USSR 
Conference in Latvia"), Nepriklausoma Lietuva (Independent 
Lithuania), 10 July 1986, p. 1. 
01 
"Ambasadorius neprieme latviu deputatu" ("Ambassador 
did not Receive Latvian Deputies"), Draugas, 16 January 
1988, p. 1; "Ambasadorius neprieme Sovietu bendradarbiu" 
("Ambassador did not Receive Soviet Aides"), Draugas, 18 
February 1988, p. 1. 
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Since the espousal of the policy of nonrecognition, 
both the Congress and the Executive have sought to keep it 
alive. Much of this activity, in the form of statements, 
resolutions, and conferences, has been geared toward 
consumption by domestic 
Latvians, and Estonians 
groups, specifically, Lithuanians, 
residing in the United States. 
However, exceptions such as the Kersten Committee hearings, 
which cost substantial money and effort, are indications 
that the policy is taken seriously, at least by those 
familiar with the circumstances surrounding it. 
The policy has also affected US-Soviet relations. 
Initially, the Kremlin declared that the Baltic issue would 
create a permanent rift between the two countries. Of 
course, a rift still exists, but the effect of the 
nonrecognition policy here is minimal, despite Soviet 
rhetoric aimed against it. Granted, the policy has caused 
Washington and Moscow to grapple between themselves and on 
the floor of the United Nations. 
diplomacy in the early 1940s 
But, successful wartime 
-- and even detente in the 
1970s were carried out in spite of it. 
Chapter five of this study demonstrated that the 





showed that it also has 
the policy was temporarily 
shelved during wartime. This chapter has expanded upon the 
limitations. First, the US can only go so far in helping 
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the Baltic States. There are relatively few tools for 
action in the hands of American policymakers. Second, it is 
unavoidable to unofficially deal with the Soviet regimes in 
the Baltic. Indeed in many cases involving individuals it 
is beneficial. The following chapter will now address 
several specific instances where implementation of the 
nonrecognition policy has been problematic -- or non-existent. 
CHAPTER VIII 
PROBLEMS OF IMPLEMENTATION: CASE STUDIES 
A. POSTWAR BALTIC REPATRIATION 
While, by and large, the US government has stood by 
the nonrecognition policy in both word and deed, there have 
been instances where it has been undermined, either 
perceptually or in fact. The first major transgression 
against it was forced postwar repatriation of Lithuanians, 
Latvians, and Estonians to their native lands, now under 
Moscow's control. 
Following the conclusion of hostilities, several 
hundred thousand Baltic persons found themselves in the 
western occupation zones of the defeated Germany. They had 
fled as the Red Army swept westward back across the 
continent. If Baltic citizens were not considered citizens 
of the Soviet Union, they would not have been in any danger 
of forced repatriation to the USSR, for the western powers 
did not recognize the citizenship decree of the presidium of 
the Supreme Soviet issued on 7 September 1940: 
(1) In accordance with Section 1, the Law on 
Nationality of the USSR of August 19, 1938, it is 
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Milda Danys, DP Lithuanian Immigration to Canada 
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Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian Soviet Socialist 
Republics shall be USSR nationals from the day 
when these Republics are received into the USSR. 
(2) Nationals of the Lithuanian, Latvian, and 
Estonian [SSRs] who at the time of the 
promulgation of the present decree are outside of 
the confines of the USSR and were not deprived of 
nationality by the Soviet governments of these 
Republics must register on or before November l, 
1940, as Soviet Nationals at diplomatic missions 
and consultants [sic] of the USSR by means of a 
personal appearance or by mailing a special 
application with their passports. 1 
In addition, the western allies possessed moral and legal 
traditions of ready asylum for political exiles: 2 
The international practice after World War I shows 
that no prjsoners of war were forcibly extradited 
to their countries of origin. At that time, the 
problem arose only between certain powers and 
Soviet Russia. From 1918 to 1921, the Soviets 
signed twenty-seven international treaties and 
agreements concerning the repatriation of 
prisoners of war and civilians. All were based 
upon the principle of voluntary repatriation only 
and contained almost identical clauses explicitly 
precluding any forced repatriation. 3 
These sentiments were echoed in postwar declarations by 
individual governments, as well as the United Nations. The 
1 US Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Consular 
Convention With the Soviet Union, Hearings on Executive D 
(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1967), p. 345. 
Technically, following the annexation of the 
Baltic States, former Russian nationals who had lost their 
nationality under the decrees of 28 October and 15 December 
1921 were given the opportunity to regain it. See Kazimierz 
Grzybowski, Soviet Public International Law: Doctrines and 
Diplomatic Practice (Leyden, The Netherlands: A.W. Sijthoff, 
1970), p. 239. 
2 Julius Epstein, Operation Keelhaul: The Story of 
Forced Repatriation from 1944 to the Present (Old Greenwich, 
CT: Devin-Adair, 1973), p. 21. 
3 Epstein, p. 14. Vitas' emphasis. 
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Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, signed 
on 28 July 1951, explicitly prohibits forced repatriation to 
a person's native land if he will face persecution there. 4 
In order to establish procedures for processing 
displaced persons, US and Soviet military authorities signed 
an agreement regarding liberated prisoners of war and 
civilians at Yalta on 11 February 1945. The document 
contains no reference to the use of force, though sees 
repatriation as the only solution. 0 Further, the US and 
USSR defined a displaced person as one who was a Soviet 
citizen on or before 1 September 1939, and who was displaced 
on or after 21 June 1941. Finally, a 12 May 1945 order from 
the Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, 
General of the Army Dwight D. Eisenhower, stated that Baltic 
citizens could not be forcibly repatriated because they did 
not meet the former criterion, and neither the US nor the 
United Kingdom recognized 
territorial changes there. 6 
4 Article 33, Section 1. 
Resolution, 12 February 1946. 
subsequent political and 
See also UN General Assembly 
Quoted in Epstein, pp. 16-17. 
0 Epstein, pp. 25-26; US Department of State, Foreign 
Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The 
Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington: US 
Government Printing Office, 1955), pp. 985-987. 
Some maintained a suspicion that there was a 
secret protocol attached to the Yalta document regarding 
forced repatriation. See "Secret Yalta Displaced Persons 
Clauses," Baltic Review, 1, 4-5 (July-August 1946), 238-240. 
6 J u r i P i i r o j a , e t a 1 . , .:::.B....::a:....:l::...t~i....::c_R--"-e-'f_u-"g'"'-"-e""""'e-'s'--__;;.a'""n~d""-""'D""""'i ___ s"'-"-p...;cl'"""'a ___ c"'-'-e_d 
Persons (London: Boreas, 1947), pp. 15-16. See also Janis 
Skrundens, Latvia 1918-1968 (New York: American Latvian 
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Nonetheless, the US government did not strictly 
adhere to a policy of voluntary repatriation for citizens 
not charged with war crimes or collaboration with the Nazis. 
Even while negotiators were attempting to safeguard Russian 
and Baltic people who did not wish to return to their 
homelands, policy was beginning to shift inside government 
circles. As early as the autumn of 1944, a memorandum was 
written by Bernard Guffler, Special War Problems Division of 
the State Department, to Charles Bohlen, chief of the East 
European Affairs Division, which indicated the change: 
The new policy toward Soviet nationals differs 
from the policy hitherto followed with regard to 
them and with the policy which it is proposed to 
continue to follow with regard to other Allied 
nationals. The most notable difference is that no 
persons claimed by other Allied Governments are 
delivered to the custody of those Governments 
against their wills. The adoption of this new 
policy towards the Soviets will result in the 
delivery to the Soviet authorities of persons 
hitherto withheld from them because they were 
unwilling to return to the Soviet Union. 7 
Bohlen "signified his approval" on 20 October 1944. 8 
The US Army began activating what one writer has 
identified as "Operation Keelhaul," a secret repatriation 
plan which called for the return, forced if necessary, of 
approximately two million prisoners of war and displaced 
Association, 1968), p. 22. 
7 US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, Volume IV, Europe 
(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 1258. 
a US Department of State, 
United States, 1944, IV, p. 1260. 
Foreign Relations of the 
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into Soviet hands. 0 persons 
implemented from 
The plan was partially 
1944 to 1947, not because of ignorance of 
the Eisenhower directive, but because of the way the 
Displaced Persons Branch of the US Army handled the matter. 
The same month that Eisenhower sought to protect Baltic 
citizens, this army branch issued the following instruction: 
"After identification by Soviet Repatriation 
Representatives, Soviet displaced persons will be 
repatriated regardless of their individual wishes. " 10 The 
loophole in this order was that Soviet representatives could 
point to a person who origjnated in what subsequently became 
soviet territory. The inrlividual then had no recourse, and 
protests meant little. 
The Soviets were aiso conducting a campaign for the 
return of Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians. Soviet 
diplomats attacked them as fascists and war criminals, who 
were conducting reactionary anti-Soviet campaigns in 
displaced persons camps. Further, according to the Kremlin, 
they were aided by the Western allies, who sought to 
continue German war policy by searching for inexpensive 
labor. Specifically, the Soviets stated that as of 1 January 
1947, 221,500 of the 827,000 refugees in Germany were Soviet 
9 Epstein, pp. 1 ff. Epstein writes that he was not 
allowed access to the secret US files on Operation Keelhaul. 
10 Allied Expeditionary Force, Supreme Headquarters, G-
5 Division, Displaced Persons Branch, Guide to the Care of 
Displaced Persons in GermaBy, revised May 1945. 
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citizens, and demanded free access to them. 11 The Soviet 
criminal code labeled flight abroad as treason, punishable 
bY death. Relatives remaining behind could also be 
punished, regardless of whether or not they assisted in the 
escape. Ironically, though the Soviets claimed Baltics as 
soviet citizens, Soviet law automatically abolishes Soviet 
citizenship for an individual who departs the country 
without the knowledge of the authorities. 12 
The Soviet campaign was also carried out closer to 
the displaced persons. Repatriation officers began 
supplying the camps with booklets and brochures extolling 
11 Vytautas Alseika, Trys desimtmeciai emigrac1Joje: 
Nuo Roitlingeno iki Niujorko (Three Decades of Emigration: 
From Reutlingen to New York) (Vilnius: Mintis, 1977), pp. 
58-61, 69-70, 72-74; The Baltic Refugees (Stockholm: Baltic 
Humanitarian Association, 1946), p. 11; Grzybowski, p. 243; 
A.J. Visinskis [Vishinsky] and A.A. Gromiko (Gromyko], Del 
pabegeliu ir perkeltuju asmenu: Kalbos Suvienytuju Naciju 
Generalineje Asamblejoje Niujorke 1946 m. (On Refugees and 
Displaced Persons: Addresses to the United Nations General 
Assembly in New York, 1946) (Vilnius: State Political Press, 
1947), pp. 15-20. 
See also Antanas Kucas, Amerikos lietuviu istorija 
(American Lithuanian History) (South Boston: Lithuanian 
Encyclopedia Press, 1971), p. 566; United Nations, 
Department of Public Information, "USSR Submits Draft 
Resolution .on Repatriation of Refugees," press release 
GA/SHC/469, 5 October 1955. 
Interestingly, Piiroja, p. 16, writes that the 
German press contributed to the Soviet anti-Baltic campaign 
in order to rid the country of foreigners and to mitigate 
German war guilt. However, all German local governments 
(Landrats) issued announcements against forced repatriation. 
See The Baltic Refugees, p. 12. 
12 The Baltic Refugees, pp. 10, 14. 
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life in the Lithuanian SSR. 13 However, more direct measures 
were also employed. Secret order 199 of the United Nations 
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) noted that 
displaced persons' leaders who were opposed to repatriation 
should be transferred to other camps containing individuals 
not slated for repatriation. The International Refugee 
organization (IRO), which succeeded UNRRA on 1 July 1947, 
issued a secret Manual for Eligibility Officers, all copies 
of which were destroyed upon IRO's liquidation. That manual 
stated that a displaced person must give sufficient 
information why he should not be repatriated. Though a 
political, not an economic, reason had to be given, 
arguments against communism had to be "plausible." For 
example, the absence of religious freedom was not sufficient 
13 For examples, see Alseika, p. 71; K. Gasparavicius, 
ed., Mokslininku zodis (Scholars' Address) (Kaunas: State 
Encyclopedic, Dictionary, and Scientific Press, 1948); 
Gasparavicius, ed., Tevyneje (In the Homeland) (Kaunas: 
State Encyclopedic, Dictionary, and Scientific Press, 1948); 
V. Kalpokas, ed., Repatrijuotuju tarybiniu pilieciu teises 
(Rights of Repatriated Soviet Citizens) (Vilnius: State 
Political Press, 1947); V. Kubilius, ed., Po gimtuoju dangum 
(Under Native Skies) (Kaunas: Spindulys, c. 1950); Justas 
Paleckis, Kelias i Lietuva Atviras (The Road to Lithuania is 
Open) (Vilnius: State Political Press, 1947); Tiesa apie 
musu gyvenima (The Truth About Our Life) (Vilnius: Tiesa, 
1947). 
For the distribution of materials by the 
International Refugee Organization, see United Nations, 
International Refugee Organization, Report to the General 
Council of the International Refugee Organization by the 
Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission: 1 July 
1947 -- 30 June 1948 (Geneva: UN IRO, 1948), pp. 27, 30. 
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to avoid repatriation. 14 
In 1946, the Lithuanians of the Reutlingen camp were 
invited to the assembly hall of an elementary school to 
listen to the presentation of a Soviet officer. He warned 
that they would not possess the right of repatriation 
indefinitely. Those who did not return would lose their 
soviet citizenship. 1 a Swettenham humorously writes of the 
cool reception accorded to Soviet repatriation missions: 
"Soviet literature was distributed in the camps, but usually 
found its way into numerous toilets! Repatriation for Salts 
at any rate was a washout." 16 Not all incidents, however, 
were humorous. On 6 September 1945, when UNRRA and US 
personnel attempted to forcibly repatriate individuals--
Ukrainians in this case -- from the Mannheim and Kempten 
14 Alseika, p. 71; Petras Stravinskas, Atsiminimai ir 
~p_a_s_a_u_l_e_z_v_a_l~g~a_: __ R_a_s_t_a_i ___ i_r __ c_r_e_d_o ___ I_I ( Rem i n i s c enc es and 
_W-'o""""'r-'l~d""'"v--'i'-e:;_w,;.;....:.:--'W.c..;:...r-=i-'t'-1:;_· n'-"""g:....;;s'--a=n'-'d"--___:;C-=r-'e:;_d..:.:....:co _ _;;;_I .;;;.I ) ( C h i c ago : C om m i t t e e t o 
Publish the Writings of Petras Stravinskas, 1982), pp. 144-
146. 
For the rigors of the screening process, see 
Stasys Mingaila, Neapkenciamo zmogaus uzrasai (Notes of an 
Un tolerated Person) (West Germany: Author, 1948), pp. 63 ff, 
83, 97-99; Piiroja, pp. 6-7, 19-22; John Alexander 
Swettenham, The Tragedy of the Baltic States: A Report 
Compiled From Official Documents and Eyewitnesses' Reports 
(New York: Praeger, 1954), p. 163. 
1 ~ Alseika, p. 71. US officers also urged Salties to 
return to their homelands. Alseika, pp. 71-72, describes a 
visit to the Hanau camp by a Captain Moses on 10 June 1947. 
He told the Lithuanians there that their future was 
uncertain. Lithuania was in need of people for 
administration and industry. He claimed that those who had 
returned were writing positive letters about their post-
repatriation experiences. See also Mingaila, p. 61. 
10 Swettenham, p. 177. 
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camps. violence broke out. From then on, US authorities 
barred the forcible repatriation of Ukrainians, and forbade 
UNRRA from utilizing American personnel in any repatriation 
efforts. 17 
Needless to say, the specter of repatriation caused 
anxiety among Lithuanians. Several publications appeared 
which voiced this concern, along with booklets geared to 
call favorable attention to their plight. Some even 
proposed that Baltic national committees be allowed to 
perform consular functions in Germany in order to guarantee 
the personal status of Lithuanians, Latvians, and 
Estonians. 18 Fears were reinforced when letters describing 
the unfavorable situation in the Baltic were smuggled back 
to the West from repatriated persons. 19 
17 Kucas, p. 567. 
18 The Baltic Refugees, p. 16; N. Kaasik, "The Legal 
Status of Baltic Refugees," Baltic Review, l, 1 (December 
1945), 25-26; " 1 Laisve 1 nori pabegelius bausti" ("'Liberty' 
Wants to Punish the Refugees"), Musu kryziaus keliai (Our 
Way of the Cross), Bulletin of the Lithuanian Ravensburg 
camp, l, 8 September 1945, p. 25; Juozas Pasilaitis, Hearken 
Then Judge: Sidelights on Lithuanian DPs (Tubingen, West 
Germany: Patria, c. 1948); V. Viliamas, Isikurimo galimybes 
uzjurio krastuose (Overseas Settlement Possibilities) 
(Nordlingen, West Germany: Sudavija, 1947), pp. 5, 10. 
19 Appeal of the Representatives of the Baltic Nations 
to the General Assembly of the United Nations. Jointly 
presented on November 24, 1947 by the Envoys of the Three 
Baltic States Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in 
Washington to His Excellency Or. Osvaldo Aranha, President 
of the General Assembly of the United Nations (Flushing 
Meadows, NY: np, 1947), pp. 16-22. 
The US Senate took cognizance of 
the postwar Baltic. See US Senate, 
Judiciary, Subcommittee to Investigate 
the situation in 
Committee on the 
Immigration and 
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While the displaced persons in Germany were 
struggling to remain in the West, a battle was being fought 
on the other side of the Atlantic to the same end. As early 
as 9 April 1944, Lithuanian Minister Povilas Zadeikis 
dispatched a note to the State Department on this issue. He 
received assurances that no person in the us zone of 
occupation would be repatriated against their will. 
zadeikis also directed the United Lithuanian Relief Fund of 
America to inform the displaced persons to firmly maintain 
their claims to Lithuanian citizenship. Despite the efforts 
of Lithuanian-American organizations, and the intercession 
of Eleanor Roosevelt, the American promises were not fully 
kept. 20 
By 1947, Operation Keelhaul had ceased and Secretary 
of State George C. Marshall said that II i t is the fixed 
policy of the United States Government to oppose any forced 
Naturalization, Displaced Persons in Europe, (Washington: US 
Government Printing Office, 1948), pp. 20-21. 
Fears of repatriation were not only present 
immediately following World War II. They existed among 
remaining displaced persons during the negotiations for the 
Austrian State Treaty of 1955. See Assembly of Captive 
European Nations, First Session (Second Part), February 12, 
1955 -- September 20, 1955. Organization, Resolutions, 
Heports, Debate (New York: ACEN, 1955), pp. 36-37, 75-83, 
102-103. 
20 Watson Kirkconnell, "Eclipse of Baltic Freedom," 
Baltic Review, 1, 4-5 (July-August 1946), 221; Kucas, p. 
567; Swettenham, p. 180. 
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repatriation of displaced persons. " 21 But this, 
unfortunately, came too late for several thousand Baltic 
citizens removed to their countries against their will among 
the approximately 2,100,000 persons repatriated to the 
soviet Union. 22 This despite the fact that the US had not 
recognized the regimes functioning in Lithuania, Latvia, and 
Estonia since 1940. Indeed, it was only in 1950 that the US 
government legislatively recognized a special category of 
refugee who could not return to his country for fear of 
political or religious persecution. This was in the form of 
amendments to the Displaced Persons Act of 1948. 23 It is 
interesting that the nonrecognition policy was able to 
protect Baltic property from falling into the hands of the 
21 Epstein, p. 1. Secretary of State James F. Byrnes 
wrote: "We support [the displaced persons] and will not 
force them to return as long as there is reason to 
believe they would be punished for political reasons." See 
his Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947), p. 
168. 
22 Grzybowski, p. 239. See also The Baltic Refugees, 
pp. 11-13, 17; Kucas, p. 566; Report to the U.S. High 
Commissioner for Germany on the International Refugee 
Organization, US Zone of Germany, 22 October 1951, annex VI, 
pp. 1-10; Vaino J. Rusmandel, "The Continued Legal Existence 
of the Baltic States," Baltic Review, 12, 7 November 1957, 
54; Supreme Lithuanian Committee of Liberation, Appeal to 
the United. Nations on Genocide (np: Lithuanian Foreign 
Service, nd), p. 34; United Nations Organization Yearbook, 
1946-1947, pp. 164-170; United Nations, International Relief 
Organization, The Facts About Refugees (Geneva: UN IRO, 
1948), pp. 4, 12-13; UN IRO, The Forgotten Elite: The Story 
of Refugee Specialists (Geneva: UN IRO, 1949). 
23 Public Law 555, An Act to Amend the Displaced 
Persons Act of 1948, 16 June 1950, section 2(d). See also 
Public Law 203, Refugee Relief Act of 1953, 7 August 1953. 
202 
soviets -- but not Baltic persons. 
B· THE SIMAS KUDIRKA INCIDENT 
This chapter has discussed the forced repatriation 
of several thousand Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians. 
we now turn to the forced repatriation of one Lithuanian, 
simas Kudirka, a sailor in the Soviet merchant marine. 
On 23 November 1970, the US Coast Guard cutter 
yjgilant and the Soviet fishing trawler Sovetskaya Litva 
(Soviet Lithuania) met in American waters off Martha's 
Vineyard, Massachusetts. There a US delegation was to meet 
with the Soviets to discuss problems of interest to the New 
England fishing industry, specifically the Soviet's illegal 
use of tightly-woven nets, which were also dropped to 
excessive depths. The delegation consisted of three fishing 
industry civilians, a Coast Guard legal advisor, and two 
officials from the US Commerce Department's National Marine 
Fisheries Service. The Vigilant (WMEC-617) was a 210 foot 
medium endurance cutter based in New Bedford, Massachusetts. 
The Sovetskaya Litva (M-26402) was a 509 foot refrigerated 
trawler, based in Klaipeda, Lithuania, which operated along 
the east coast of the United States. 24 
24 Jurgis Gliauda, Simas, trans. Kestutis Ciziunas and 
J. Zemkalnis (New York: Manyland, 1971), pp. 2-4; Algis 
Ruksenas, Day of Shame (New York: David McKay, 1973), pp. 
xv, plates following p. 176; US House of Representatives, 
Attempted Defection by Lithuanian Seaman Simas Kudirka. 
Report of the Subcommittee on State Department Organization 
and Foreign Operations, Committee on Foreign Affairs 
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At some point during the proceedings, Simas Kudirka, 
a radio operator on board the trawler, managed to leap 
undetected onto the deck of the Vigilant. Kudirka hid below 
and informed an American sailor of the circumstances. The 
sailor, in turn, reported to the vessel's commanding 
officer, Commander Ralph Eustis. Eustis was a 1954 graduate 
of the Coast Guard Academy and the US Naval Postgraduate 
school. His previous assignments had included tours in 
Maine, Japan, California, and Coast Guard Headquarters. 
When Eustis went below to interrogate Kudirka, Kudirka 
informed him that he was Lithuanian, not Russian. Kudirka 
also requested political asylum. 
This information made its way back to one of the 
civilian delegates, Robert M. Brieze, president of the New 
Bedford Seafood Producers Association. Ironically, Brieze 
was a Latvian whose entire family had been deported to 
Siberia in 1941, and who fled the Soviets in 1944. Brieze 
had earlier expressed anger that a ship named Soviet 
Lithuania was sailing into US waters, despite the 
nonrecognition policy. 25 Brieze went to see Commander 
Eustis and informed him of the policy, the presence of the 
Baltic desk at the State Department, and the danger to 
Kudirka were he returned to Soviet officials. He also 
(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 
2 ° Chapter seven, note 47 of this 
possibility of indirect recognition. It is 
instance into that category of concern. 
1971), pp. 2 ff. 
study cited the 
safe to put this 
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advised that the Lithuanian Legation in Washington should be 
contacted. 26 
The incident, however, began traveling along the 
tortuous path of Coast Guard and State Department 
bureaucracy. The commander of the First Coast Guard 
District in· Boston. Rear Admiral William B. Ellis, was 
recovering from an illness, and had relinquished district 
command to his chief of staff, Captain Fletcher W. Brown, 
Jr. Technically, Ellis was not in command and could issue 
no binding directives. Yet, Brown informed Ellis of the 
situation and sought his advice. Admiral Ellis and other 
officers began displaying an appalling lack of historical 
knowledge. Ellis was unaware of the nonrecognition policy, 
and confused the concepts of defection and desertion. One 
of the officers thought that Brieze escaped the Soviets in 
order to avoid the draft. 27 A radio conversation between 
Ellis and Commander Eustis was indicative of these 
attitudes: 
"In order to protect the fisheries talks," 
Ellis said, ''you should notify the Soviets of the 
defection. You must also return the defector if 
they so desire. But if they choose to do nothing, 
keep him on board." 
26 Gliauda, pp. 3, 53-54; Ruksenas, pp. xv, 15; US 
House of Representatives, Attempted Defection by Lithuanian 
Seaman Simas Kudirka. Hearings Before the Subcommittee on 
State Department Organization and Foreign Operations, 
Committee on Foreign Affairs (Washington: US Government 
Printing Office, 1971), pp. 31 ff. 
27 Gl iauda, pp. 25-26; Ruksenas, pp. 277-279; US House 
of Representatives, Report, pp. 7-9. 
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"But if the defector jumped overboard while the 
ships were unmooring," Eustis remarked, "The 
Vigilant could make an attempt to pick him up." 
"In this case, too," Ellis replied, "the Soviet 
ship should be given the first opportunity. Make 
sure you don't preempt them in taking that 
action. 1128 
When testifying after the incident, Ellis stated: "I'm not 
sure if [Captain Brown] said the man was a Lithuanian. I 
don't think it would have meant anything if he had. He was 
still a Soviet citizen." 29 Further, though Ellis was 
formally not in command, his advice to subordinates acquired 
the ring of an order. 30 
By then the State Department had been drawn into the 
matter. Edward L. Killham was the officer in charge of 
bilateral affairs in the Office of Soviet Union Affairs. 
This was his third tour at the bilateral section of the 
Soviet desk. Killham was a senior foreign service officer 
with eighteen years experience. The initial report had been 
phoned to him by Captain Wallace C. Dahlgren, USCG, chief of 
the Intelligence Division in the Office of Operations (Flag 
Plot). As a country officer, Killham possessed the 
authority to order a defector held by US officials. Yet, he 
viewed this not as a genuine defection, but as a possible 
Soviet attempt at provocation. In any event, US officials 
appeared more concerned with the success of the negotiations 
28 Gliauda, pp. 51-52. 
29 Ruksenas, p. 279. 
30 Gliauda, p. 26. 
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than with the political ramifications of the incident. 31 
Not only were officials not addressing the basic 
issues of asylum and nonrecognition, the system itself was 
beginning to break down. Communications problems delayed 
transmissions. Bureaucratic procedures and chains of 
command were blurring among different actors at the Coast 
Guard and State Department. While Ellis and Killham 
appeared to be advocating one course of action, the Coast 
Guard district's legal officer, Commander Flanagan, advised 
that Kudirka should be detained, brought ashore, and 
transferred to either the State Department or the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service. Finally, the entire 
matter should have been handled at the Baltic, not the 
Soviet, desk. 32 
31 Gliauda, pp. 37-38; Ruksenas, p. 86. 
32 Gliauda, pp. 42-43; Ruksenas, pp. 190, 192, 198, 
276-287; US House of Representatives, Hearings, pp. 37, 115. 
United States Code, Title 8, section 1153 (a)(7) 
writes that the Attorney General may issue immigrant visas: 
to aliens who satisfy an Immigration and 
Naturalization Service officer at any examination 
in any non-Communist or non-Communist dominated 
country, (A) that (i) because of persecution or 
fear of persecution on account of race, religion, 
or political opinion they have fled (I) from any 
Communist or Communist-dominated country or area . 
. and (ii) are unable or unwilling to return to 
such country or area on account of race, religion, 
or political opinion. 
The US Code of Federal Regulations, Title 8, section 
253.1 (f) writes that a crewman: 
who alleges that he cannot return to a Communist, 
Communist-dominated, or Communist-occupied country 
because of fear of persecution in that country on 
account of race, religion, or political opinion 
shall be removed from the vessel or aircraft for 
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The path of inquiry was becoming overgrown with 
the dense vegetation of bureaucracy. The problem 
itself had become distorted and reduced to a 
technical detail of a Search and Rescue operation 
with some potential political nuances. 33 
By now, the Soviets had discovered Kudirka's 
presence on board the Vigilant and demanded his return. The 
.§__ovetskaya Litva's commander, Captain Popov, lodged a 
maritime protest to the Vigilant, contending that Kudirka 
had stolen three thousand rubles from the safe in Popov's 
stateroom though rubles are worthless outside the Soviet 
Union. 34 
Brieze later testified: 
At approximately 11 p.m., Captain Eustis said that 
he had orders from above to give back the 
Lithuanian defector to the Russians. I then 
pleaded with Captain Eustis to save the defector's 
life and keep him aboard the Vigilant. Captain 
Eustis said he had no choice as he had received 
his orders. At this time Captain Eustis was 
crying. He said that the orders had come from the 
interrogation. Following the interrogation, the 
district director [of Immigration and 
Naturalization] having jurisdiction over the area 
where the alien crewman is located may in his 
discretion authorize parole of the alien crewman 
into the United States . 
33 Gliauda, p. 36. Documents from the Lithuanian 
Consulate General in Chicago, now located at the Lithuanian 
Research and Studies Center, indicate that confusion 
abounded not only during the incident, but following it, as 
well. Vague information was being received from US 
government agencies, including an incorrect rendition of 
Kudirka's name, i.e. Simas Gruze. 
34 Gliauda, pp. 80-81. 
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Boston office. 3 ~ 
soon thereafter, Soviet sailors were allowed to board the 
~· capture, beat, and transport Kudirka back to the 
sovetskaya Litva. Though distraught, Commander Eustis 
-
reportedly ordered the crew to "keep their mouths shut" 
regarding the incident. However, the three civilian 
fishermen aboard the Vigilant at the time made the story 
public. New Bedford shopkeepers refused service to Coast 
Guard personnel, who were also jeered in the town's streets. 
The Vigilant was placed under guard following bomb threats. 
commander Eustis' home was placed under surveillance and the 
phone number was changed to an unlisted one. His two sons 
were harrased in the local school, once by a teacher. 36 
The media response, in both liberal and conservative 
quarters, was critical, though President Nixon was informed 
only two days later, after the story had been nationally 
broadcast. International response was also harsh. One week 
following the Kudirka incident, the UN Commissioner for 
Refugees, Prince Sadrunin Khan, called on US Ambassador 
Charles Yost and presented a protest addressed to Secretary 
of State William Rogers. Lithuanian-Americans staged 
massive demonstrations in major 
3 ~ US House of Representatives, 
also Ruksenas, pp. 173, 225. 
cities, protesting US 
Hearings, p. 35. See 
36 Kucas, p. 304; Ruksenas, p. 275. 
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actions and demanding Kudirka's return. 37 President Nixon 
could not ignore the response and stated at his news 
conference of 10 December 1970: "I can assure you it will 
never happen again. The [US] for 190 years has had a proud 
tradition of providing opportunities for refugees and 
guaranteeing their safety, and we are going to meet that 
tradition. 1138 
Investigations conducted by Congress and the Coast 
Guard followed the much publicized incident. During 
congressional hearings, Rep. Edward Derwinski (R-IL) stated: 
The fact that the seaman involved was a 
Lithuanian, it is incomprehensible to me that 
anybody at a reasonable level in the Department of 
State, or anybody who had reached a captain's or 
admiral's rank in the Coast Guard, would not 
understand that the Soviet Union is made up of 
many captive peoples and a Lithuanian is not a 
Russian. 39 
During Robert Brieze's testimony, Rep. John Buchanan (R-IL) 
added: 
It would appear, Mr. Brieze, that you have a 
better understanding of international law and of 
United States foreign policy than either the Coast 
Guard or the State Department, since we do not 
recognize that the Soviet Union has any right 
under Heaven to a Lithuanian citizen seeking 
asylum. 40 
Indeed most .official US discussion of the Kudirka incident 
37 Kucas, pp. 303-304; Ruksenas, pp. 265-266, 270, 272-
274. 
38 Ruksenas, p. 275. 
39 US House of Representatives, Hearings, p. 4. 
<.1.0 US House of Representatives, Hearings, p. 41. 
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speaks of mistakes in implementing asylum-granting 
There is usually no mention of the procedures. 
nonrecognition policy, indicating that a great deal of 
personnel are either unaware of it, or do not fully 
understand its implications in practical matters. For 
example, Louis F.E. Goldie, a professor at the US Naval War 
college, writes that the Kudirka incident "was merely an 
illegality [foreigners exercising authority on US territory] 
aided and abetted by an officer of the U.S. Coast Guard." 41 
Admiral Ellis, Captain Brown, and Commander Eustis 
were suspended pending investigation. A Coast Guard board 
of investigation recommended general courts-martial for 
Ellis and Brown. Secretary of Transportation John Volpe did 
not c~ncur with this decision, and provided the officers 
with the opportunity to retire with punitive letters of 
reprimand; they took this route. Volpe did, however, concur 
in Eustis' reassignment. Eustis was transferred to 
Executive Base, Governor's Island, New York, where he served 
as executive officer. He was passed over for promotion to 
the rank of captain in May 1972. 42 Finally, the State 
41 Louis F.E. Goldie, "Legal Aspects of the Refusal of 
Asylum by U.S. Coast Guard on 23 November, 1970," Lituanus, 
18, 3 (Fall 1972), 63. 
42 Ruksenas, pp. 294-298. For other accounts of the 
Kudirka incident, see Joanne S. Gowa, U.S. Obligations Under 
International Law Governing the Status of Refugees and the 
§ranting of Asylum: The Case of Simas Kudirka. Monograph 
Series in Public Affairs No. 6 (Princeton, NJ: Woodrow 
Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton 
University, 1975); Clyde R. Mann, "Asylum Denied: The 
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oepartment issued a policy directive dealing with asylum 
requests on 4 January 1972. Guidelines were also issued to 
the Coast Guard. 43 
As for Kudirka, he was tried in secret and on 20 May 
1971 was sentenced to ten years in a Siberian labor camp for 
high treason. At his trial, he was allowed to speak for 
four hours, where he denied being a Soviet subject and 
demanded independence for Lithuania. 44 Lithuanian-American 
organizations, along with a number of politicians, continued 
to work for his cause. It was later discovered that 
Kudirka's mother had been born in Brooklyn, New York, and 
later emigrated to Lithuania. Under US law, since she was 
an American citizen, he, too, could claim US citizenship. 
Though the USSR does not recognize dual citizenship, 
President Gerald Ford was able to strike a bargain with 
Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev and won Kudirka's 
release. On 5 November 1974, a Soviet plane carrying 
Kudirka, his wife, daughter, and mother landed at New York 
Vigilant Incident," Lituanus, 18, 3 (Fall 1972), 13-57; 
Lieutenant Commander Paul M. Regan, USCG, "International Law 
and the Naval ·Commander," US Naval Institute Proceedings, 
107, 8 (August 1981), 51 ff. 
~ 43 Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations: An 
Introduction to Public International Law, 4th ed. (New York: 
Macmillan,· 1981), pp. 276-277. 
44 Kuc as, pp. 304-305; Anatole Shub, "Report on the 
Trial Testimony of Simas Kudirka -- Lithuanian Sailor," 
Lituanus, 18, 3 (Fall 1972), 7-12; Shub, "Tell defector's 
stirring plea for free Lithuania," Chicago Sun-Times, 7 
August 1971, p. 1. 
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city's Kennedy Airport, almost four years after the incident 
off Martha's Vineyard. 40 
As far as senior foreign service and naval officers 
were concerned, the Kudirka incident revolved around the 
issue of political asylum. The matter only incidentally 
involved a Lithuanian sailor. Nonrecognition here played a 
secondary role in terms of bureaucratic decision making in a 
compressed situation, as well as in long term oficial 
analyses. Beyond the issuance of new asylum guidelines for 
us personnel and a pro forma reaffirmation of the policy, it 
was largely ignored. Forced repatriation once again 
occured, but this time on a US naval vessel in American 
territorial waters. Had the incident not taken place in a 
politically charged atmosphere, it may never have come to 
light, indicating the passive role of the nonrecognition 
policy in official circles. As an announced policy, it has 
40 Bill Anderson, "New Stress Over the Baltic Lands," 
Chicago Tribune, 18 March 1975; Kucas, pp. 305-306. Kucas, 
p. 306, writes that one of the US officials escorting 
Kudirka from Moscow was William Dyess, chief of the State 
Department's Soviet section. The author of the present 
study once again notes that there is a Baltic desk at the 
Department, and asks why an official from that entity was 
not dispatched instead. 
See also Algirdas M. Budreckis, ed., The 
Lithuanians in America 1651-1975: A Chronology & Fact Book 
(Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana, 1976), p. 66; US Department of 
State, letter of Carol C. Laise, Assistant Secretary for 
Public Affairs, to Antanas Sukauskas, private citizen, 14 
March 1974. 
Kudirka wrote his memoirs after arriving in the 
United States. See Simas Kudirka and Larry Eichel, For 
!hose Still at Sea: The Defection of a Lithuanian Sailor 
(New York: Dial, 1978). 
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~ithstood the test of time. However, in a real world 
situation, it fell through the bureaucratic cracks. 
c. THE HELSINKI ACCORDS 
The Final Act of the Conference on Security and 
cooperation in Europe was signed at Helsinki, Finland on 1 
August 1975. It climaxed a decade long effort on the part 
of the Soviet Union to win confirmation of the territorial 
and political status quo on the continent. The act 
consisted of three "baskets" dealing with military 
confidence building, broad based cooperation, and human 
rights. The Declaration on Principles Guiding Relations 
Between Participating States included provisions on 
sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in 
sovereignty, avoidance of the threat or use of force, 
territorial integrity, non-intervention in internal affairs, 
and the right of self-determination. 46 
Already three years prior to the signing of the 
Helsinki accords, Americans of eastern European descent were 
46 US General Accounting Office, Helsinki Commission: 
The First 8 .Years. Report to the Chairman of the Commission 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe. GAO/NSIAD-85-57, 1 
March 1985 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 
1985), pp. i, 1-2; US House of Representatives, Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Part II. Hearings 
Before the Subcommittee on International Political and 
Military Affairs of the Committee on International Relations 
(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 121-
124. See also Voldemars Korsts, ed., Heritage--
Nationalities News (Chicago: Republican State Nationalities 
Council of Illinois, 1978), p. 2. 
214 
warning that the agreement could recognize the status quo in 
Europe, that is Soviet domination of eastern Europe, 
including the Baltic States. A Lithuanian-American 
delegation presented a memorandum to Secretary of State 
HenrY Kissinger urging "that the international status of the 
Baltic states not be compromised" at the conference. US 
officials, in turn, maintained that the US advocated 
peaceful territorial changes and continued nonrecognition of 
the Baltic annexation. 47 
As the signing of the final act drew near, more 
activity was taking place between Congress and the State 
Department regarding the status of the nonrecognition 
policy. On 11 April 1975, Rep. Thomas E. Morgan, chairman 
of the House Committee on International Relations, received 
assurances from the State Department that nonrecognition 
would not be bargained away at Helsinki: 
The Department affirms that it remains the 
policy of the United States not to recognize the 
forcible annexation of the Baltic States by the 
USSR. 
The Department of State agrees that the 
United States delegation to the Conference should 
not agree to the recognition by the Conference of 
the Soviet Union's forcible annexation of Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania. We expect that the 
Conference will adopt a declaration of principles 
which will include respect for "frontier 
47 Baltic Committee in Scandinavia, Memorandum 
Regarding The European Security and Cooperation Conference 
and the Baltic States (Stockholm: BCS, 1972), p. 2; 
Budreckis, p. 64; US Department of State, letter of Acting 
Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs John Richardson, Jr. 
to llmar Pleer, president of the Estonian-American National 




in our view this will not 
48 
On the very eve of the signing of the accords, 
president Gerald Ford, Secretary Kissinger, and 
congressional represenatives received a delegation of 
Americans of eastern European descent in the White House. 
president Ford noted that the US was not abandoning east 
Europe: 
We have acted in concert with our free and 
democratic partners to preserve our interests in 
Berlin and Germany, and have obtained the public 
commitment of the Warsaw Pact governments to the 
possibility of peaceful adjustment of frontiers--
a major concession which runs quite contrary to 
the allegation that present borders are being 
permanently frozen. 
Specifically addressing the understandable 
concern about the effect of the Helsinki 
declarations on the Baltic nations, I can assure 
you that the United States has never 
recognized the Soviet incorporation of Lithuania, 
Latvia and Estonia and is not doing so now. Our 
official policy of non-recognition is not affected 
by the results of the European Security 
Conference. 
There is included in the declaration of 
principles on territorial integrity the provision 
that no occupation or acquisition of territory in 
violation of international law will be recognized 
48 US House of Representatives, Subcommittee on 
International Political and Military Affairs, Committee on 
International Relations, Conference on Security and 
fooperation In Europe (Washington: US Government Printing 
Office, 1975), p. 11. See also Baltic Council of Australia, 
Notes and Documents on Australian Recognition of the 
Incorporation of the Baltic States into the USSR (np: BCA, 
1974), p. 14; Bronis J. Kaslas, Jhe Baltic Nations -- The 
Quest for Regional Integration and Political Liberty 
(Pittston, PA: Euramerica, 1976), pp. 278-280. 
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as legal. 49 
In and of itself, the Helsinki signing did not 
violate the nonrecognition policy, especially in view of 
repeated US pronouncements to this effect. What was 
disturbing were reports that Secretary Kissinger, the 
National Security Council, and the State Department sought 
to dilute the policy for the sake of detente. Bill Anderson 
reported in the Chicago Tribune on 15 March 1975 that: 
President Ford is getting advice to drop United 
States diplomatic recognition of Lithuania, 
Latvia, and Estonia. 
Opinion is so strong . that some officials 
in the White House initially tried to conceal from 
the press a [February] meeting by Ford with 
supporters of freedom for the Baltic States. 
It was felt that the highly motivated Baltic 
supporters would generate publicity and damage 
"delicate" dealings with Russia. 
This time Kissinger's staff lost to Ford's 
staff, although there was a compromise: The NSC 
wanted the Baltic group to talk only about 
"domestic" American matters and to see Ford 
without advertising the meeting. 
Further compounding the NSC-State Department 
problem is the fact that Ford for some time has 
shown a higher-than-average Presidential interest 
in the Baltic situation. 00 
Anderson later reported that certain White House staffers 
prevented the Voice of America from broadcasting news of the 
49 US Department of State, Department of State 
Bulletin, 73, 1885, 11 August 1975, pp. 204-206. West 
German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher on 25 July 
1975, and British Prime Minister Harold Wilson on 5 August 
1975 declared to their respective parliaments that the 
Helsinki accords did not recognize the status quo in Europe 
as final. See Kaslas, pp. 277-278. 
"
0 Bill Anderson, "Ford is Urged 
Ties," Chicago Tribune, 15 March 1975. 
to Cut Our Baltic 
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visit, censored photographs, and attempted to have Rep. 
Edward Derwinski, who organized the meeting, reprimanded. 01 
when these disclosures were made, the State Department was 
subjected to "a rolling avalanche of outraged telephone 
calls, telegrams, and letters.""' 2 
About the time of the February delegation to the 
White House, the US consul in Leningrad, Joseph V. Neubert, 
and his deputy, Garry L. Mathews, visited the Baltic States 
and met with senior communist officials. 03 The New York 
Times reported: 
The United States through its consulate [in 
Leningrad] is diluting a 35-year-old policy of 
refusing to recognize the incorporation of 
Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia into the Soviet 
Union. 
Western diplomats [in Leningrad] feel that 
there is a gradual but unmistakable American 
movement toward de facto, if not formal, 
recognition of the Soviet Baltic republics 
[Consul General Neubert] acknowledged that in 
effect he was now the United States Ambassador to 
the three republics. 
Mr. Neubert adheres to American policy protocol 
by not making direct contacts with the highest 
party and government officials in the Baltic 
republics, but he has met with their deputies . 
. The consulate, rather than the embassy in 
Moscow, has responsibility for reporting on the 
"'
1 Anderson, "New Stress Over the Baltic Lands," 
Chicago Tribune, 18 March 1975. 
"'
2 
"Forgive Them Their Helplessness," editorial, 
Chicago Tribune, 5 April 1975. See also William I. Bacchus, 
"Multilateral Foreign Policy Making: The Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe," in The Politics of 
-:-P-'0-=l'-'1=-· .::::.C..:.Y___,!M~a.!.:k:..::i~n~g~i~n:!._.!.!Ac::m::..:e::.;...r..:::i:...::c:..:a~: _ _!F'-' :::.i ..::.V..::e:__c~· ~a~s:...:e=----=S;...;t:...:u=d~i:...:e::...:s~ , e d . Dav i d A . 
Caputo (San Francisco: Freeman, 1977), pp. 132-165. 
"'
3 US House of Representatives, Conference on Security 
2._nd Cooperation in Europe, p. 37. 
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Baltic region to the State Department. 154 
such developments only served to increase anxiety among 
those who clinged to the policy as an important moral 
statement on the part of the United States. 
Months after the signing of the Helsinki accords, 
when the controversy would have been expected to settle, the 
House of Representatives saw fit to address the issue once 
again in terms of the nonrecognition policy. House 
Resolution 864 was approved by the House Subcommittee on 
International Political and Military Affairs on 18 November 
1975, and was debated by the full House on 2 December. HR 
864 stated, in part: 
Whereas the Soviet Union appears to 
interpret the Final Act of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed at 
Helsinki, as giving permanent status to the Soviet 
Union's illegal annexation of Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania, . Now, therefore, be it 
Resolved, That notwithstanding any 
interpretation which the Soviet Union or any other 
country may attempt to give to the Final Act 
it is the sense of the House of Representatives 
(1) that there has been no change in the 
longstanding policy of the United States on 
nonrecognition of the illegal seizure and 
annexation by the Soviet Union of the three Baltic 
nations , and (2) that it will continue to 
be the policy of the United States not to 
recognize in any way the annexation of the Baltic 
nations by the Soviet Union. 1515 
154 James F. Clarity, "U.S. Eases Policy on Baltic 
States," New York Times, 18 May 1975. 
1515 US Congress, Congressional Record, 2 December 1975, 
p. H 11587. See also US House of Representatives, 
C_o-'n=f...::e~r:...:e~n...::c:..::e:...._~o~n~S~e..:::c:..::u::...:r~i...::t~y'--!!:a~n:..::d~_.:::C...::o:..:o~p=e~r-=a::..t=i-=o....:n=--.::.i..:::n,__-=E...::u:...:r:...:o~p=e , Part I I , 
pp. 1-2. 
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During the debate, Rep. Edward Koch (D-NY), tried to 
frame the resolution relative to detente: 
Detente is an admirable goal, but we need not--
and should not -- forsake the truth or acquiesce 
in oppression in our quest for better relations 
with the Soviet Union. If we acquiesce in the 
illegal incorporation of the Baltic States, are we 
not as guilty of cynical expediency as Russia and 
Germany were when they originally divided up this 
area of Eastern Europe in their pact of 1939?" 6 
Koch went on to say that the nonrecognition policy, in 
particular, and US foreign policy, in general, are designed 
to be definite statements to the world community: "What is 
the purpose of our foreign policy if it is not to encourage 
self-determination and democracy around the world?"" 7 Rep. 
Boland, too, emphasized that foreign policy addresses not 
merely domestic interest groups, but a broader international 
audience, as well: . we do not consider this resolution 
merely for those citizens of Latvian, Lithuanian, and 
Estonian descent. We mean by this resolution to express to 
the world that this body does not waiver in its commitment 
to freedom throughout the world."" 0 HR 864, directed mainly 
to the Kremlin's attention, was unanimously approved the 
same day. The Senate passed a similarly worded resolution, 
56 US Congress, 
p. H 11589. 
07 US Congress, 
p. H 11589. 
"
0 US Congress, 
p. H 11589. 
Congressional Record, 2 December 1975, 
Congressional Record, 2 December 1975, 
Congressional Record, 2 December 1975, 
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senate Resolution 406, on 5 May 1976. 09 
Helsinki did not end with the signing of the accords 
in August 1975. The "Helsinki process" consists of follow-
up review meetings and reports focusing on adherence to the 
political commitments made in 1975. Critics of the accords 
assert that continued meetings sanctify Soviet hegemony in 
Europe with nothing in return. Others say that the Helsinki 
process focuses attention on Soviet human rights 
violations. 60 
The first review occured in Belgrade, Yugoslavia in 
1977-1978. On 25 November 1977, Sen. Robert Dole and 
Ambassador Arthur Goldberg of the US delegation spoke of the 
Baltic States during addresses to the conference. 
second review occured in Madrid in 1980-1981. 
09 US Senate, Senate Resolution 406, 5 








the principle on territorial integrity 
excludes the acquisition of territory by force or 
threat of force. It states that no acquisition 
contrary to international law may be regarded as 
legal. The language in this principle reflects 
and supports the longstanding U.S. position on the 
Baltic states. . The executive branch 
has also welcomed House and Senate resolutions 
expressing no change in the U.S. position of 
nonrecognition. 
See US Department of State, "Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe: A Foreign Relations Outline," 
Department of State Bulletin, 26 September 1977, p. 406. 
60 US General Accounting Office, p. 2. See also Zinta 
Arums, Joint Baltic American National Committee (JBANC) 1986 
Annual Report (Rockville, MD: JBANC, 1987), pp. 7-9; John B. 
Genys, "The Joint Baltic American Committee and the European 
Security Conference," Journal of Bal tic Studies, 9 ( 1978), 
245-258. 
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oecember 1980, Warren Zimmerman, deputy chairman of the US 
delegation, reaffirmed the nonrecognition policy, adding 
that the Soviet incorporation violated principle eight of 
the Helsinki accords. Zimmerman also noted that territorial 
acquisition contrary to international law as listed in 
principle four was applicable to the Baltic. 61 For the 
Madrid conference, President Jimmy Carter appointed Rimas 
cesonis as a public member of the US delegation. Cesonis 
was a member of the public affairs committee of the 
Lithuanian American Community. 02 The Vienna conference took 
place in 1986-1987, where the US delegation repeated 
Washington's position on the Baltic. 
The US State Department and US Commission on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe, which is a mixed 
executive-legislative entity, issue periodic reports on the 
monitoring of the Helsinki process. They routinely reaffirm 
the nonrecognition policy, and chronicle the progress of 
61 Edgars Dunsdorfs, The Baltic Dilemma II: The case of 
the reversal of the de jure recognition by Australia of the 
incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union 
(Melbourne: Baltic Council of Australia, 1982), pp. 382-383; 
US Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, The 
Belgrade Followup Meeting to the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe: A Reoort and Appraisal. Transmitted 
to the Committee on International Relations, US House of 
Representatives (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 
1978), p. 23. 
62 Vytautas Kutkus, JAV Lietuviu Bendruomenes krasto 
valdybos veikla nuo 1979 m. gruodzio men. 15 d. iki 1982 m. 
spalio men. 23 d. (Activity of the Lithuanian American 
~ommunity from 15 December 1979 to 23 October 1982) (np: 
LAC, 1982), p. 14. 
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human rights in the Baltic States under the equal rights and 
self-determination provisions of principle eight. However, 
at least in the State Department reports, the section 
dealing with principle eight usually repeats itself every 
year. In other places where activities are broken down by 
nation, the Baltic States are included in the Soviet 
union. 63 
It must be noted that the Final Act is not a treaty 
under international law, but a non-binding declaration of 
intentions. The act explicitly states that it is not 
eligible for registration under Article 102 of the United 
Nations Charter. 64 The US, though, considers the ten 
principles of the Helsinki Declaration "solemn moral and 
political undertakings drawn from the body of established 
63 See, for example, US Commission on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe, Implementation of the Final Act of 
the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: 
Findings and Recommendations Seven Years After Helsinki. 
Report Submitted to the Congress of the United States 
(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1982), pp. 20-
22; US Department of State, Implementation of Helsinki Final 
Act. December 1, 1983 March 31, 1984. Sixteenth 
Semiannual Report (Washington: US Government Printing 
Office, 1984), p. 14. 
The US government is not the only entity 
monitoring implementation of the Helsinki accords in 
Lithuania. For a discussion of the Lithuanian Helsinki 
Group, see Tomas Venclova, Lietuva pasaulyje (Lithuania in 
the World) (Chicago: Academic Press, 1981), pp. 55-66. 
64 Kaslas, pp. 277-278; US Commission on Security and 
Co o p e r a t i o n I n E u r o p e , .::.:R:..::e:..ip::..o=-=.r.....:t'--t.;;..;.o_t:...:h~e_..;C'"""o'-n~g""""r--'e'-s::....::..s--..::o:....:f=------'t:...:h:.:...::.e--..::U:....:n=i-=t:....:e:....d= 
States on Implementation of the Final Act of the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Findings and 
Recommendations Two Years After Helsinki (Washington: 
USCSCE, 1977), p. 4. 
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international law. " 6 ts Washington's position 
notwithstanding, the USSR claims that the Helsinki 
oeclaration of Principles applies between East and West, but 
not necessarily between the Soviet Union and other Socialist 
states. Thus, as far as the Kremlin is concerned, the Final 
Act justifies behavior such as the 1968 invasion of 
czechoslovakia. 66 
Finally, a number of commentators have addressed the 
supposed recognition of the Lithuanian occupation implicit 
in the Helsinki accords. In retrospect, most advise against 
a defeatist interpretation of the Final Act, citing repeated 
US government pronouncements reaffirming nonrecognition. 
Indeed, they caution that concessions of recognition at 
Helsinki psychologically play into the hands of Soviet 
leaders. The signatories of the Final Act possessed no 
authority to determine the status of the Lithuanian state. 
Thus, regardless of what occured in Helsinki in 1975, the 
legal status of Lithuania remains unchanged. 67 
6
ts US Department of State, The Belgrade Followup 
Meeting to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe. October 4, 1977 -- March 9, 1978 (Washington: US 
Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 13. 
66 US Department 
Meeting, pp. 13-14. 
of State, The Belgrade Followup 
07 Kazys Sidlauskas, Amerikos Lietuviu Tarybos veiklos 
penkmetis (Lithuanian American Council: Five Year Summary of 
Activity) (Chicago: LAC, 1980), pp. 8, 10; Petras 
Stravinskas, Ir sviesa ir tiesa: Rastai ir credo I (And 
Light and Truth: Writings and Credo I) (Chicago: Valerijonas 
Simkus, 1978), pp. 74-78. 
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It appears, too, that the status of Europe as a 
whole remains unchanged. On 19 October 1977 at Belgrade, 
Ambassador Albert W. Sherer, deputy chairman of the US 
delegation, conceded: 
The Eur~pe envisaged by the Declaration of 
Principles is one in which each state feels secure 
in its basic interests without the need to assert 
special hegemonic rights or intra-alliance 
reservations. We have not yet reached that day. 
We must continue to work toward it. 68 
D. THE US OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS 
In 1975, Rep. Elizabeth Holtzman (D-NY) began 
planning legislation to amend the 1952 Immigration and 
Naturalization Act, which contained no specific provision 
excluding Nazi war criminals from the US. The amendment 
sought to identify, exclude, and deport persons who, under 
the Nazis, "engaged or assisted in or incited or ordered any 
other person to engage or assist in the persecution of any 
person on account of such person's race, religion or 
national origin." The act was signed by President Carter in 
October 1978. 69 September of the following year saw the 
sa US Department 
Meeting, p. 14. 
of State, The Belgrade Followup 
69 Public Law 95-549, 30 October 1978. 92 Stat. 2065, 
8 U.S.C. 1251 (a)(19)(1978). See also Silvia Kucenas, "OSI 
Collaborates With KGB," Lituanus, 30, 1 (Spring 1984), 85; 
US House of Representatives, House Report No. 95-1452 
(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1978); S. Paul 
Zumbakis, Soviet Evidence in North American Courts: An 
Analysis of Problems and Concerns With Reliance on Communist 
Source Evidence in Alleged War Criminal Trials (Woodhaven, 
NY: Americans for Due Process, 1986), pp. 5-6. 
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creation of the Office of Special Investigations (OSI) 
within the Justice Department's Criminal Division. Its task 
was the location and deportation of Nazi war criminals 
living in the United States. 70 
Several months later, in January 1980, Walter S. 
Rockler, OSI director, and his deputy, Allan A. Ryan, Jr., 
traveled to Moscow to secure Soviet cooperation in 
identifying and prosecuting eastern European war criminals. 
Most relevant documentation and witnesses were located in 
soviet-controlled territory. Rockler and Ryan met with 
Soviet Procurator General Roman Rudenko. Though Ryan and 
others have termed the cooperative agreement reached a 
"handshake," Zumbakis writes that "a statement that no 
formal agreement or report was ever executed or exchanged is 
implausible, at best. The stakes were too important, the 
bureaucratic level too high, for a handshake agreement." 71 
70 Lithuanian American Community of the United States, 
National Executive Committee, Public Affairs Council, 
"Memorandum of Concerns Regarding the Conduct of the Office 
of Special Investigations," Lituanus, 31, 4 (Winter 1985), 
48; US Department of Justice, Order of the Attorney General, 
Transfer of Functions of the Special Litigation Unit Within 
the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department 
of Justice to the Criminal Division of the Department of 
Justice. No. 851-79, 4 September 1979. 
71 Zumbakis, 
Community, p. 50. 
p. 30. See also Lithuanian American 
Ryan was appointed OSI director 
succeeded by Neal Sher in 1983. 
in 1980, and was 
Zumbakis, note, p. 29, writes: 
Rudenko represented the Soviet 
prosecutor in the Nuremberg trials, 
he personally attempted to have a 
entered into evidence, which the 





zumbakis contends that there are documents related to the 
Moscow Agreement, but that the OSI objects to their release 
by the State Department. 72 
The OSI's activities have generated discussion over 
several issues beyond the scope of this study: the presence 
of Nazi war criminals in the United States, 73 utilization 
of Soviet evidence in American trials, 74 the use of civil 
procedures without juries, 7 ~ Nazi activities in the Baltic 
72 
Nuremberg discovered had been signed by the 
witness after several months in solitary 
confinement and in which all questions and answers 
had been prepared by Moscow interrogators. In 
1952, General Rudenko was personally in command 
of the slaughter of inmates in a Ural gulag. 
Zumbakis, p. 30. 
73 See Charles R. Allen, Jr., Nazi War Criminals Among 
~. Jewish Currents Reprint Series (New York: Jewish 
Currents, 1963), pp. 32-40; Algirdas Budreckis, "Soviet 
Attempts to Eradicate Lithuanian Sovereignty," Baltic 
Review, 34 (November 1967), 37-38; Leonas Jonaitis, They 
Live in Your Midst (Vilnius: Gintaras, 1972); Allan A. Ryan, 
Jr., Quiet Neighbors: Prosecuting Nazi War Criminals in 
America (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1984); 
Vytautas Zeimantas, Teisingumas reikalauja (Justice Demands 
l!) (Vilnius: Mintis, 1984). 
74 See Kucenas, p. 82; Lithuanian American Community, 
pp. 59-60; Victor A. Nakas, "OSI and the Baltic Community," 
Li tuanus, 31, 3 (Fall 1985), 83, 85; Bal ys Raugas, ed., JAV 
LB trys desimtmeciai (Three Decades of the Lithuanian 
American Cbmmunity) (Brooklyn: LAC, 1982), pp. 290-291; US 
Department of Justice, letter of Assistant Attorney General, 
Criminal Division, Steven Trott, to Rep. Frank Annunzio, 7 
November 1983; Zumbakis, pp. 58-95. 
7 ~ See Arums, pp. 21-22; Kutkus, pp. 16-17. 
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states during World War I I '7 a discrimination against 
Americans of east European descent, 77 and alleged Soviet 
machinations in tandem with the OSI. 78 What is important in 
terms of the present study is the impact of the OSI on the 
nonrecognition policy. This was dramatically brought out 
during the deportation proceedings of Karl Linnas. 
Karl Linnas was a retired sixty-seven year old land 
surveyor who lived with his wife and three daughters on Long 
Island, New York in 1987. He was tried in absentia in his 
native Estonia in January 1962, and was sentenced to death 
76 See Alex Alexiev, Soviet Nationalities in German 
Wartime Strategy, 1941-1945, R-2772-NA (Santa Monica, CA: 
Rand, 1982), pp. 17-20, 29-30; Juozas Prunskis, Lithuania's 
Jews and the Holocaust (Chicago: Lithuanian American 
Council, 1979); Arnold Purre, "Why the Baltic Soldiers 
Fought the Soviets," Baltic Review, 2, 2 (June 1948), 23-30; 
Kazys Ruksenas, "Del Lietuvos zydu gelbejimo hitlerines 
okupacijos metais (1941-1945 m.)" ("On the Rescue of 
Lithuania's Jews During the Years of Hitler's Occupation 
(1941-1945)"), in Lietuvos istorijos metrastis 1978 
(Yearbook of Lithuanian History 1978) (Vilnius: Lithuanian 
SSR Academy of Sciences, 1979), pp. 36-49; Isaiah Trunk, 
Jewish Responses to Nazi Persecution: Collective and 
Individual Behavior in Extremis (New York: Stein & Day, 
1979), pp. 38, 40-41, 43, 53, 55, 111, 196-197, 249, 316. 
77 See Lithuanian American Community, Bulletin 15 
(English summary), 29 December 1987, p. 3; Nakas, pp. 83-84. 
78 Budreckis, "Soviet Attempts to Eradicate Lithuanian 
Sovereignty,." p. 38; Lithuanian American Community, 
"Memorandum of Concern," p. 49. 
On 11 July 1974, Rep. Joshua Eilberg, chairman of 
the House Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and 
International Law, perhaps naively, stated: I would 
imagine that the Russians would be happy to cooperate in an 
endeavor as uncontroversial as locating Nazi war criminals." 
See US Congress, "Department of State Impedes Investigation 
of Nazi War Criminals," Congressional Record, 11 July 1974, 
P. H 6443. 
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for war crimes in connection with his alleged administration 
of a concentration camp during the German occupation of his 
country. 79 Following proceedings in the United States, 
Linnas' US citizenship was revoked in 1981, and several 
federal courts ruled that he could be deported for lying on 
his 1951 visa application, where he wrote that he had been a 
student during the war. The US Supreme Court cleared the 
way for Linnas' deportation on 27 January 1987. His family 
approached approximately fifty countries to find one--
other than the Soviet Union which would accept him. 
However, they all rejected Linnas' entry, and he was 
deported from New York City to Estonia on 20 April 1987. 00 
He died, according to Soviet reports, of heart failure 
several months later. 
In addition to the objections noted above, the 
Linnas deportation raised questions of nonrecognition vis-a-
vis Baltic citizenship. As noted at the beginning of this 
chapter, the presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet issued a 
decree on 7 September 1940 converting Lithuanian, Latvian, 
and Estonian nationality to Soviet nationality. 01 Those who 
79 Though formally tried in January 1962, the guilty 
verdict had already appeared in the 7 December 1961 issue of 
Socialist Legality, published in the USSR. 
ao Arums, p. 
Lacayo, "Problems 
1987, p. 60. 
23. See also Allen, pp. 
of Crime and Punishment," 
29-32; Richard 
Time, 20 April 
01 A technical amendment regarding the Klaipeda 
Territory and the Silute and Pagegiai districts of Lithuania 
was decreed on 16 December 1947. See US Senate, Committee 
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recognize the incorporation of the Baltic States into the 
soviet Onion regard Baltic refugees as stateless persons not 
entitled to diplomatic protection. The us, though, 
recognizes such persons as possessing their original Baltic 
citizenship, unless they have been naturalized as US 
citizens. 82 
on Foreign Relations, Consular Convention With the Soviet 
Onion, pp. 345-346. 
Robert Langer notes that "the change of 
nationality of the population in a certain territory as a 
result of cession or annexation is actually mass 
naturalization." See his Seizure of Territory: The Stimson 
Doctrine and Related Principles in Legal Theory and 
Diplomatic Practice (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1947), p. 201. 
82 Kaasik, pp. 23-24. 
A new Soviet law went into effect on 1 July 1979 
which recognizes a Soviet citizen as one born or naturalized 
as such -- and their children, regardless of where they were 
born. Further, the latter are not recognized as possessing 
non-Soviet citizenship. Both houses of Congress passed 
resolutions condemning this infringement of the US 
citizenship of several million native and naturalized 
Americans. See House Concurrent Resolution 200, 
Congressional Record, 13 November 1979, pp. H 10583-10586, 
10603; Senate Concurrent Resolution 54, Congressional 
Record, 28 November 1979, p. S 17441. See also Rep. Robert 
K. Dornan's remarks, Congressional Record, 10 October 1979, 
p. E 4945; Dunsdorfs, I I, pp. 379-382. 
Grzybowski, pp. 334-335, recounts Articles 40 and 
41 of the 1926 Statute of Soviet Consuls Abroad, which hold 
that Soviet consuls must maintain discipline among Soviet 
citizens abroad: 
The consul must see to it that citizens of the 
(USSR] who are abroad . carry out all his 
legitimate orders. In case of insubordination to 
such orders of the consul, the latter is to notify 
the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in 
order that the necessary measures may be taken. 
In case of extreme necessity a consul has 
the power to order the citizen of the 
U.S.S.R. to return to the territory of the 
O.S.S.R. 
Grzybowski, p. 335, adds: 
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Linnas was naturalized and, later, denaturalized. 
At this point he came within the jurisdiction of the 
immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). Because 
Linnas had lost his citizenship, he no longer possessed the 
right to remain in the US. An INS administrative law judge, 
and the Board of Immigration Appeals, determined his 
deportability. Once this stage has been completed, a 
defendant can choose the country to which he wishes to be 
deported, provided the country in question accepts him. 
Regarding the OSI trials, the only country which has been 
willing to accept deportees has been the Soviet Union.as 
Presumably, when the US deported Linnas to Soviet-
occupied Estonia, it was violating the nonrecognition 
policy. However, Washington has not interpreted events in 
such a manner, but has focused more narrowly on deportation 
proceedings. In the first place, when a defendant is found 
guilty in an OSI trial, he is not guilty of war crimes per 
se, but of entering the United States illegally, for 
example, by lying on visa and citizenship applications. As 
such, the matter is a domestic one, completely divorced from 
events which may have taken place outside the US. 
as 
Then, deportation occurs under section 243 (a)(7) of 
It is doubtful 
accept a similar 
and control over 
Union. 
whether Soviet authorities would 
degree of consular supervision 
aliens resident in the Soviet 
Lithuanian American Community, "Memorandum of 
Concerns," p. 70. 
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the Immigration and Nationality Act, 84 which deports a 
person to any country willing to accept him, not on the 
basis of his country of nationality or citizenship. When 
Linnas went to Estonia, he was not going as an Estonian as 
far as the US was concerned. In general terms, deportation: 
to the Soviet Union would not, as a matter of law, 
contravene the long-standing and firmly held U.S. 
policy of non-recognition of the forcible 
incorporation of Estonia into the Soviety Union. 
(US officials] strongly adhere to that policy and 
believe it is unaffected by [Linnas'] deportation. 
a l5 
one group has cynically commented that "this response, 
although acknowledging the non-recognition policy, amounts 
to little more than lip service." 86 
Indeed while the US asserts that such deportations 
do not legally violate nonrecognition, the USSR politically 
may interpret them as a form of de facto recognition. Thus 
Washington may be looking at the matter much too narrowly, 
without considering practical implications. 87 Further. it 
84 8 U.S.C. 1253 (a)(7). 
5 l5 US Department of State, letter of Acting Assistant 
Secretary for Public Affairs and Acting Spokesman Alan D. 
Romberg to Jonas Urbonas, chairman, Public Affairs Council, 
Lithuanian American Community, 18 January 1985, quoted in 
Lithuanian American Community, "Memorandum of Concerns," p. 
7 1 . 
88 Lithuanian 




Concerns," p. 72. 
American Community, "Memorandum of 
See also "Karl Linnas' Deportation and 
Policy," Lituanus, 31, 4 (Winter 1985), 
American Community, "Memorandum of 
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is not known whether the nonrecognition policy was ever 
discussed in conjunction with the Moscow agreement. 88 While 
as a matter of principle, the director of OSI is barred from 
entering the Baltic, his subordinates may do so with an 
escort from the US embassy in Moscow or the consulate in 
Leningrad. 89 
As of this writing, only one Baltic person, Karl 
Linnas, has been deported to Soviet-occupied territory in 
the Baltic. With the strict, procedural US interpretation 
of this and possibly other deportations, the OSI cases are 
not glaring legal examples of violation of nonrecognition, 
as were postwar repatriation and the Simas Kudirka incident. 
Realistically, however, it is difficult to reconcile 
deportation with nonrecognition. The punishment of war 
criminals is a vital task which must be vigorously pursued. 
Yet, perhaps a formula could be constructed whereby 
punishments would be served in the US, and not the Baltic. 
Otherwise, a contemporary version of Operation Keelhaul may 
be underway. 
E. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Chapter five of the present study examined the very 
as Zumbakis, p. 32. 
ae Raugas, p. 290. This notwithstanding, it is 
interesting to note that a former OSI director frequently 
utilizes quotation marks when refering to the nonrecognition 
policy, implying that he does not consider it important, 
valid, or both. For example, see Ryan, p. 68. 
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real legal, political, diplomatic, and economic consequences 
of the nonrecognition policy. Chapters six and seven, on 
the other hand, saw that the policy could be circumvented. 
rhe case studies in this chapter recounted four instances of 
factual or perceptual violation of nonrecognition. 
Postwar repatriation, the Kudirka incident, and the 
activities of the OSI impacted upon individuals turned over 
to authorities not recognized as possessing legitimate 
over Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian jurisdiction 
nationals. In these cases, nonrecognition was either 
unknown or simply ignored. 
best, a secondary factor. 
In any event, the policy was, at 
Only at Helsinki did it assume 
greater importance. This even to the point of two rival 
bureaucracies, Ford's and Kissinger's, fighting over its 
appropriateness in that context -- as well as its viability 
at all. Interestingly, where the policy took center stage, 
Helsinki, it was not violated despite the harsh rhetoric 
emanating from conservative and emigre groups. 
Nonrecognition was only perceptually violated by the signing 
of the Helsinki accords. 
The US government formally does not recognize the 
occupation and its logical consequences, that is, mass 
naturalization and the abandonment of sovereignty. These 
cases deal with Washington's commitment to that stand. 
However, there were other issues involved beside 
nonrecognition. For example, in repatriation and the 
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Kudirka incident, matters of asylum and political 
persecution were also in play. Diplomacy, too, was a 
factor, for repatriation was executed in the afterglow of 
successful East-West wartime diplomacy, while Kudirka was 
handed back at the threshold of detente. The OSI presents 
another dilemma, 
denaturalization 
namely, how to reconcile the policy with 
proceedings, while properly crusading 
against war criminals. 
A student of nonrecognition cannot afford to ignore 
the limited practical role of Baltic diplomats in these 
cases. While they successfully operated to protect national 
interests in the legal and economic realms, the needs of 
diplomacy, coupled with bureaucratic ignorance or sabotage, 
limit their powers. The only guarantee that Baltic 
diplomats can expect under the nonrecognition policy is a 
courteous reception. 
Nonrecognition hangs by a thread, as demonstrated in 
Kissinger's actions during Helsinki, the words of an 
American consul (the pseudo-ambassador to the Baltic), and 
the legal tightrope walked by the OSI. Indeed a human being 
was sacrificed for the sake of successful fishing talks. 
This is compounded by the occasional incompetence of those 
seeking to preserve the policy, as seen in the fatalistic 
declarations of those convinced that the West sold out the 
Baltic States at Helsinki. 




The controversy surrounding the Kudirka 
as well as questions focused on the OSI, are 
indicative of this. The post-Helsinki declarations -- as 
always, bipartisan -- are also applicable here. The problem 
is not that the policy is never invoked, but that it is 
invoked after it has been violated. This is especially 
obvious in the most flagrant violations, repatriation and 
Kudirka. For ultimately, the policy exists to protect a 
group of people 
successful. 
a task which has not always proved 
CHAPTER IX 
NONRECOGNITION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
A. INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 
Though this study deals with the United States 
policy of nonrecognition, it is useful to briefly examine 
the attitudes of others regarding the legal status of 
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. 
To commemorate the twentieth anniversary of the 
incorporation of the Baltic States, the Consultative 
Assembly of the Council of Europe passed Resolution 189 on 
29 September 1960. In addition to pledging support for the 
independence of the three countries, the resolution noted 
that "this illegal annexation took place without any genuine 
reference to the wishes of the people," and noted "that the 
independent existence of the Baltic States is still 
recognized de jure by a great majority of the Governments of 
the nations of the free world. " 1 
Over twenty years later, the European Parliament 
Kaslas, ed., The USSR-German Aggression 
(New York: Robert Speller & Sons, 1973), 
also Algirdas J. Kasulaitis, Lithuanian 
..Qhristian Democracy (Chicago: Leo XIII Fund, 1976), p. 236. 
1 Bronis J. 
Against Lithuania 
PP. 461-462. See 
236 
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called for more specific measures on behalf of the Baltic 
states. On 13 January 1983, the parliament adopted a 
resolution by a vote of 98-6 with eight abstentions calling 
for the matter to be submitted to the United Nations Special 
committee on Decolonization. 2 The resolution was based on a 
report submitted by a member of the parliament, Dr. Otto von 
ttabsburg, who noted that most European states had not 
recognized the annexation. Habsburg added that though the 
resolution could not change anything, it may have a positive 
effect upon public opinion. 3 
The Baltic States were not struck from the roster of 
the League of Nations upon their occupation. However, there 
were no representatives of the three countries present when 
the League wound up its affairs. 4 Schnorf laments: "When 
the League of Nations stopped functioning politically, the 
international voice of the Baltic States was stilled.".s 
2 This has yet to be done. 
3 William J.H. Hough, I II, "The Annexation of the 
Baltic States and its Effect on the Development of Law 
Prohibiting Forcible Seizure of Territory," New York Law 
School Journal of International and Comparative Law, 6, 2 
(Winter 1985)' 438-439. 
4 Robert Langer, Seizure of Territory: The Stimson 
Doctrine and Related Principles in Legal Theory and 
Diplomatic Practice (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1947), pp. 282, 247; Krystyna Marek, Identity and Continuity 
of States in Public International Law (Geneva: Librairie E. 





A. Schnorf, "The Baltic States in U.S.-Soviet 
Years of Doubt, 1943-1946," Lituanus, 12, 4 
73. Clarence A. Manning, on the other hand, 
value of the League to the Baltic States, in 
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Of course, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia are not 
represented at the League's successor, the United Nations. 
on 6 April 1945, Estonia's acting consul general in charge 
of legation, Johannes Kaiv, informed Secretary of State 
Edward Stettinius that the Soviet delegation could not 
express the views of the Estonian people, and that only the 
legal representatives of Estonia's constitutional government 
could do so. Yet, the Baltic States were not allowed to 
participate in the food, monetary, and other UN conferences, 
even as observers."' At the UN's inception, the French 
delegate, Bidault, remarked that, in addition to Germany, 
there were "13 European States of recognised international 
standing representing 150 million inhabitants and a glorious 
past in civilisation, who are not present in this hall." 7 
The principle of nonrecognition is not explicitly 
mentioned in the UN Charter. However, some commentators, 
such as R. Y. Jennings and Hersch Lauterpacht, believe that 
nonrecognition is implicit in Article 2, paragraph 4 of the 
particular, and to the world, in general. He writes that by 
World War II, "the League of Nations had become a bad joke." 
See his The Forgotten Republics (New York: Philosophical 
Library, 1952), p. 205. 
"'Alfred Bilmanis, "Baltic 
Eastern Europe," Social Science, 
Schnorf, p. 73. 
States 
21' 1 
The Belgium of 
(January 1946), 36; 
7 
"The Missing Countries," Baltic Review, 1, 4-5 (July-




which deals with non-intervention.a Von Glahn 
The coming into force of the United Nations 
Charter ended the legality of the 
acquisition of title to territory through 
conquest. The relevant provisions of the 
instrument (especially Art. 2, par. 4) make it 
abundantly clear that, from a legal point of view, 
the use or the threat of the use of force, in 
violation of obligations assumed under the 
Charter, to obtain territory from another state is 
clearly prohibited to all member states of the 
organization. 9 
Because of this, non-acquisition of territory by force may 
be considered an authoritative expectation in international 
politics, linking the Stimson Doctrine to the principles of 
self-determination and decolonization.i 0 
Finally, some have said that the presence of the 
USSR, and the absence of the Baltic States, in the UN amount 
to a tacit recognition of the incorporation by the 
a Hough, p. 448; E. Krepp, Security and Non-Aggression: 
Baltic States and U.S.S.R. Treaties of Non-Aggression 
(Stockholm: Estonian Information Centre/Latvian National 
Foundation, 1973), p. 32; Langer, pp. 286. 
9 Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations: An Introduction 
to Public International Law, 4th ed. (New York: Macmillan, 
1981), p. 325. Von Glahn's emphasis. However, on pp. 325-
326, von Glahn adds that member states have individually 
acquiesced in forcible territorial seizure on several 
occasions. Valid title to territory can result from tacit 
acceptance or pro forma protests directed against continued 
possession of seized territory. 
Edgars Dunsdorfs writes that most members of the 
UN do not share the US view of the incorporation of the 
Baltic. See his The Baltic Dilemma II: The case of the 
reversal of the de jure recognition by Australia of the 
incorporation of the Baltic States into the Soviet Union 
(Melbourne: Baltic Council of Australia, 1982), p. 418. 
io Hough, p. 448. See also van Glahn, p. 175. 
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organization's member states. Yet, this is not necessarily 
the case, for one must examine the statements of individual 
members along with relevant court decisions. There has 
never been a prevailing view that mere membership in the UN 
leads to a member's automatic recognition of all acts 
undertaken by another member as legal. 11 
B. GREAT BRITAIN 
Assistance from the Royal Navy, in addition to loans 
and weapons shipments, helped the Baltic States win their 
independence following World War I . In general, Britain 
possessed a great deal of prestige in the area during the 
interwar period. However, Britain wanted to curb the 
influence of Russia, France, and Germany there. Indeed, 
London was trading with Moscow while concurrently pressuring 
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia not to. The British provided 
moral support to the Baltic and little else. London 
refused to become the area's defender or a party to an east 
European security agreement. It. instead, hoped for Germany 
11 Stasys Backis, "Lietuvos valstybes tarptautine 
teisine ir politine padetis" ("The International Legal and 
Political Status of the Lithuanian State"), in Lietuva 
okupacijoje (Lithuania Under Occupation), ed. Jonas Balkunas 
(New York: World Lithuanian Community Congress Organizing 
Committee, 1958), p. 123. 
For further details see E. Aruja, "UNO and the 
Baltic States," Baltic Review, l, 4-5 (July-August 1946), 
236; Domas Krivickas, "The Evolution of the Soviet 
Constitution Imposed on Lithuania: One Nation's 'Road to 
Socialism,'" Baltic Review, 6 (March 1956), 53-55; Vaclovas 
Sidzikauskas, "The United Nations and the Baltic States," 
paltic Review, 25 (October 1962), 5-11. 
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and the Soviet Union to annihilate each other, with the 
Baltic being the obvious battleground. When the British 
offered guarantees to the Baltic States in the summer of 
1939, it was already too late. 12 
Upon occupation, Baltic diplomats in London faced a 
chillier reception than those in Washington, but they were 
not ordered to transfer their facilities and archives to the 
soviets: 13 
After complete occupation of the Baltic States by 
Soviet Red Army Churchill instructed British 
Ambassador to Moscow, Sir Stafford Cripps to 
"affect to believe" that this action of the Soviet 
Government was dictated by the "imminence and 
magnitude" of the German danger now threatening 
Russia and that the Soviet Union might well have 
been justified in taking, for reasons of self-
defense, measurs [sic] "otherwise open to 
criticism." Unlike the American Government, the 
British Government officially did not protest at 
the annexation of the Baltic States by the USSR. 
On the other hand, the British Foreign Office 
hoped to be able to put off for some time to come 
the "awkward question" of whether or not to 
recognise the annexation of the Baltic States by 
the Soviet Union. The British felt fortunate that 
the closing of the Baltic by the Germans relieved 
them of any commercial questions in the Baltic 
States which might have forced them to take a 
12 Edgar Anderson, "British Policy Toward the Baltic 
States, 1940-41," Journal of Baltic Studies, 11, 4 (Winter 
1980), 325-326. Anderson, pp. 326-327, writes: 
When the highly moralistic Bible student, Lord 
Halifax, the British Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, was informed on 15 June 1940 
about complete occupation of Lithuania by Soviet 
forces, he dismissed the message with a remark: 
"It leaves me quite cold!" 
13 Edgars Dunsdorfs, The Baltic Dilemma: The case of 
the de jure recognition by Australia of the incorporation of 
the Baltic States into the Soviet Union (New York: Robert 
Speller & Sons, 1975), p. 289. 
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decisive step as regards the recognition of Soviet 
conquest. 14 
While some leftist British diplomats, such as 
cripps, advised immediate de jure recognition, financially 
this was not possible. The considerable British investments 
in the Baltic were lost. London, hoping to avert total 
disaster, froze $5 million in Baltic gold deposited in the 
country and seized twenty six Baltic ships in British ports. 
Recognizing the occupation would have removed the legal 
basis for detaining these assets. London, though, also 
announced that they would be released if British claims in 
the Baltic were satisfiect. 10 
The British government did not regard the events of 
July and August 1940 as decisions freely undertaken by the 
Baltic States, and responded as such to the 23 July protests 
of the British ministers in London. Yet, the government did 
not go so far as to condemn Moscow's actions. Three days 
later, Lord Halifax prepared a memorandum for the War 
Cabinet. He wrote that since the annexation was occuring in 
the middle of the war, it was unknown if the situation would 
be permanent. Further, recognition would damage Britain's 
reputation in neutral countries, as well as in the United 
States. The cabinet generally concurred with these ideas. 
1
"" Anderson, p. 327. 
10 Anderson, pp. 328, 330; US Department of State, 
Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 
1940, Volume I, General (Washington: US Government Printing 
Office, 1959), p. 392. 
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on 8 August, following incorporation by the Supreme Soviet, 
the cabinet deferred a final decision. By withholding 
recognition, the USSR was alienated, but recognition would 
be equally undesirable. Halifax later advised Soviet 
Ambassador Ivan Majskij not to press the issue of the Baltic 
legations. 15 
Baltic diplomats in London carried on their 
activities and assisted sailors who remained in the 
country. 17 They also channeled some Baltic funds and 
property out of legal reach of the British government. When 
Anthony Eden became foreign secretary in Uecember 1940, he 
decided that he would not formally receive the diplomats. 
The ministers were informed of the decision on 6 January 
1941, and told that they would have to write private letters 
to the head of the Foreign Office's Northern Department, 
Laurence Collier. London also refused to entertain the idea 
of governments-in-exile: 18 
[T]he Foreign Office [wanted] to tell [the Baltic 
diplomats] verbally and privately that they better 
not press for an official ruling and that, if they 
took no action, their names would remain on the 
Diplomatic List and they would continue for the 
present to enjoy diplomatic immunities. 19 
16 Anderson, pp. 327-329. 
that the cabinet entertained 
recognition on 15 October 1940. 
Anderson, p. 330, writes 
the possibility of de facto 
17 See Kaslas, pp. 301-303, for Minister Balutis' 
protest of the People's Seimas resolutions to Lord Halifax. 
18 Anderson, pp. 329-330. 
19 Anderson, p. 328. 
244 
Indeed, The Foreign Office List and Diplomatic and 
consular Yearbook continued to list Baltic ministers and 
career consuls under the names of their countries. However, 
shortly after the conclusion of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of 
1942, discussed in chapter six of the present study, The 
.Q)plomat's Annual (Annual Edition of the Diplomatic 
Bulletin) began listing Baltic ministers and staff in a 
separate annex without the names of the countries they 
represented. The annex was entitled, "List of Persons no 
longer included in the Diplomatic List but still accepted by 
H.M. Government as Personally Enjoying Certain Diplomatic 
Courtesies." The Foreign Office continued the practice 
noted above. 20 
The position of the government remained unaltered 
during the remainder of the war. On 21 December 1944 and 31 
January 1945, the government responded to questions in the 
House of Commons by saying that the 1940 changes in the 
Baltic were not recognized. 21 Following the war, the Baltic 
legations in London issued thousands of documents to Baltic 
refugees, and Britain expressed the same reservation as the 
20 Algirdas Budreckis, "Liberation Attempts From 
Abroad," in Lithuania 700 Years, 2nd rev. ed., ed. Albertas 
Gerutis (New York: Manyland, 1969), pp. 386-387; Langer, p. 
265; Marek, pp. 404-405; Vaino J. Rusmandel, "The Continued 
Legal Existence of the Baltic States," Baltic Review, 12, (7 
November 1957), 61. 
21 Budreckis, p. 387; United Kingdom, Parliamentary 
Debates (Hansard), House of Commons, Official Report 
(London: HM Stationery Office), 21 December 1944, vol. 406, 
column 1953; 31 January 1945, vol. 407, column 1464. 
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us did at Nuremberg. 22 
However, Britain was now prepared to officially rule 
00 the status of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. In 1946, 
the British government recognized the Baltic situation de 
facto, but not de jure. 23 On 23 May 1947, the 
undersecretary of foreign affairs, Mayhew, stated in the 
House of Commons that "it is necessary for us to deal with 
these facts as we find them. " 24 On 15 February 1954, the 
joint parliamentary undersecretary in the Foreign Office, 
Dodds-Parker, reiterated in the House of Commons the de 
facto recognition, but added that de jure recognition was 
not subject to consideration. 2 ~ 
In de facto recognition, Britain acknowledged 
certain unalterable facts, while registering disapproval of 
them. London recognizes that the Baltic States continue to 
22 Budreckis, p. 396; Felix Kessler, "Phantom Diplomats 
Carry On in Britain -- Men With No Country," The Wall Street 
Journal, 12 December 1970, p. 22. Nuremberg is discussed in 
chapter seven of the present study. 
23 A/S Tallinna Laeviihisus and others v. Tallinna 
Shipping Company, Ltd., and Estonian State Steamship Line, 
Lloyd 1 s List Law Reports, 1946, vol. 79, p. 251; Rusmandel, 
p. 59. 
24 United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 
House of Commons, Official Report (London: HM Stationery 
Office), 23 May 1947, vol. 437, column 2785. 
2 ~ United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 
House of Commons, Official Report (London: HM Stationery 
Office), 15 February 1954, vol. 523, column 1637. British 
courts have not recognized Soviet nationalization decrees in 
the Baltic, and have acted as US courts in assets cases. 
See Dietrich A. Loeber, "Baltic Gold in Great Britain," 
Baltic Review, 36 (October 1969), 18-19; Marek, p. 407. 
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but their authority has been usurped and, 
consequently, cannot be practically exercised. 26 In 1954, 
sir Roger Makins, British ambassador to Washington, stated: 
Since de 
The practice of Great Britain has always conformed 
fairly closely to the de facto principle. If a 
government is in effective control of the country 
in question; if it seems to have a reasonable 
expectancy of permanence; if it can act for a 
majority of the country's inhabitants; if it is 
able (though possibly not willing) to carry out 
its international obligations; if, in short, it 
can give a convincing answer to the question, 
"Who's in charge here?", then we recognize that 
government. We are not conferring a favor, we are 
recognizing a situation of fact. 27 
facto recognition possesses limited legal 
consequences, British-Baltic treaties are still valid, 
though the field of application has narrowed. Baltic 
nationals are able to be protected by their diplomatic 
representatives, as well. 20 
A major development in British policy involved the 
Baltic gold frozen following the occupation. In 1959, 
London began negotiating with Moscow regarding the gold's 
disposal. A joint British-Soviet declaration was issued on 
12 February 1967, and Prime Minister Harold Wilson's 
government confiscated the gold. It was sold on 29 June 
26 Thomas M. Franck 
Relations and National 
and Michael J. Glennon, Foreign 
Security Law: Cases, Materials and 
Simulations (St. Paul, MN: 
406. 
West, 1987), p. 431; Marek, p. 
27 Franck and Glennon, 
423-424. 
p. 458. See also Hough, pp. 
20 Loeber, pp. 24-25; Rusmandel, p. 66. 
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1967, invested, and began earning interest for the British 
government. On 5 January 1968, an agreement was concluded 
between the two countries, which dropped the claims of each 
against the other. The agreement also stipulated that 
British claims for losses in the Baltic be paid out of the 
funds realized from the sale of the Baltic gold. 29 
While the Anglo-Soviet agreement did not transfer 
the formal ownership of the gold, 30 an Estonian diplomat 
"thought this was very unfair It wasn't our 
governments that appropriated the property. The money 
should have been preserved for the legitimate governments as 
a matter of principle." 31 When implementing legislation 
came before the House of Commons, objections were raised. 
The government responded: 
lf . [the Baltic] States came into existence 
at some future date 32 and considered that they 
had a case for the return of the value of the 
assets that we are proposing to distribute, the 
appropriate course for them to take would be to 
present a claim to the British government through 
the diplomatic channel. In addressing themselves 
29 Loeber, pp. 12-13; Maris Pone, "The Fate of the 
Baltic Gold Reserves in London," in Problems of Mininations: 
Baltic Perspectives, 
CA: Association for 
1973), p. ·193; Asko 
eds. Arvids Ziedonis, et al. (San Jose, 
the Advancement of Baltic Studies, 
Vuorjoki, "The Baltic Question in 
Today's World," Baltic Review, 38 (August 1971), 4. 
30 Loeber, p. 19. 
31 Kessler, p. 1. Kessler's emphasis. Loeber, pp. 30 
ff, reviews various twentieth century cases and arguments 
regarding compensation for expropriated foreign property. 
32 This is an unusual statement, since London formally 
considers the Baltic States as still in existence. 
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to any such claim I am sure that the British 
government of the day would keep well in mind all 
the sad history of the Baltic peoples, and 
that the British Government would be predisposed 
to take as sympathetic a view as, in all the 
circumstances of the case, they feel to be 
warranted. 3 3 
Be that as it may, Loeber harshly criticizes London: 
[T]he United Kingdom has yielded, after 27 
years, to Soviet diplomatic pressure. H.M. 
Government has undertaken to use the assets of 
third parties in order to comply with obligations 
it accepted itself under the terms of the 1968 
Agreement. The Baltic gold is thus appropriated 
by Great Britain at the expense of those holding 
title in the gold. To this extent Great Britain 
is unjustly enriched, unless it compensates the 
owners of the Baltic assets, as required by 
international law . 
. The claim that it is "proper and within 
the power of the British Government and 
Parliament" to use the Baltic gold is not 
supported by international legal principles. 
The argument is not substantiated and 
appears to be unconvincing. The reasoning that it 
is "just" to use the Baltic assets "to help our 
claimants, who suffered heavy losses" is not legal 
in character. It is of a socio-economic nature. 
It is certainly true that British investors 
incurred heavy losses in what is now the Soviet 
Union. But it is not in order to compensate them 
at the expense of the Baltic States and its 
corporations. 34 
Following the Second World War, Baltic diplomats 
continued to transact normal business, enjoyed diplomatic 
privileges, and maintained their legations. However, new 
legation officers are not permitted to replace those who 
die. Thus when Lithuanian Minister Bronius Balutis died in 
33 United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), 
House of Commons, Official Report (London: HM Stationery 
Office), 22 January 1969, vol. 776, columns 611-612. 
34 Loeber, pp. 37-38. 
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1967, the position of charge d'affaires was assumed by 
counsellor Vincas Balickas. However, Balickas possesses no 
assistants who were on duty at the time of the occupation. 
Thus he is the final accredited representative of Lithuania 
to Great Britain. 36 As for the government he represents, 
"[i]n the present situation Her Majesty's Government do not 
regard any specific authority as being competent to 
represent [Lithuania]. " 36 
C. GERMANY 
Hitler's Germany did not oppose the annexation of 
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia in August 1940, though it did 
not formally recognize it. This was a result of the 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and its secret protocols regarding 
the division of eastern Europe. Lithuanian Minister Kazys 
Skirpa was evicted from the Lithuanian Legation by the 
Berlin police. 37 This did not change following the German 
36 Budreckis. p. 400; Norma Krause Herzfeld, "The 
persistent Lithuanians: A government without a country," The 
Catholic Reporter, 9 June 1961, sec. 2, p. 1; Hough, p. 423; 
Kessler, p. 1; Marek, p. 406. 
36 P.J.S. Moon of the UK mission to the UN, 14 April 
1967, quoted in Dunsdorfs, I, p. 295. 
As late as 1979, the topic of nonrecognition arose 
in London. This was in conjunction with Soviet military 
maneuvers in Lithuania, to which British observers had been 
invited. The under secretary of state declared that this 
possessed 
Lithuania. 
no implications for British policy toward 
See Hough, p. 415. 
37 Kaslas, pp. 307-308; Boris Meissner, Die 
Sowjetunion, die Baltischen Staaten und das Voelkerrecht 
(The Soviet Union, the Baltic States, and International Law) 
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attack on the Red Army. 
After the conclusion of hostilities, German courts 
generally decided cases involving Baltic nationals according 
to the policy of the respective occupying power. The 
annexation was recognized in the Soviet zone, and initially 
in the French zone, since France had recognized the 
annexation de facto. Courts in the American and British 
zones applied nonrecognition. 38 
Following the establishment of the Federal 
Republic of Germany, West German courts were faced with the 
dilemma as to whether or not the Baltic States legally still 
existed as far as Bonn was concerned. German civil law acts 
on the basis of the lex patriae principle, whereby cases 
involving foreigners are decided according to the civil law 
of their home country, and not according to German law (lex 
domicilii). The Soviets, of course, had introduced the 
Russian Civil Code of 1922 in the Baltic following the 
occupation, supplanting the laws of the independence period. 
This judicial problem was soon resolved, though, after the 
Bonn government recognized the independent Baltic States de 
(Cologne: 
305. 
Verlag Politik und Wirtscharft, 1956), pp. 304-
Kaslas adds that Skirpa, before 
legation, saw to it that the Lithuanian 
building was inaccessible. The Soviets had 
Berlin fire department to remove it. 
he left the 
flag atop the 
to call the 
See Kaslas, pp. 290-292, for Skirpa's 
the People's Seimas resolutions to Ribbentrop. 
protest of 
aa Rusmandel, pp. 55-56. 
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jure. 
On 3 August 1951, the West German Interior Ministry 
informed the UN International Refugee Organization that the 
federal government considered Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia 
to be under military occupation (occupatio bellica). The 
government does not consider Baltic citizens to be Soviet 
citizens. Bonn also honors passports issued by Baltic 
consuls, and has accepted semi-official diplomatic 
representation. Until his death in 1987, Dr. Albertas 
Gerutis served as charge d'affaires of Lithuania. 39 
When West Germany established diplomatic relations 
with the Soviet Union, Bonn's position toward the Baltic 
remained unchanged. There was no de jure recognition of the 
Soviet Union's de facto borders. This was confirmed in 
German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer's letter of reservation to 
the Soviet government on 14 September 1953. The Bundestag 
later unanimously reaffirmed his position on 14 September 
1955. The 12 August 1970 Bonn-Moscow pact, which called on 
both parties to respect territorial integrity, did not 
recognize the annexation, either, for the Soviet Union's 
western boundaries were not discussed. The Foreign Ministry 
attested to this on 27 August and 9 October 1970. Thus West 
Germany does not recognize the annexation of the Baltic 
89 Budreckis, p. 398; Dunsdorfs, I, p. 293; Herzfeld, 
p. 1; Domas Krivickas, "Lithuania's Struggle Against 
Aggression and Subjugation," in Twenty Years 1 Struggle for 
Freedom of Lithuania, ed. Juozas Audenas (New York: ELTA, 
1963), pp. 141-142; Rusmandel, pp. 55, 68. 
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states, either de facto or de jure. 40 
D. FRANCE 
On 8 August 1940, several days after the Supreme 
soviet formally admitted the Baltic States into the Soviet 
Union, the Soviet representative in Paris demanded that the 
Baltic legations be closed down within ten days. On 15 
August, the Lithuanian legation was closed and the keys 
handed over to the Soviet embassy by the prefect of police. 
Lithuanian Minister Petras Klimas. who also represented his 
country in Belgium, Spain, Portugal, and Luxembourg, was 
later arrested by the Germans. 41 Even in unoccupied France, 
the police did not recognize the status of the Lithuanian 
consul at Marseilles. Following the German attack against 
the Soviets, the Germans requisitioned Baltic facilities in 
France on 22 June 1941. 
When the Germans retreated from France in September 
1944, the Baltic diplomats requested the French authorities 
for permission to continue their official activities. This 
was denied, although Lithuanian Charge d' Affaires Dr. 
Stasys Backis and Counsellor Dr. Jurgis Baltrusaitis, Jr. 
continued to personally enjoy diplomatic privileges. There 
was no official announcement concerning the recognition of 
40 Hough, p. 426; Meissner, p. 308; Vuorjoki, p. 4. 
41 See Kaslas, pp. 305-307, for Klimas' protest of the 
incorporation to Vichy Foreign Minister Baudouin. 
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annexation, though some commentators feel that de facto 
recognition was implied in French government actions. 42 
While the French executive was not sympathetic to 
Baltic interests, the French Supreme Court was not as harsh. 
rn a 1951 case involving Latvian citizenship, Gebraud v. De 
Medem, the tribunal decided: 
Considering that no act of international 
significance has intervened to obliterate the 
recognition of the Latvian State as a holder of 
rights and liable to legal obligations; that the 
Court of Appeals rightly decided that so long as 
the Peace Treaty has not determined the fate of 
Latvia, it is impossible to say that Latvians have 
at present no nationality. 43 
The most recent expression of the French position 
toward the Baltic was made by Foreign Minister Claude 
Cheysson on 17 December 1981: 
France has not recognized the annexation of the 
States of Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania by the 
U.S.S.R. in 1940. Since then, it has not extended 
any recognition, either expressly or tacitly. 44 
42 Budreckis, p. 387; Albertas Gerutis, Petras Klimas 
(Cleveland: Viltis, 1978), pp. 199-201; Antanas Klimas, et 
al., "Petras Klimas," Lietuviu enciklopedija (Lithuanian 
Encyclopedia) (South Boston: Lithuanian Encyclopedia Press, 
1957), vol. 12, p. 120; Marek, p. 408; Rusmandel, pp. 63, 
68; C. Surdokas, "Lietuvos diplomatine ir konsularine 
tarnyba II" ("Lithuania's Diplomatic and Consular Service 
II"), Karys, 9 (November 1987), 408. 
Though Baltic facilities were in the hands of the 
Soviets, Baltic gold in France was not transferred to them. 
See Backis, p. 123. 
43 Journal du Droit International (Journal of 
International Law) (Paris), (1951), 173. See also 
Budreckis, p. 397; Krivickas, pp. 142-143; Rusmandel, p. 63. 
44 Marek, p. 408; and Rusmandel, p. 63, disagree. They 
feel that de facto recognition was implied in postwar French 
actions toward Baltic diplomats. 
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This attitude was confirmed in 1975 at the time of 
the signing of the Helsinki Final Act by the 
president of the Republic when he indicated that 
"(i)n the view of France, the texts signed here do 
not imply the recognition of situations which it 
would not have recognized otherwise. 4 ~ 
E. SWEDEN 
Though the Swedish government has never officially 
affirmed it, its position comes closest to de jure 
recognition of the annexation. Sweden recognized the 
incorporation on 12 August 1940. That day, the lowest 
ranking staff member of the Lithuanian legation in 
Stockholm, Zilinskas, lowered the Lithuanian tricolor to 
half mast, and transferred the keys to the Swedish foreign 
ministry. 46 The Swedes also turned Baltic assets over to 
the Soviets in 1941. 47 Finally, following the Second World 
Quoted in Hough, p. 430. 
46 Kaslas, pp. 308-309; Marek, p. 398; Meissner, p. 
302. See Kaslas, pp. 300-301, for Minister Vytautas Gylys' 
protest of the People's Seimas resolutions to the Swedish 
foreign minister. 
47 US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
_U_n_i_t--'-e-'-d'--S~t"""a'-t'-e~s , 1 9 4 O , I , p . 4 4 2 , w r i t e s : 
An agreement between Sweden and the Soviet Union 
was eventually signed in Moscow on May 30, 1941, 
which regulated their mutual property claims in 
the former Baltic States. Swedish economic claims 
of all kinds amounted to about 118,000,000 Swedish 
crowns; and "in final settlement of all other 
Swedish claims the Soviet Government will pay the 
Swedish Government the sum of 20,000,000 Swedish 
crowns in eight quarterly installments, or over a 
period of two years." In return, Sweden "released 
gold to a value of 18,000,000 Swedish crowns 
belonging to the Baltic States and deposited in 
Sweden, and also a number of Baltic ships lying in 
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war, Sweden repatriated 167 Baltic citizens who had been 
compelled to fight with the German army, but only after 
fierce governmental and public debate. 48 
On 13 December 1944, Foreign Minister Gunther 
addressed the Swedish Riksdag and stated that "practical 
considerations" dictated Swedish policy toward Lithuania, 
Latvia, and Estonia. No Baltic nationality is recognized in 
Sweden. One is considered stateless if he left his country 
before the Soviet citizenship decree of 7 September 1940. 
otherwise, he is considered a Soviet citizen. 49 On the 
other hand, judicial and administrative practice has treated 
all Baltic refugees as political refugees and, therefore, as 
stateless persons. In a 1949 case, Laurine v. Laurine, 
Sweden's supreme court (#ogstra Domstol) opined that if 
people have no real ties with their homeland and do not 
intend to return to it, they should be treated as 
stateless.ts 0 
Swedish ports before the negotiations were 
cone l uded." 
48 The Baltic Refugees (Stockholm: Baltic Humanitarian 
Association, 1946), pp. 11-13, 17. 
49 Budreckis, pp. 387-388; Rusmandel, pp. 64-65. 
tso 25 February 1949, Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv, 1949, part 
1, p. 82. See also Hough, pp. 440-443; Lohk v. Lohk, 12 
December 1948, Nytt Juridiskt Arkiv, 1948, part 1, p. 805; 
Falke Schmidt, "Construction of Statutes," Scandinavian 
Studies in Law, 1957, I (Stockholm: Almquist & Wicksell, 
1957), pp. 188-190; Schmidt, "Nationality and Domicile in 
Swedish Private International Law," The International Law 
Quarterly, 4 (1951), 39-52. 
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In 1968, Sweden's Prime Minister Tage Erlander 
stated that the Baltic States possess a right to 
independence.ts 1 The Royal Swedish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs admitted in 1977, however, that the "Swedish 
Government has not 'made up its mind' whether to recognize 
the incorporation as either de facto or de jure. "ts 2 
F. SWITZERLAND 
The Swiss Federal Council closed the Baltic missions 
in January 1941, but they were not turned over to the 
Soviets, and Baltic diplomats continued to reside in the 
Latvian legation.ts 3 On 15 November 1946, Baltic archives 
and property were turned over to the Federal Political 
Department for fiduciary administration (gestion 
fiduciaire). The owners were considered to be in a position 
whereby they could not manage the assets. The 
administration was to end once the owners could legally 
administer the property, or there was a legitimate state 
succession. Indeed, the following year, the head of the 
ts 1 Vuorjoki, p. 4. 
ts 2 Quoted in Hough, p. 443. 
tss Jurgis Savickis, Zeme dega I (The Ground Burns I) 
(Chicago: Terra, 1956), p. 345, writes of the concern of 
Baltic diplomats in Switzerland during the occupation of the 
Baltic. He served as Lithuanian minister to the League of 
Nations. 
See Kaslas, 
Saulys' protest of the 
Swiss federal president. 
pp. 298-299, for 
People 1 s Seimas 
Minister Jurgis 
resolutions to the 
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soviet mission in Switzerland asked to use the Latvian 
mission on the ground of state succession. The Swiss 
refused the request. However, the 1946 report of the 
Federal Council spoke of the "former Baltic States." The 
swiss government has not formally recognized the annexation 
of the Baltic States. 04 
G. OTHER COUNTRIES 
Canada recognizes the de facto entry of the Baltic 
states into the Soviet Union, but does not recognize their 
annexation de jure. It has reaffirmed this position on 
several occasions. 55 In 1948, Soviet consulates in Canada 
attempted to induce Lithuanians there to register as Soviet 
citizens. This prompted Ottawa to reiterate its policy of 
nonrecognition. 50 No Lithuanian legation was ever 
established in Ottawa, since the one in London, England 
served that purpose for all the Commonwealth countries. 
There have, however, been three honorary consuls general in 
Toronto: Gerald L.P. Grant-Suttie from 1937 to 1949, Jonas 
54 Budreckis, p. 398; Hough, 
408-409; Rusmandel, p. 64. 
pp. 435-436; Marek, pp. 
55 Dunsdorfs, I, p. 296; Hough, pp. 428-429; Kaslas, p. 
470; Laane and Baltser v. Estonian State Cargo & Passenger 
S.S. Line, 1949, Canada Law Reports, vol. 539, pp. 539-540; 
Marek, pp. 407-408. 
56 Budreckis, 
Official Report, 
Rusmandel, p. 62. 
p. 397; Canada, 
17 May 1954, 
House of Commons Debates, 
vol. 96, column 1767; 
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Gylys from 1949 to 1959, and Jonas Zmuidzinas since 1962. 157 
A vice consul was appointed to Toronto in the autumn of 
1988. 
Belgium's policy came to light in Compagnie Belgo-
Lithuanienne d'Electricite v. Societe des Central es 
Electriques Regionales, decided by the High Court in 
Brussels on 26 October 1946. The Court noted that Belgium 
had not recognized the annexation of the Baltic States de 
jure. In addition, "no document issued by the Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade establishes that the 
Belgian Government considers such annexation recognized de 
facto." 158 In 1945, Belgium refused to repatriate Baltic 
nationals to the USSR, and thirty years later stated that 
the Helsinki accords did not imply a change in policy. 159 
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia continue to be listed 
157 Pranas Gaida, et al., Lithuanians in Canada (Ottawa: 
Canada Ethnic Press Federation, 1967), pp. 288-289. 
Rusmandel, p. 62, writes that the Commonwealth countries 
were dropped from the British Foreign Office List in 1954. 
Since then, its successor in Canada, Canadian 
Representatives Abroad and Representatives of Other 
Countries in Canada, has not listed Baltic consular officers. 
158 26 October 1946, Journal du Droit International, 77 
(1950), 865-867. In a 1951 divorce case involving a Latvian 
couple, the court approached the matter differently when it 
stated that in: 
actual fact, the USSR effectively occupies Latvia 
and has incorporated that state, ensuring the 
establishment of power Latvia has now ceased 
to exist as an independent state. 
See Pulenciks v. Augustovskis, Tribunal Civil de Bruxelles, 
5 April 1951, Pasicrisie Belge, 1952, III, pp. 40-42. 
l59 Budreckis, pp. 397-398; Hough, p. 432. 
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on the map of the Danish foreign minister. In 1982, 
oenmark's foreign ministry declared: 
We have never recognized the annexation of these 
three countries to the Soviet Union. It is for 
this reason that we cannot inquire with Moscow 
about the rumors [of an anthrax epidemic] 
affecting these three countries. This is very 
inconvenient [but} we do not want [the 
Soviets] to get from us any piece of writing which 
they then could interpret as the recognition of 
the annexation 60 
The position of the Italian government is unclear. 
The Baltic legations and consulates in the country were 
closed in 1940, but without a formal declaration. De facto 
recognition may be inferred, however. The Baltic missions 
have not been included in the Italian diplomatic list since 
the annexation. 61 
The Irish government's position was made clear in 
1942 when the Supreme Court was deciding Soviet claims to 
Lat vi an and Es ton i an v e s s e l s i n _Z_a_r_i_n_e __ v_. __ o_w_n---"-e __ r__ s _ o'"""f'--_s_._s_. 
Ramava and McEvoy v. Owners of Otto. 62 The Ministry of 
External Affairs informed the court that Ireland did not 
recognize Soviet sovereignty in Latvia and Estonia either de 
facto or de jure. The court, in turn, ruled that the 
60 Quoted in Hough, p. 432. 
61 Budreckis, p. 387; Rusmandel, 
edition of Ambasciate e legazioni 
published by the Italian government. 
p. 64. 
estere 
See also any 
in Italia, 
See Kaslas, pp. 296-297, for Minister Stasys 
Lozoraitis' protest of the People's Seimas resolutions to 
the Italian foreign minister, Count Galeazzo Ciano. 
62 4 July 1942, The Irish Law Reports, 1942, pp. 148-
172. 
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vessels in question were not the property of the USSR. 63 
Spain and Portugal are both signatories to the 
Saavedra Lamas Pact, discussed in chapter three of the 
present study. As such, they are bound not to recognize 
forcible changes in territorial title. Spain made no 
official comment on the annexation, but continued to receive 
Latvian and Estonian envoys. Portugal officially declared a 
policy of nonrecognition and suspended its treaties with the 
Baltic States. 64 
The Vatican has not recognized the annexation. 6 ~ 
Upon occupation, Lithuanian Minister Stasys Girdvainis 
remained at his post. 66 When a new pope is elected, it is 
customary for all diplomats accredited to the Holy See to 
present new credentials signed by their respective chiefs of 
state. When Pope John XXIII succeeded Pope Pius XII, this 
announcement was made to all Vatican diplomats, including 
Girdvainis. However, it was obvious that he could not 
receive new credentials. Senior Lithuanian clergymen 
63 See Langer, p. 268. 
64 Hough, p. 433; Krivickas, 
Rusmandel, p. 58. 
p. 142; Marek, p. 409; 
6 ~ Tiesa, the Lithuanian Pravda, characterized this 
stand by the Vatican as tantamount to the invasion of 
Lithuania by the Crusaders. See "Puola popieziu uz 
okupacijos nepripazinima" ("Pope Attacked for Nonrecognition 
of the Occupation"), Draugas, 11 September 1987, p. 1. 
ea See Kaslas, pp. 295-296, for Minister Girdvainis' 
Protest of the People's Seimas resolutions to the papal 
secretary of state, Louis Cardinal Maglione. 
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interceded on behalf of the Lithuanian diplomat, asking the 
pope to accept the old credentials issued in 1939. Rumors 
that John XXIII was pursuing a new policy toward the eastern 
bloc, combined with Girdvainis not being invited to certain 
diplomatic functions, caused consternation among Lithuanians 
in western Europe. Finally, L'Osservatore Romano reported 
in January 1959 that the Lithuanian legation would be 
allowed to function, though Girdvainis title was changed to 
gerant d'affaires. Girdvainis was eventually succeeded by 
his first secretary, Stasys Lozoraitis, Jr., son of the head 
of the Lithuanian Diplomatic Service. 67 
Though the nations of the eastern bloc have not 
formally issued pronouncements on Soviet actions in the 
Baltic in 1940, it may be assumed that they recognize the 
annexation de jure. Yugoslavia, on the other hand, has 
indicated that the Soviet Union possesses no legal title to 
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Yugoslav leader Josip Tito 
criticized the USSR in that vein on 29 July 1951. This 
position was recently reiterated in Socialism, a semi-
official Yugoslav periodical. 68 
Soviet-influenced Finland has made no official 
announcements regarding the annexation, nor has there been 
67 Budreckis, p. 399; Herzfeld, p. 1; Krivickas, p. 
142; "Lietuvos Pasiuntinybe prie sv. Sosto veike ir veiks" 
("The Lithuanian Legation at the Holy See Will Continue to 
Operate"), Eltos Informacija (Elta Information), 15 January 
1959, supplement, pp. 1-2; Rusmandel, pp. 58, 68. 
68 Hough, pp. 437, 430-431. 
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anY public or governmental discussion of the matter since 
the 1940s. Dr. Ragnor Deller continued to serve as 
Lithuanian consul in Finland until his death in December 
1960. However, the Soviet-Finnish armistice of 1944 
reguired the Finns to repatriate Estonians who had fled the 
advancing Red Army. The 1947 Treaty of Paris required 
Finland, as a defeated ally of Germany, to liquidate Baltic 
assets in the country and turn them over to the USSR. 60 
No recognition of the annexation has been made by 
Malta, Greece, Luxembourg, Turkey, Norway, or the 
Netherlands. 70 
As far as Latin America is concerned, many of which 
states are signatories to the Saavedra Lamas Pact, 
Uruguay has been a leader among those nations 
refusing to acknowledge the legality of the 
forcible seizure of territory along the Baltic. On 
February 16, 1963, the President of Uruguay 
received a Lithuanian delegation and delivered a 
speech in which he affirmed the Uruguayan 
position. In Brazil and Colombia, Baltic 
diplomatic personnel are active, and Ecuador and 
Chile have received semi-official diplomatic 
representatives of the Baltic States. Guatemala, 
Paraguay and Venezuela continue to send 
representatives to diplomatic receptions held at 
Baltic embassies in South America. Costa Rica has 
become an outspoken advocate of Baltic sovereignty 
and continually criticizes the Soviet seizure of 
69 Budreckis, p. 400; Axel Gadolin, The Solution of the 
Karelian Refugee Problem in Finland (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 
1952), p. 13; Hough, p. 437. 
70 Hough, pp. 433-434. 
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Baltic territory. 71 
onlY Argentina under the leadership of Juan Peron withdrew 
recognition from the Lithuanian legation in 1948 during 
trade negotiations with the USSR. Argentina declared that 
operations would be suspended pending a resolution of the 
Baltic situation by the United Nations. The legation was 
transferred to Uruguay. 72 
Asia has seen the People's Republic of China, the 
Republic of China, South Korea, and the Phillipines 
explicitly declare a policy of nonrecognition. Other Asian 
nations have not announced a position. Most African nations 
acquired their independence after World War II and have not 
discussed the issue. 70 
H. THE AUSTRALIAN RECOGNITION EPISODE 
Australia had not recognized the incorporation of 
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia into the Soviet Union. In 
1948, when the Soviet embassy invited Baltic nationals to 
71 Hough, p. 444. See also Brazil, Ministerio das 
Relacoes Exteriores, Departamento Economico e Consular, 
Divisao Consular, Lista do Corpo Consular Estrangeiro {List 
of the Foreign Consular Corps), 31 December 1955 (Rio de 
Janeiro: Departamento de Imprensa Nacional, 1956), pp. 28, 
64; Budreckis, pp. 387, 400. 
72 Budreckis, p. 399; Herzfeld, p. 1; Krivickas, p. 
143; Meissner, pp. 300-301; Rusmandel, p. 59. 
See Kaslas, pp. 297-298, for Minister Kazimieras 
Grauzinis' protest of the People's Seimas resolutions to 
Argentina's foreign minister, Jose Maria Cantilo. 
73 Hough, pp. 445-446. 
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register as Soviet citizens, the Australian government 
advised that the request be ignored, and reiterated its 
policy, which it would also do on other occasions. 74 
This policy, however, was to drastically change in 
mid-1974. On 17 May 1974, Prime Minister Gough Whitlam 
wrote: 
The policy of the present Australian Government is 
that while not formally recognising the 
incorporation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia 
into the Soviet Union, it must be cognisant of the 
de facto situation and deal with the government 
which has effective control of the territory in 
question. This was also the attitude taken by all 
of our predecessors on this matter. 70 
This position, in and of itself, was no surprise. However, 
on 3 July 1974, while the foreign minister was out of the 
country, and without consulting the cabinet or Labor party 
leaders, Prime Minister Whitlam decided to grant de jure 
recognition to the annexation. On 16 July, Sir James 
Plimsoll, Australian ambassador in Moscow was informed of 
the decision. He, in turn, officially visited Estonia on 
28-30 July. 76 
By early August, news of the visit had leaked to the 
Australian press, who, along with the Liberal opposition, 
pressed for confirmation. The foreign ministry confirmed 
74 Rusmandel, pp. 62-63. See also Kaslas, pp. 470-471. 
76 Baltic Council of Australia, Notes and Documents on 
Australian Recognition of the Incorporation of the Baltic 
States into the USSR (np: BCA, 1974), p. 13. 
76 Baltic Council of Australia, pp. 13, 
I, pp. 37-38. 
18; Dunsdorfs, 
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the change in policy on 4 August, and Prime Minister Whitlam 
publicly addressed the topic on 6 September. 77 
The announcement of de jure recognition, extended 
without any pressure from Moscow, immediately caused 
controversy in the halls of government, as well as among the 
general public, particularly immigrants. Even the 
Australian Communist Party disapproved of the action. 70 By 
a vote of 29-27, the Australian Senate resolved on 18 
September: 
That the Minister for Foreign Affairs is deserving 
of censure and ought to resign because: in breach 
of a clear undertaking to the contrary given by 
the Prime Minister the Government shamefully and 
furtively extended recognition to the 
incorporation of the Baltic States in the 
U.S. S. R., the Minister withholding any 
announcement or explanation of the decision. 79 
R.G. Mccomas, the honorary Latvian consul in 
Melbourne, immediately lost his official status. Baltic 
nationals who had not received Australian citizenship were 
now considered to be under Soviet consular protection. 
Indeed, there was even talk that Australian citizens of 
Baltic descent could be compelled to serve in the Soviet 
army if they happened to visit Soviet-occupied territory. 
77 Dunsdorfs, I, pp. 38-39. 
70 Baltic Council of Australia, pp. 1-4; Dunsdorfs, I, 
p. 258. See also Antanas Skerys, Geelongo Lietuviu 
Bendruomenes kronika 1948-1978 (Chronicle of the Geelong 
Lithuanian Community 1948-1978) (Geelong, Australia: 
Australian Lithuanian Community, 1980), p. 260. 
79 Quoted in Dunsdorfs, I, p. 218. 
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Australia recognizes dual citizenship and, theoretically, 
could not protest such Soviet actions. 80 
It is difficult to speculate on the full effect of 
Australia's policy shift, for it would not last beyond the 
end of 1975. That year saw problems befalling the Labor 
government, including price fluctuations, industrial 
disputes, bankruptcies, and high unemployment. Meanwhile, 
Baltic activists strove to place the recognition issue on 
the opposition Liberal Party's platform. The Liberals 
promised to reverse recognition if they won the elections of 
13 December 1975, which they did. On 17 December, Malcolm 
Fraser was named new prime minister and Andrew Peacock took 
the foreign minister's portfolio. That day, Peacock cabled 
Ambassador Plimsoll in Moscow with instructions that neither 
he nor his senior staff should officially visit the Baltic. 
Two days later Latvian Consul Mccomas was reinstated to his 
former position. 81 
It would be foolish to assert that the issue of 
Baltic recognition brought Prime Minister Whitlam's 
government down, though it can perhaps be safely said that 
the uproar following the incident certainly did not help his 
fortunes. Indeed action on the reversal of recognition was 
80 Dunsdorfs, I, pp. 37 ff, 296. 
81 Viktoras Baltutis, ed., 
metrastis II (Australian Lithuanian 
Australian Lithuanian Community & 
Foundation, 1973), p. 27; Dunsdorfs, 
Australijos lietuviu 
Yearbook II) (Adelaide: 
Australian Lithuanian 
II, pp. 324-349, 354-355. 
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taken two days following the 1975 elections. In addition, 
though some commentators have ascribed devious motives, it 
is likely that the public rationale was truthful, namely 
that Australia was merely recognizing reality. In terms of 
politics and public relations, though, the prime minister 
handled the matter poorly. In terms of law, the maintenance 
of the previous de facto recognition would have sufficed as 
far as dealing with reality was concerned. 02 
The entire Australian recognition episode is a mere 
blip in the overall landscape of diplomatic history. 
However, it demonstrates both the fragility and strength of 
the nonrecognition policy. It has not been forgotten, and 
governments cannot completely ignore it. 
I. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In general, there are three groups of countries 
regarding the status of the Baltic States. The US heads the 
group which has not recognized their incorporation either de 
jure or de facto. Great Britain is at the head of countries 
extending de facto recognition. The third, and largest, 
group consists of states which have not expressis verbis 
stated an opinion. 83 Overall, however, the United States 
has been the clearest and most consistent on the 
02 Henry S. Albinski, review of Dunsdorfs I, Journal of 
Baltic Studies, 7, 4 (Winter 1976), 373-374. 
as Jonas Maziulis, review of Meissner, Baltic Review, 7 
(16 June 1956), 78-79. 
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nonrecognition policy. Despite flaws in implementation, the 
us has maintained the spirit of the Stimson Doctrine. 84 
84 Backis, p. 122; Langer, p. 285. 
CHAPTER X 
CONCLUSION 
A. LITHUANIAN DIPLOMATIC CONTINUITY 
As the nonrecognition policy entered the 1970s, 
concern began to mount over the diplomatic continuity of the 
Republic of Lithuania in the United States. Since the 
incorporation, diplomatic and consular personnel had 
remained on duty, supported from the assets frozen by 
Washington on 15 July 1940. They had also been able to 
appoint successors when needed. Thus when Minister Povilas 
Zadeikis died in 1957, his counsellor, Juozas Kajeckas, 
succeeded him~ His assistant, in turn, Dr. Stasys Backis, 
succeeded him in 1977 following a long illness. 1 However, 
while honorary consuls could be appointed with little 
difficulty, 2 the representation at the legation could not 
1 Kajeckas died the following year. See Norma Krause 
Herzfeld, "The persistent Lithuanians: A government without 
a country," The Catholic Reporter, 9 June 1961, sec. 2, p. 
1 . 
2 Mrs. Josephine J. Dauzvardis succeeded her late 
husband, Dr. Petras Dauzvardis, as consul general in Chicago 
on 12 November 1972, though in an honorary capacity. 
Vytautas Cekanauskas succeeded the late honorary Consul 
General Dr. Julius J. Bielskis in Los Angeles on 6 October 
269 
270 
be replaced as easily. The US ruled that only individuals 
commissioned in the Lithuanian foreign service at the time 
of the occupation could serve at the legation. The problem 
for continuity was obvious. 3 
Funds to support Lithuanian diplomatic and consular 
activities in the US and abroad were also dwindling at this 
time. Representative Charles Dougherty and Senator John 
Heinz decided to address this issue. After considering 
several alternatives, such as allowing the US government to 
cover financial shortfalls not met by Lithuanian-American 
donations, and having Congress establish a large, permanent 
trust fund, Dougherty and Heinz proposed legislation in 
which the US government would provide $250,000 annually to 
the Lithuanian legation as of 1981: 
(a) there is authorized to be 
appropriated for fiscal year 1981 to the legation 
of Lithuania in the United States, $250,000. 
(b) The Charge d'Affaires of the legation . 
is authorized to receive, on behalf of such 
legation, any funds appropriated under this Act to 
such legation, and is authorized to administer 
such funds. Such funds may only be used for the 
maintenance of the operations of such legation. 
The Charge d'Affaires may use such funds to pay 
the compensation of personnel which the Charge 
d'Affaires may appoint to be in the diplomatic 
corps of the legation, except that all such 
1977. Indeed, the Chicago consulate was upgraded to a 
consulate general on 11 August 1961. See C. Surdokas, 
"Lietuvos diplomatine ir konsularine tarnyba II" 
("Lithuania's Diplomatic and Consular Corps II"), Karys, 9 
(November 1987), 410. 
3 The pessimistic tone regarding this matter can be 
seen in John Sherwood, "The keeper of Lithuania's fading 
flame," Chicago Tribune, 13 July 1978, sec. 2, pp. l, 4. 
271 
personnel must be of Lithuanian parentage and may 
not be United States citizens. Such personnel 
shall be entitled to all the privileges and 
immunities of diplomatic personnel of comparable 
rank from other countries. 4 
The State Department, however, did not agree with 
that manner of financial support: 
The sponsors of H.R. 5407 [Rep. Dougherty's bill] 
believe that after having recognized the 
Legations's diplomatic status for more than 39 
years, it would be inappropriate for the United 
States to permit the Lithuanian Charge d'Affaires 
and the small and dwindling corps of Lithuanian 
diplomats and their families to face a bleak 
future. 
The Department thoroughly shares this view. 
However, the Department also believes that to 
provide direct U.S. Government financial 
assistance to the Lithuanian Legation would 
degrade the valid and important degree of 
independence which the Lithuanian Charge 
d'Affaires, an accredited foreign diplomatic 
representative, now possesses from the U.S. 
Government and from U.S. domestic politics and 
related considerations. 
I am pleased to inform you that we are in the 
final stages of working out an arrangement which 
will provide for the continuing financial 
requirements of the Lithuanian Legation . 0 
The arrangement which the State Department was referring to 
was the pooling of the resources of all three Baltic 
4 Senate Resolution 2257 in US Congress, Congressional 
Record, 4 February 1980. Rep. Dougherty had introduced 
similar legislation in the House on 26 September 1979. See 
House Resolution 5407. 
0 US Department of State, letter of Assistant Secretary 
for Congressional Relations J. Brian Atwood to Rep. Clement 
J. Zablocki, chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 8 
February 1980, pp. 1-2. See also US Department State, 
Statement by Robert L. Barry, Assistant Secretary for 
European Affairs, before the Subcommittee on International 
Organizations, House Foreign Affairs Committee, 26 June 
1979, p. 5. 
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countries, the bulk of which came from Latvian funds. This 
was accomplished in 1980. 6 
While the financial security of the Lithuanian 
diplomatic corps was assured for the near future, the rule 
that only officers commissioned as of June 1940 could serve 
would practically invalidate that victory. This problem, 
though, would soon be resolved, as well. In what was 
probably the most important victory for proponents of the 
nonrecognition policy since the promulgation of the policy 
itself, Dr. Stephen Aiello, special assistant to President 
Jimmy Carter for ethnic affairs, announced in October 1980: 
Up until now, we have accepted as diplomatic 
representatives of the Baltic countries only 
individuals who were in 1940 commissioned officers 
of the diplomatic services of the last independent 
governments. With the passage of time, the number 
of individuals accreditable under this standard 
has dwindled to a handful. In view of the 
important symbolic role of Baltic diplomatic 
representation, we . . are prepared, in response 
to their request, to coordinate closely with the 
three present Baltic Charge d'Affaires on 
designation of their successors in order to 
provide for continued representation when the 
present corps of Baltic diplomats is no longer 
6 For ·Lithuanian-American efforts aimed at assuring 
Lithuanian diplomatic continuity, see Vytautas Kutkus, JAV 
Lietuviu Bendruomenes krasto valdybos veikla nuo 1979 m. 
gruodzio men. 15 d. iki 1982 m. spalio men. 23 d. (Activity 
of the Lithuanian American Community from 15 December 1979 
to 23 October 1982) (np: LAC, 1982), p. 15; Balys Rangas, 
ed., JAV LB trys desimtmeciai (Three Decades of the 
Lithuanian American Community) (Brooklyn: LAC, 1982), p. 
273; Kazys Sidlauskas, · Amerikos Lietuviu Tarybos veiklos 
Q_enkmetis (Five Years' Activity of the Lithuanian American 
Council) (Chicago: LAC, 1980), p. 16. 
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able to function. 7 
This opened the door for a successor to the aging 
charge d'affaires in Washington, Dr. Stasys Backis. Backis 
had been charge since 1 January 1977 and deputy chief of the 
Lithuanian Diplomatic Service since 20 August 1978. He 
succeeded to the post of chief upon the death of Stasys 
Lozorai tis, Sr. on 24 December 1983, and continued to serve 
as charge in Washington. Meanwhile, on 6 December 1983, 
Stasys Lozoraitis, Jr. had been confirmed as Backis' 
counsellor. On 15 November 1987, Backis retired as charge 
and was succeeded by Lozoraitis, Jr. Backis continues to 
serve as chief of the service, while officially listed as 
counsellor of legation in Washington. Lozoraitis, Jr., who 
was not a commissioned officer in 1940, is now Lithuanian 
representative to both the US and the Vatican.a 
The Lithuanian legation periodically presents its 
credentials to the US State Department, disseminates 
information on the current situation in Lithuania, and sees 
to it that the status of diplomatic and consular personnel 
is maintained. Because new appointments are not made by a 
7 Stephen Aiello, White House Office of Public Affairs, 
draft statement, reprinted in Draugas, 28 October 1980, p. 
1. Aiello, along with his deputy, Victoria Mongiardo, 
delivered this statement at the annual meeting of the board 
of directors of the Lithuanian American Community in Chicago 
just before the November election. 
a Surdokas, I, Karys, 
Surdokas, II, pp. 405-407; 
Diplomatic List, May 1988 
Printing Office, 1988), p. 44. 
8 (October 1987), 363-364; 
US Department of State, 
(Washington: US Government 
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head of state, the Lithuanian representative is officially a 
charge d'affaires accredited to the US Secretary of State. 
In the State Department's Diplomatic List, charges are 
listed in order of their precedence immediately after 
ambassadors. The senior charge d'affaires in Washington at 
this writing is Latvian Charge Dr. Anatol Dinbergs, who has 
served since 1 October 1970. Up until his retirement, 
stasys Backis was second charge in order of precedence. The 
last individual on the list is Ernst Jaakson, Estonian 
consul general in New York City in charge of legation since 
15 December 1965. 9 
As indicated above, honorary consular personnel in 
the US had been appointed for a number of years, replacing 
retiring or deceased officers. Mrs. Mary Krauchunas served 
as vice consul in Chicago from 1983 to 1985. Mr. Vytautas 
Cekanauskas was appointed consul general in Los Angeles in 
1977. Mrs. Josephine Dauzvardis was appointed consul 
general in Chicago in 1972, and was succeeded by Mr. 
9 Robert Keatley, "Homeless Diplomats: Their Lands Are 
Gone, Their Mission Remains," The Wall Street Journal, 20 
March 1973, p. 20; Krystyna Marek, Identity and Continuity 
of States in Public International Law (Geneva: Librairie E. 
Droz, 1968), p. 402; Tom Tiede, "Legation is last bit of 
Lithuania," Huntington Park [California] Daily Signal, 2 
April 1979; US Department of State, Diplomatic List, pp. 
vii-viii. See also Charles Peters, "Tilting at Windmills," 
The Washington Monthly, May 1984, p. 10. 
Tiede adds: 
As for the legation itself, it has unhappily 
become something of a diplomatic chuckle in 
Washington. Some who are aware of the five-story 
outpost say it is an absurd relic. 
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vaclovas Kleiza in 1985. 10 There are currently three 
Lithuanian consuls general in the US: Cekanauskas, Kleiza, 
and Anicetas Simutis in New York City. 11 Simutis is the 
only Lithuanian consul general who can provide full consular 
services to Lithuanian citizens, including the issuance of 
Lithuanian passports. His jurisdiction encompasses the 
entire United States, its territo~ies and possessions. He 
is not an honorary consul because he was on duty as a 
consular attache in New York at the time of occupation. He 
became vice consul in 1951, consul in 1965, and consul 
general in 1967. 12 
10 See Surdokas, II, pp. 410-411. See also a 
memorandum from Lithuanian Consul General Julius J. Bielskis 
in Los Angeles to Charge d'Affaires Juozas Kajeckas dated 17 
July 1971 regarding the possible appointment of a vice 
consul and two consular attaches in that city. This was 
never implemented. The document is housed in the Dauzvardis 
Consular Collection at the Lithuanian Research and Studies 
Center, Chicago. 
11 US Department of State, Foreign Consular Offices in 
the United States, February 1987 (Washington: US Government 
Printing Office, 1987), p. 52. 
12 See Bronis J. Kaslas, ed., The USSR-German 
Aggression Against Lithuania (New York: Robert Speller & 
Sons, 1973), pp. 471-472; Surdokas, II, pp. 408-409. 
For information on Latvian diplomatic and consular 
succession, see Draugas, 18 November 1987, p. 1; Latvian 
Legation, Press Bureau, Latvia in 1939-1942: Background; 
Bolshevik and Nazi Occupation; Hopes for Future (Washington: 
Latvian Legation, 1942), pp. 105-106; Marek, pp. 401-402; 
Vaino J. Rusmandel, "The Continued Legal Existence of the 
Baltic States," Baltic Review, 12 (7 November 1957), 67-68; 
US House of Representatives, Select Committee on Communist 
Aggression, Communist Takeover and Occupation of Latvia, 
Special Report No. 12 (Washington: US Government Printing 
Office, 1954), pp. 6-7; US House of Representatives, Select 
Committee to Investigate the Incorporation of the Baltic 
States into the U.S.S.R., Baltic States Investigation I 
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As honorary, and not career, consuls, and as 
naturalized US citizens, Cekanauskas and Kleiza are subject 
to the tax laws of the United States, except for fees 
accepted for consular services. 13 As far as Washington is 
concerned, 
[a]s a matter of U.S. policy, honorary consular 
officers recognized by the U.S. Government are 
American citizens or permanent resident aliens who 
perform consular services on a part-time basis. 
The limited immunity afforded honorary consular 
officers is specified in Article 71 of the [Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations]. However, such 
individuals do not enjoy personal inviolability 
and may be arrested pending trial if circumstances 
should otherwise warrant. However, appropriate 
steps must be provided to accord to such officers 
the protection required by virtue of their 
official position. In addition, the consular 
archives and documents of a consular post headed 
by an honorary consular officer are inviolable at 
all times and wherever they may be, provided they 
are kept separate from other papers and documents 
of a private or commercial nature relating to the 
other activities of an honorary consular officer 
(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 14; US 
Department of State, Diplomatic List, p. 43; US Department 
of State, Foreign Consular Offices, p. 51. 
Estonia recalled its minister in 1925 and placed the 
legation in the charge of the consulate in New York. This 
situation, therefore, is not a by-product of the 
incorporation. For further information on Estonian 
representation in the US, see William J.H. Hough, III, "The 
Annexation of the Baltic States and its Effect on the 
Development of Law Prohibiting Forcible Seizure of 
Territory," ·New York Law School Journal of International and 
Comparative Law, 6, 2 (Winter 1985), 412; Evald Roosaare, 
"Consular Relations Between the United States and the Baltic 
States," Baltic Review, 27 (June 1964), 19; Rusmandel, pp. 
66-67; US Department of State, Diplomatic List, p. 23; US 
Department of State, Foreign Consular Offices, p. 26. 
13 John R. Wood and Jean Serres, Diplomatic Ceremonial 
and Protocol: Principles, Procedures and Practices (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 76. 
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or person working with that consular officer. 14 
B. LITHUANIA AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF STATEHOOD 
As historians often point out, Lithuania was not a 
state fabricated during the twentieth century, but a nation 
which had achieved statehood in the thirteenth century. 
Though formal statehood and the exercise of sovereignty have 
occasionally been interrupted, the essence of statehood has 
been alive within the Lithuanian nation for over seven 
hundred years. 1 ~ 
A renewed consciousness of Lithuanian statehood and 
citizenship appeared before the formal reconstitution of the 
Lithuanian state during the national renaissance of the late 
nineteenth century. Statehood manifested itself during 
various rebellions, the Vilnius Conference of 1905, the 1918 
declaration of independence, the wars of independence and, 
finally, governmental activity until the occupation of 1940. 
Statehood also manifested itself during the 1941 national 
revolt, which attempted to reconstitute the Lithuanian state 
following the Soviet retreat and, after the return of the 
14 US Department of State, Foreign Consular Offices, 
pp. i-ii. 
1 ~ Stasys Backis, "Lietuvos valstybes tarptautine 
teisine ir politine padetis'' ("The International Legal and 
Political Status of the Lithuanian State"), in Lietuva 
okupacijoje (Lithuania Under Occupation), ed. Jonas Balkunas 
(New York: World Lithuanian Community Congress Committee, 
1958), pp. 121-122. 
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Red Army, in underground and overt partisan activity.is 
A century of national revival, culminating in the 
establishment of an independent state, produced 
among the Lithuanians strong commitments to 
national ideas and to the national state. The 
younger generation especially, sensitive to the 
medieval traditions of Lithuanian statehood, took 
modern Lithuania's independence as an axiomatic 
fact and therefore refused to reconcile itself to 
its loss.i 7 
Statehood is as much a subjective factor of 
consciousness, as it is an objective one of formal 
governmental apparatus. The consciousness of a state's 
goals and tasks leads to a consciousness of duty and 
obligations toward the state, that is, laboring for and 
defending it. One commentator stresses the importance of 
civic consciousness and education during the course of a 
national occupation. This entails the study of a state's 
past, democratic principles, legal foundations, and civil-
legal goals. In addition to this, though, a citizen of an 
occupied state must develop new ideas and look to an 
independent future. If this is not done, statehood itself 
is in jeopardy.is 
This is especially valid when applied to smaller 
nations. In this regard, Sveics is quoted in extenso: 
ia Petras Stravinskas, Ir sviesa ir tiesa: Rastai ir 
credo. Pirma knyga (And Light and Truth: Writings and Credo. 
A First Book) (Chicago: Valerijonas Simkus, 1978), pp. 33-
35. 
i 7 Zenonas Ivinskis, "The Lithuanian Revolt Against the 
Soviets in 1941," Lituanus, 12, 2 (Summer 1966), 5-6. 
18 Backis, p. 124; Stravinskas, I, pp. 32-33, 37-38. 
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Many Big Power ideologists condemn nationalism, 
and a number of scholars habitually use the term 
nationalism only in a negative sense. However, 
small nations must recognize and rely on 
nationalism as a primary source of their strength . 
. Nationalism has become an expression of a 
nation's will to live and its individualism. It 
has become a symbol of the dignity of peoples.· It 
is the feeling of belonging to a national 
brotherhood. In many instances it is the 
strongest and most durable social bond. 
From the point of view of national defense and 
survival, nationalism -- a product of patriotic 
loyalty and uniting cohesion -- is the main source 
of strength. It fixes the basic loyalty, the 
political objectives, the strategy, and many 
techniques in the struggles to defend a nation. 
Nationalism, adequately mobilized, is an 
impressive force. In situations of political and 
social conflict, it enhances national strength in 
various ways: (a) rallies the nation's forces, (b) 
unifies them, (c) clarifies the issues of the 
struggle, distinguishes friend from foe, and (d) 
provides a guiding philosophy, a sense of 
direction, an understanding of the goals to be 
achieved. 
Small states and nations that do possess the 
precious inheritance of nationalism should 
recognize its value as a foundation of national 
survival. They should build their future on it. 19 
Lithuanian Minister Dr. Stasys Backis has written 
that, along with the use of atomic energy, the fight against 
colonialism is the most distinctive feature of the postwar 
world. 20 Those fighting for independence in Asia and Africa 
19 V.V. Sveics, "Nationalism: A Source of Strength for 
Small Nations," in Fourth Conference on Baltic Studies: 
Summaries of Papers (Brooklyn: Association for the 
Advancement of Baltic Studies, 1974), p. 69. Sveics' 
emphasis. 
20 Backis, "Kataliku baznycios doktrina apie tautu 
apsisprendimo teise" ("The Catholic Church's Doctrine on 
Se 1 f - Deter min at ion" ) , in Suva z i av i mo d a r b a i IV (Proceedings 
ry), ed. A. Liuima (Rome: Lithuanian Catholic Academy of 
Sciences, 1961), p. 52. 
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over the past four decades have realized that an independent 
state is the most desirable vehicle for the refinement of a 
nation's social, economic, and cultural progress. Some have 
gone as far as asserting that the supppression of a nation's 
progress toward those goals, as well as the forced 
subjugation of a state, are violations of international law. 
The mere existence of a state is enough to grant it the 
right to survival; recognition by other states is 
unnecessary. As such, all nations, regardless of size and 
strength, are morally and juridically equal. 21 
Be that as it may, Alfred Cobban has pointed out the 
practical difficulties in such an approach. He notes that 
the will of struggling populations has played less a role in 
decolonization than the will of the major powers. Thus, 
while admitting the rights of nationality, the power of a 
state or lack thereof cannot be ignored. Such 
limitations mean that the greater states will, perhaps 
necessarily, exert the most power on the global stage. 22 
Cobban goes on to ask: 
How do these [realities] affect the prospects of 
national self-determination? Local autonomy may 
solve the problems of some of the smaller 
communities, but there are a considerable number 
21 Konstantinas Rackauskas, "Power Politics 
vs. International Law," Baltic Review, 14 (1 August 1958), 
64-65; Antanas Trimakas, "The Soviet Disregard of the Right 
of Peoples to Self-Determination," Baltic Review, 16 (April 
1959), 37. 
2 2 A l f r e d C o b ban , ~T...:;;h:....;eo..--=N...;:;a:....t:....;1;;;..· o~n'---S-'--' --'-t--'-a'-t'"-e-'---_a'""n"""d.;..;._---'-N.;_a~t"""i'-o'-'n~a"""l'---S~e"""l'"""'f""""-­
D et er min at ion (New York: Crowell, 1970), pp. 289, 301. 
281 
of small nations which, because of their history 
as separate political entities; or their 
experience of national oppression in the past, 
will not be satisfied with anything short of 
political independence and the rank of state . 
. On the other hand, . we cannot avoid the 
conclusion that the smaller nations or states are 
dependent for their economic wellbeing on the 
policies of the great world powers. Economic 
resources mean military power, and the 
concentration of the one in the modern world has 
as its concomitant a concentration of the other. 23 
Obviously, as Cobban indicates, sovereignty without 
an adequate economic or military defense is an oxymoron. In 
1940, Lithuania was forced to bend to superior force, though 
the country and its citizens were never released from their 
rights and obligations in the international community. 24 
Practically, in order to lift the suspension of sovereignty, 
the lack of resistance in 1940 has presented problems: 
23 
Their surrender of national sovereignty can be 
both understood and regretted. With no 
expectation of assistance, they were powerless to 
withstand Soviet aggression. Yet, in retrospect, 
it is clear that the cause of independence would 
have been served better in the eyes of the world 
through resistance. Finland's stout but futile 
resistance evoked widespread admiration. No one 
could have expected the Baltic States to defeat 
the Soviet Union but even token opposition would 
have been remembered in a more favorable light 
than was the almost docile submission. 20 
Cobban, p. 284. 
24 Backis, "Lietuvos valstybes tarptautine teisine ir 
politine padetis," p. 123; Cobban, p. 285. 
20 Richard A. Schnorf, "The Baltic States in U.S.-
Soviet Relations: From Truman to Johnson," Lituanus, 14, 3 
(Fall 1968), 57. The author of the present study discussed 
the practical difficulties of Lithuanian resistance in 1940 
in a previous study. See Robert A. Vitas, Civil-Military 
Relations in Lithuania Under President Antanas Smetana 1926-
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In the end, though, 
[t]he conception of equality belongs not to the 
field of power but to that of rights. If we are 
saying anything that is worth saying when we talk 
of national equality, we must mean an equality of 
rights. We come back then to a fundamental 
question of political philosophy. If it is agreed 
that the rights of a nation are to be interpreted 
not in terms of power or prestige, but in terms of 
the interests of its citizens, then, when we say 
that all nations are equal we mean that they all 
have equal rights to economic, cultural and 
spiritual wellbeing. 26 
Evidently, through the nonrecognition policy, the 
United States still recognizes the existence of the 
independent Lithuanian state, and that its organs are 
competent to discuss and represent Lithuania's affairs, 
though with certain practical limitations. 27 But, as Hough 
notes, the de facto presence of Soviet power in that country 
cannot be forever ignored and, without an international 
coercive authority, Moscow cannot be compelled to leave. He 
cites three possibilities of legalization of territorial 
title: Prescription, or the continuous and undisturbed 
exercise of sovereignty; Validation by the injured party; 
and a Quasi-legal action by the international community. As 
far as Lithuania is concerned, the first method has been 
disturbed, the second has come by way of spurious 
plebiscites and installed regimes, and the third has not 
1940, M.A. Thesis, Political Science, Loyola University of 
Chicago, 1986, pp. 180-183. 
26 Cobban, p. 305. 
27 See Backis, "Kataliku Baznycios doktrina," p. 55. 
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occured, nor is it likely to. 28 He concludes that Lithuania 
does indeed juridically still exist, for 
[i]n light of historical and legal precedents, it 
must be concluded that the only truly legal 
validation of an illegal annexation remains the 
genuine approbation by the injured party or total 
and complete acquiescence in the face of 
overwhelming force by the indigenous population 
and third party members. 29 
Thus Washington is not being unreasonable in asserting its 
policy of nonrecognition. 
Lithuania may juridically still exist as far as the 
United States is concerned and, as previous chapters have 
noted, this possesses concrete legal and political 
consequences. Practically, though, it lives only as the 
Lithuanian SSR, a union republic of the USSR. According to 
Article 80 of the Soviet constitution, "A Union Republic has 
the right to enter into relations with other states, 
conclude treaties with them, exchange diplomatic and 





Hough, pp. 468 ff. 
Hough, p. 480. William L. Tung writes: 
If a territory is under the suzerainty of a state 
which later incorporates it as an integral part of 
the country, the validity of the action depends 
upon the wishes of the majority of the population 
and the international status of the incorporated 
territory. The detachment of part of the 
territory of one state by another through conquest 
followed by the establishment of a puppet regime 
is really annexation under disguise. 
International Law in an Organizing World (New York: 
1968), p. 165. 
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international organizations." 30 However, under 
nonrecognition, the US has rejected any overtures from the 
Lithuanian SSR foreign ministry. 
April 1956, though, saw rumors and news reports that 
Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia may be granted satellite 
status as "people's democracies." There was even a report 
that the twentieth congress of the Soviet Communist Party 
had secretly resolved to have Moscow formally relinquish 
sovereignty over the Baltic States. 31 
A new People's Democracy of Lithuania, if recognized 
as a legitimate government by Washington, would then be the 
heir to the claims of its predecessor, that is, the prewar 
Lithuanian government. The government in Vilnius would 
receive title to the assets of procedure located in the US. 
This would include deposits, investments, facilities, and 
the contents of offices. The Lithuanian diplomats currently 
stationed in this country presumably would be made to vacate 
the premises by the new government, and Washington would 
have no choice but to acquiesce. Lithuania would also 
probably be successful in a claim to a seat in the United 
Nations. While this is obviously sheer speculation, 
3
° Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics. Adopted at the Seventh (Special) 
Session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Ninth 
Convocation, on October 7, 1977 (Moscow: Novosti, 1977), 
article 80. 
31 Antanas Trimakas, "Satellite Status for the Baltic 
States -- A Possible Opening for Freedom," Baltic Review, 7 
(16 June 1956), 3-4. 
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satellite status for Lithuania and the other Baltic States 
would present a dillema for the US and other nations 
espousing a nonrecognition policy. 32 As for now, 
Lithuania's statehood survives in a different form. 
C. NORMATIVE DIMENSIONS OF NONRECOGNITION 
Hough writes that two principles have been at odds 
in interstate relations for over five thousand years: 
Machiavelli's La forza fa giustizia (might makes right) and 
the legal maxim Ex iniuria ius non oritur (legal rights will 
not arise from illegality). 33 
The US government and interested parties have long 
stressed the normative nature of the nonrecognition policy, 
which seeks to apply law, not Machiavellian politics, to the 
Lithuanian situation. Some commentators have stated that 
normative goals have little, if anything, to do with 
nonrecognition. Algirdas Gustaitis, for example, writes 
that the American political establishment tries to keep 
matters related to the ~olicy in a secondary position, not 
going beyond occasional formalities. He contends that 
Lithuanians should not be naive as to Washington's 
intentions toward a small nation. As far as he is 
32 
"Kremlin Tactics In Converting the Baltic States 
Into Satellites," Baltic Review, 7 (16 June 1956), 14-15; 
;::,...o::....:::..~-=--=~-"--~ 
Gerhard von Glahn, Law Among Nations: An Introduction to 
Public International Law, 4th ed. (New York: Macmillan, 
1981), p. 103. 
33 Hough, pp. 303-304. 
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concerned, votes and publicity are of primary concern 
here. 34 Historian Constantine Jurgela wrote that 
nonrecognition "is not an active policy." 35 
Gerard Mangone correctly points out that 
international values, or lack thereof, are at the foundation 
of the nonrecognition policy's effectiveness: 
International law, now or in the future, cannot be 
substituted for international politics. 
Nevertheless, a substantial improvement in 
international lawmaking must be made soon if legal 
definitions, procedures, and judgements ever hope 
to bridle a few of the startling changes in 
international relations today that threaten to jar 
the universe. Lawmaking cannot proceed more 
rapidly than the shared values of a community, and 
these, in turn, depend on a rough harmony of 
economic, ideological, aesthetic, and other 
interests. International law can be no better 
that the international political system that 
34 Algirdas Gustaitis, Simas Kudirka Nobelio taikos 
prem1Jai {Simas Kudirka for the Nobel Peace Prize) (np: 
Europos lietuvis I European Lithuanian, 1971), pp. 8, 11. 
For an example of symbolism vis-a-vis the 
nonrecognition policy, one can note that the flags of the 
independent Baltic States were planted on the moon in May 
1972 by the crew of Apollo 16. They were later presented to 
Baltic diplomats. See statement of Senator Charles H. Percy 
(R-IL), 21 March 1972, p. 1. The flags are also permanently 
hung in the Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts in 
Washington. See Keatley, p. 1. 
35 Constantine R. Jurgela, letter to Robert A. Vitas, 
22 May 1986. Povilas A. Mazeika writes: 
During times of peaceful relations (including the 
period of the cold war) the Baltic nations cannot, 
of course, count on any significant moral or 
political help from outside the Soviet Russian 
empire. The question is then whether there are 
forces within the empire leading to eventual 
liberation. 
See his "Russian Objectives in the Baltic Countries," in 
Problems of Mininations: Baltic Perspectives, eds. Arvids 
Ziedonis, et al. (San Jose, CA: Association for the 
Advancement of Baltic Studies, 1973), p. 124. 
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nurtures it. 36 
Von Glahn correctly adds "that individual or multilateral 
declarations concerning the invalidity of conquest as a 
source of territorial titles have been more than 
counterbalanced by the contrary practices of states." 37 
This is the crux of the impotence of the 
nonrecognition policy, for if the nations which make up the 
global community refuse to obey international law, there can 
be no hope of collective enforcement: 
[I]t is inaccurate and dangerous to assimilate a 
declaration of this sort to a sanction. 
Inaccurate, because the only effective sanction is 
that which is applied collectively in fulfillment 
of their common obligations by those in a position 
to bring the aggressor back to respect for the 
law. Dangerous, because the egoism of States 
easily induces them to limit to such declarations 
their resistance to aggression. 38 
If no action is taken, 
36 Gerard J. Mangone, 
Law, rev. ed. (Homewood, 
On page v, Mangone writes: 
The Elements of International 
IL: Dorsey Press, 1967), p. 526. 
37 
The eye of the student, scholar, and statesman, 
therefore, should be fixed on ways to make the 
current practice of international law contribute 
to a desirable future for mankind. Put another 
way, they should be prepared to engage in a battle 
for values. 
von ·Glahn, p. 325. 
38 Charles de Visscher, Theory and Reality in Public 
International Law, rev. ed., trans. P.E. Corbett (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 329. See also 
Martin Brakas, "Lithuania's International Status: Some Legal 
Aspects 1," Baltic Review, 37 (October 1970), 55-57; Bruno 
Chevrie~, "The International Status of the Baltic States," 
Baltic Review, 1, 6 (November 1946), 270; "Courtly defense 
of a higher law," Chicago Tribune, 26 January 1988, section 
3, p. 3. 
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[t]ime is hard on "theoretical" nations. In an 
exile of more than 20 years [at that time], the 
operation becomes diplomacy by petition, a paper 
diplomacy of words while the deeds behind the 
words fade away and are conveniently forgotten. 39 
While it is true that pursuit of "good relations" 
with the Soviet Union may obscure normative goals regarding 
the Baltic States, in particular, and East-West issues, in 
general, 40 Lithuanian Minister Dr. Stasys Backis urges both 
scholar and layman to combine sentiment and jurisprudence 
with the realities of foreign policy. 41 It was clear from 
the very enunciation of the nonrecognition policy that the 
US would not wage war to liberate Lithuania, Latvia, and 
Estonia. On the other hand, Washington has not abandoned 
the idea of independence for the three countries. 42 
Indeed, in a sense, the US has done more for the 
Baltic States in terms of its national existence than other 
39 Herzfeld, p. 1 . 
40 Trimakas, p. 9, writes: "Western pressure on the 
Kremlin has been mild, although embarassing to the 
Soviet leaders." Cf. Richard Pipes, Survival is not Enough: 
Soviet Realities and America's Future (New York: Simon & 
Schuster, 1984); Jean-Francois Revel, How Democracies Perish 
(New York: Doubleday, 1984). 
41 Backis, "Lietuvos valstybes tarptautine teisine ir 
politine padetis," p. 117. 
42 Richard A. Schnorf, "The Baltic States in U.S.-
Soviet Relations: From Truman to Johnson," Li tuanus, 14, 3 
(Fall 1968), p. 60; Leonardas Simutis, Amerikos Lietuviu 
Taryba: 30 metu Lietuvos laisves kovoje 1940-1970 
(Lithuanian American Council: 30 Year Struggle for the 
Liberation of Lithuania 1940-1970) (Chicago: LAC, 1971), p. 
102. 
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countries. For example, Lithuanian diplomats in Berlin and 
Moscow believed that Germany and the Soviet Union were the 
sources of Lithuania's salvation. Yet, in the last few 
years of independence, during the course of ultimatums 
presented by Poland, Germany, and the USSR, those two powers 
did not offer even symbolic support. The US, in its 
continuing condemnation of the incorporation, stands out as 
a leader in the international cause for the liberation of 
the Baltic. 
The United States has long infused morality and 
idealism into its foreign policy. This mentality as applied 
to the incorporation of the Baltic was, in Senator Charles 
J. Kersten's words, "in the true American spirit." 43 When 
viewing the normative character of American foreign policy, 
[i]t cannot be said, although at times it has been 
so stated, that all these purposive principles, 
charters, and declarations were only empty words. 
Standing alone, neither the moral tenets nor the 
qualities of power and interest define the 
totality of political endeavor. Rather, that 
totality contains both. 44 
Thus morality, though it cannot stand alone, is an integral 
component of Washington's policy toward other nations. 
While power could not realistically be applied toward 
43 Charles J. Kersten, Self-Determination of the 
Enslaved Nations -- The Only Basis for True Peace, address 
before the Lithuanian Chamber of Commerce of Illinois, 
Bismarck Hotel, Chicago, 17 May 1953 (Chicago: LCCI, c. 
1953), p. 1. 
44 Leonas Sabaliunas, "Baltic 
Disillusionment With the West and 
Lituanus, 14, 2 (Summer 1968), 13. 
Perspectives: The 
the Choices Ahead," 
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liberating the Baltic States, morality certainly has not 
been ignored. Schnorf, for example, is of the opinion that 
though nonrecognition was, and is, a politically sound 
policy, it was not undertaken in response to political 
expedience, America's ethnic electorate, or the pleas of 
Baltiri diplomats in the United States. US diplomats in the 
Baltic correctly interpreted the nature of the occupation, 
elections, and subsequent annexation as staged and illegal. 
The diplomats reported the immorality of the process to 
Washington, which responded with a policy "solidly based on 
moral grounds" and disapproval of Stalin's actions. 40 
As seen in chapter six, the course of wartime 
diplomacy did witness some dilution of the nonrecognition 
policy. But one cannot ignore the instances when Washington 
has reaffirmed its stand. President Roosevelt, 
Undersecretary Welles, and other staff at the State 
Department faced incredible pressure from London to ignore 
the policy during the spring of 1942, when Britain was 
fighting a desparate battle against Germany and seeking 
40 Richard A. Schnorf, "The Baltic States in U.S.-
Soviet Relations, 1939-1942," Lituanus, 12, 1 (Spring 1966), 
36-38; Schnorf, "The Baltic States in U.S.-Soviet Relations: 
From Truman to Johnson," 58. In "The Baltic States 
1939-1942," p. 36, Schnorf writes: 
It is doubtful whether the Baltic diplomats alone 
could have caused the United States to refer to 
the proceedings in the Baltic States as "devious 
processes." Even with the backing of a much 
larger ethnic group, the Polish Ambassador in 1945 
was not able to convince the United States to 
maintain recognition of the legitimate Polish 
Government in London. 
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Moscow's support. Though it could have helped inter-allied 
relations, the US government did not back down from the 
policy at a time when the future of the war hung in the 
balance. Eventually, the Soviets relented and signed a 
treaty which did not compromise the status of the Baltic. 46 
More recently, the US reaffirmed the nonrecognition 
policy on another occasion when political expedience and 
diplomatic courtesy would have warranted its suppression. 
On 15-19 September 1986, a town meeting style conference 
took place in Jurmala, Latvia. It was sponsored by the 
Chautauqua Institute of Jamestown, NY, and attended by 
approximately 270 US government officials and private 
citizens. American officials -- wearing lapelpins depicting 
the American and independent Latvian flags -- reaffirmed the 
policy for the first time ever on Baltic soil. Indeed, a 
Soviet official traveled from Moscow to denounce the policy 
which was receiving great attention inside the conference, 
as well as outside. This reportedly had a positive impact 
upon the Latvian citizenry. 47 The effect of the policy upon 
46 Edmund R. Padvaiskas, "World War II Russian-American 
Relations and the Baltic States: A Test Case," Lituanus, 28, 
2 (Summer 1982), 22. 
47 Zinta Arums, Joint Baltic American National 
Committee (JBANC) 1986 Annual Report (Rockville, MD: JBANC, 
1987), pp. 29-30; "Daniloff incident sours U.S.-Soviet 
conference," Chicago Sun-Times, 16 September 1986, p. 34; 
Nils Melngailis, "The Chautauqua Conference and its Meaning 
for the Baltic Cause," Lituanus, 33, 1 (Winter 1987), pp. 
83-86. 
The "Daniloff incident " article's byline was 
listed as "Jurmala, U.S.S.R. ,"not Jurmala, Latvia. 
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morale in the Baltic is a significant factor, though average 
citizens often do not fully know of, or understand, it. 48 
While the nonrecognition policy is far from perfect 
in achieving its goals, 49 the United States' continued 
adherence to it is primarily based in the morality advocated 
by the tenets of international law. In the final analysis, 
normatively, "non-recognition is the most pertinent 
manifestation of the postulate that a unilateral tour de 
force should not be allowed to bring about a valid change in 
the existing territorial order." 00 
D. A POLICY AWAITING COMPLETION 
Of course, ultimately the status of Lithuania and 
the Baltic States vis-a-vis international law is determined 
by foreign governments. For many, the Baltic States have 
ceased to exist as separate political and juridical 
entities. Though the Soviet Union is guilty according to 
48 Hough, p. 481; In Re Linnas, US Immigration Court, 
New York City, case A8 085 628, 5 April 1985; US House of 
Representatives, Subcommittee on International Political and 
Military Affairs, Committee on International Relations, 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 27. 
49 Robert Langer, Seizure of Territory: The Stimson 
Doctrine and Related Principles in Legal Theory and 
Diplomatic Practice (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1947), p. 119, writes: in the field of 
political life there are no best, only second-best 
solutions." Cf. David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom,!! 
Strategy of Decision: Policy Evaluation as a Social Process 
(New York: Free Press, 1970). 
00 Langer, p. 288. 
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the letter of the law, no practical action, obviously, has 
been taken to redress the grievance. 
Does a state exist through recognition or by 
fulfilling certain conditions of statehood? For Lithuania, 
statehood, as granted by the US government, is limited and 
honorary -- a hollow statehood. For, as Aron writes: 
. major historical events, those by which the 
states are born and die, are external to the 
juridical order. The Baltic States have ceased to 
exist, they are no longer subjects of law; nothing 
the Soviet Union does on the territories that, in 
1939, were subject to the Estonian or Lithuanian 
sovereignty any longer relates to international 
law, at least in the eyes of those of the states 
that have ceased to "recognize" Estonia, 
Lithuania, and Latvia (that is, almost every 
state). When a state is crossed off the map of 
the world, it is the victim of a violation of 
international law. If no one comes to its aid, it 
will soon be forgotten and the state that has 
delivered the coup de grace will be no less 
welcome in the assemblies of so-called peaceful 
nations.~ 1 
On the other hand, at least in the United States, the 
political and juridical impact of nonrecognition is quite 
real. If sovereignty is once again able to be effectively 
exercised, it will be done by the prewar, though 
reconstituted, governments of the Baltic. New states would 
not be created.a 2 This is true regardless of the time it 
ai Raymond Aron, Peace and War: A Theory of 
International Relations, trans. Richard Howard and Annette 
Baker Fox (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1966), p. 108. See 
also Philip C. Jessup, Transnational Law (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 1956). p. 62. 
a 2 Marek, p. 416; Alexander Shtromas, "Political and 
Legal Aspects of the Soviet Occupation and Incorporation of 
the Baltic States," Baltic Forum, 1, 1 (Fall 1984), 38. 
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takes to achieve restoration, for as Marek writes, 
In the case of the Baltic States the finality 
of Soviet annexation cannot be admitted at the 
present time. The Soviet claim to the domination 
of the Baltic States continues to be rejected by 
the international community. No general post-war 
international instrument has confirmed the 
existing state of affairs in the Baltic. No 
general peace-making in Europe has taken place and 
no foundations of any new international 
delimitation have been laid. This does not mean 
that a constitutive and validating effect would 
attach to such settlements per se. It merely 
means that nothing even approximately final has 
taken place which would totally destroy any 
reasonable chance of an ad integrum restitutio of 
the Baltic States. 
It is precisely the persistence of this 
reasonable chance of restitution which determines 
the time-limit up to which the international legal 
system can withstand a divorce between validity 
and effectiveness. 03 
Many say that the occupation and incorporation are 
past history and should be accepted, albeit reluctantly. 
Nonrecognition is only a fiction with no practical effect. 
On the other hand, it could be asserted that the matter is 
important to this day, not only because of the fact that the 
Baltic States are strategically located with implications 
for international power politics, 04 but also precisely 
because of its symbolic value, with symbolism not used as a 
synonym for trivia. Is public policy merely a practical 
03 Marek, p. 415. Marek's emphasis. See also US 
Displaced Persons Commission, Second Semiannual Report to 
the President and the Congress, 1 August 1949 (Washington: 
US Government Printing Office, 1949), pp. 12-13 
04 E. Krepp, Security and Non-Aggression: Baltic States 
and U.S.S.R. Treaties of Non-Aggression (Stockholm: Estonian 
Information Centre, Latvian National Foundation, 1973), p. 
5. 
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instrument, or does it also possess some normative 
dimension? Obviously, Washington has long been concerned 
with such issues. 
Despite the pessimism often attending discussions of 
nonrecognition, this study has pointed out concrete legal 
and political effects involving citizenship, restrictions on 
US government officials, and millions of dollars of assets. 
One cannot say that Moscow is pleased with the policy, 
though it has learned to live with it. One cannot ignore 
the positive effect the policy has on morale in the Baltic. 
The people living in that region know that they have not 
been forgotten, and that the events of 1940 have not been 
erased from history books on the western side.of the Iron 
Curtain.ee It has also been claimed that: 
[t]he uncertain international status of these 
nations discourages a great many Soviet citizens 
from settling in the Baltic countries. Thus it 
reduces the flow of colonists and considerably 
hinders Soviet genocidal policies of colonization, 
ethnic dilution, Russification and effective 
absorption of Baltic nations into the Soviet 
Union. 
There are indications that this non-recognition 
of annexation has also had a restraining effect on 
Soviet repressive policies since their authorities 
have to consider the possibility that extreme 
measures of repression in the Baltic countries 
might not be regarded as an internal matter of the 
Soviet Union and could provoke protests in the 
United Nations and elsewhere.es 
ee Langer, p. 288; Schnorf, "The Baltic States in U.S.-
Soviet Relations: From Truman to Johnson," p. 59. 
es US House of Representatives, Conference on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe, p. 27. 
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It is probably most accurate to state that the 
nonrecognition policy has yet to reach its logical 
conclusion, namely the restoration of practical sovereignty 
to Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. This is the practical, 
albeit long-term, goal of the policy. While this 
possibility is kept alive by nonrecogniton, the specific--
and realistic -- moral goals of the policy's founders are 
achieved. Hence, it is a successful policy. Ex iniuria ius 
non oritur, which does not allow valid title to arise from 
an invalid act, is precisely what the policy asserts. 
Washington's continuous reaffirmation of the policy reflects 
a refusal to confer a title which does not conform to 
international standards of law and morality, regardless of 
how imperfectly enforced. The Soviet Union continues to be 
regarded as a mere occupant in the Baltic, and the Stimson 
Doctrine remains a vital and viable component of the law.~ 7 
Brakas asserts: 
To a great degree, non-recognition is to be 
qualified as a kind of intervention against the 
annexing state . . Negative as this intervention 
by non-recognition may be, it throws a dark shadow 
of immorality and delinquency on the annexing 
~ 7 Ti-Chiang Chen, The International Law of 
Recognition, With Special Reference to Practice in Great 
Britain and the United States, ed. L.C. Green (New York: 
Praeger, 1951), p. 415; Malbone W. Graham, "What Does Non-
Recognition Mean?" Baltic Review, 1, 4-5 (July-August 1946), 
173; Hough, p. 484; Langer, p. 288; Marek, p. 414; Boris 
Meissner, Die Sowjetunion, die Baltischen Staaten und das 
Voelkerrecht (The Soviet Union, the Baltic States, and 
International Law) (Cologne: Verlag Politik und Wirtschaft, 
1956), reviewed in Jonas Maziulis, Baltic Review, 7 (16 June 
1956), 79. 
297 
state's status, brands that state as a law-breaker 
in the eyes of the world, and interferes with its 
political and diplomatic freedom of action. 
[E]ven in this world of imperfect justice in 
international relations, arbitrariness of states, 
no matter how mightily and supreme, has its limits 
where the existence of law _g_!@. law is 
endangered.~ 0 
While asserting the nonrecognition policy, the US 
government does not practically alter US-Soviet relations, 
but it nevertheless makes a statement emanating from the 
very principles upon which it stands. It may not be a 
powerful force against practical exigencies, but it is an 
important one, for it represents not only the aspirations of 
Lithuanians, Latvians, and Estonians -- but of Americans, as 
well. 
~ 0 Martin Brakas, "Lithuania's International Status: 
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APPENDIX A 
OFFICIAL US POLICY STATEMENT ON NONRECOGNITION 
Gist is one of the organs by which the US State 
Department transmits its policy statements to the public. 
This appendix quotes directly from the August 1984 issue of 
that publication. 
US Policy: The Baltic Republics 
Background: The US does not recognize the forcible and 
unlawful incorporation of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania 
into the USSR that occured in 1940. As an integral part of 
US policy toward these occupied countries, the US Government 
continues ·ta recognize and conduct business with the 
diplomatic representatives of the last independent Baltic 
governments. The Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian chiefs 
of mission in the US enjoy full diplomatic privileges and 
immunities. Part of their major role is to continue to 
uphold the ultimate goal of a free Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania. 
Helsinki Final Act and US policy toward the Baltic 
Republics: The US espousal of freedom for the Baltic 
Republics has enjoyed broad bipartisan support since it was 
first enunciated in 1940. To clarify our stand on the 
interpretation of the Helsinki Final Act during the review 
conference in Madrid in 1980, the deputy chairman of the US 
delegation said: 
"The United States does not recognize the illegal 
incorporation, by force of arms. of the States of Latvia, 
Lithuania, and Estonia by the Soviet Union. I would also 
recall the statement in Principle IV [territorial integrity 
of states] that no occupation or acquisition of territory in 
contravention of international law will be recognized as 
legal. And I would reiterate my government's consistent 




Reaffirmation of US policy at the UN: In July 1983, on the 
commemoration of the 61st anniversary of the de jure 
recognition of the three Baltic Republics by the US, 
President Reagan had delivered to the UN Secretary General a 
statement in which he said: 
"Americans share the just aspirations of the Baltic nations 
for national independence. We cannot remain silent in the 
face of the continued refusal of the Government of the USSR 
to allow these people to be free. We uphold their right to 
determine their own national destiny, a right contained in 
the Helsinki Declaration which affirms that 'all people 
always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when 
and as they wish, their internal and external political 
status, without external interference. and to pursue as they 
wish their political, economic, social, and cultural 
development.' 
"For this reason, the Government of the United States has 
never recognized the forced incorporation of the Baltic 
States into the Soviet Union and will not do so in the 
future. 
"On this occasion we wish to reaffirm this policy as we note 
the anniversary of the 1922 recognition by the US of the 
three Baltic Republics. In doing so, we demonstrate our 
continuing commitment to the principles and purposes of the 
United Nations Charter and to the cause of peace and liberty 
in the world." 
The value of US policy: The US position upholding the 
right to freedom and liberty of the Baltic nations is a 
reminder that the democratic West has not forgotten the 
injustice done to those peoples, and it is also a symbol of 
hope for the future. This position is fully consistent with 
the importance which the US and most other countries in the 
world place on human rights, particularly as enunciated in 
the Helsinki Final Act. 
Baltic diplomatic representation: The Baltic missions in 
the US remain important symbols to the Baltic peoples, and 
we continue to deal with their diplomats on a full range of 
appropriate matters. Those three offices are diplomatic 
entities, fully independent of US Government financing. 
They have been paid for by Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian 
Government funds that were protected from seizure by the 
Soviets in 1940 and blocked by the US at that time. 
yolicy applications: 
Republics is manifested 
Our policy 
in several ways: 
toward the Baltic 
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The Secretary of State annually issues National Day 
greetings to the Baltic peoples through the Charges 
d'Affaires; and senior representatives of the Department 
of State attend the official National Day functions of the 
three missions. 
- So that the US Government speaks with a consistent voice 
regarding our nonrecognition policy, we seek to coordinate 
actions of other US agencies on such matters as captions 
and place names relative to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania 
on official US Government maps. 
- We support the flow of news and information to the Baltic 
peoples in their native languages through broadcasts of 
the Voice of America and the Baltic Services Division of 
Radio Liberty. 1 
- We reiterate on all appropriate occasions our policy of 
not legally recognizing the forcible incorporation of the 
three countries into the USSR. 
- Our Ambassador in Moscow and Cabinet-level officers of the 
US Government do not visit the Baltic Republics. 
Effect on US-Soviet relations: The Soviet Union has been 
fully aware of our policy since its enunciation in 1940, and 
our espousal of this position has not affected in any 
significant way the substance or the course of our bilateral 
relations. From time to time we deal with the USSR on items 
such as US citizen interest cases involving family 
reunification of persons living in the Baltic Republics. 
However, the need for such de facto contacts with the 
Soviets on specific topics concerning individuals does not 
in our view detract from the integrity or substance of the 
nonrecognition policy. 
1 The Baltic Services Division was transferred to Radio 
Free Europe in October 1984. 
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APPENDIX B 
THE HENDERSON MEMORANDUM OF 15 JULY 1940 
As noted in chapter four of the present study, the 
memorandum written by Loy Wesley Henderson, assistant chief 
of European affairs at the State Department at the time of 
incorporation, addressed the issues and dilemmas faced by 
the United States. The Henderson Memorandum is reprinted 
entirely in this appendix from US Department of State. 
Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 
1940, Volume I, General (Washington: US Government Printing 
Office, 1959), pp. 389-392. 
340.51 Frozen Credits/3251 1 
Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of 
European Affairs (Henderson) 2 
[Washington,] July 15, 1940. 
As you are aware, on one pretext or another the 
Soviet Government, by demands backed up with threats of 
force, has during the last six weeks forced the three Baltic 
countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to permit the 
1 Internal microfilm notation by the State Department's 
archivists. Not in the memorandum's original. 
The succeeding notes reprinted here are taken 
directly from Foreign Relations of the United States, added 
to the document by the archivists. They have been 
renumbered for purposes of this recapitulation. 
2 Addressed to the Assistant Secretary of State, Adolf 
A. Berle, Jr., and to the Adviser on Political Relations, 
James Clement Dunn. A note written by the latter, at the 
beginning of the memorandum, reads: "I feel funds of all 3 
of these countries should be blocked on same basis as those 
of countries occupied by Germany." 
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entrance of Soviet troops aggregating about 500,000 men. 
Under Soviet pressure the Governments in all three countries 
have been replaced by governments which are mere Soviet 
puppets. The President of Lithuania was successful in 
escaping to Germany; the President of Latvia appears to be a 
virtual if not an actual prisoner; the President of Estonia 
is also apparently without any power whatsoever. 
Under Soviet pressure elections were ordered in 
these three countries for yesterday and today. It is clear 
from reports which reach us that these elections are merely 
a mockery. Only persons approved by the Soviet Government 
or the Communist International 3 are permitted to stand as 
candidates. It appears likely that following these so-
called elections it will be arranged for these three 
republics to be merged into the Soviet Union. Whether these 
arrangements will be put into effect at once or whether the 
Soviet Government will be satisfied for some time to come 
with having the three countries under its actual control, 
although fictiously independent. remains to be seen. 
On Saturday, July 13, shortly after noon, the 
Latvian Minister 4 presented the attached note 0 to Mr. 
Atherton after having endeavored unsuccessfully to obtain an 
appointment with the Secretary or Under Secretary. In this 
note he points out that in view of the circumstances 
surrounding the holding of the elections in Latvia he 
"reserves the right not to recognize the results of the 
coming elections and the acts emanating therefrom". The 
Minister also states that in United States banks there are 
deposits of the Latvian State and of Latvian banks, 
corporations and private citizens, and that there are a 
number of Latvian ships in the waters of the western 
hemisphere. He asks that if attempts are made to alienate 
these deposits, vessels and other Latvian property and 
interests in the United States, the American Government 
safeguard and secure the said deposits and property. It is 
understood that the Lithuanian Minister 0 has also prepared a 
note which he plans to hand to the Department within the 
next few days, if he has not already done so, in which he 
will point out the illegality of the elections in Lithuania. 
There is no Estonian Minister in this country. The only 
3 The Communist (Third, Red) International, founded by 
the Bolsheviks at Moscow in March 1919. 
4 Alfred Bilmanis. 
0 Not printed. 
6 Povilas Zadeikis. 
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representative of that government in the United States is 
the Estonian Consul General in New York. 7 
The recent events in the Baltic States have raised a 
number of rather important questions. The note of the 
Latvian Minister merely serves to render these questions 
more active. Among these questions are the following: 
1. ls the Government of the United States to apply 
certain standards of judgement and conduct to aggression by 
Germany and Japan which it will not apply to aggression by 
the Soviet Union. In other words, is the Government of the 
United States to follow one policy with respect to, say, 
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, and German-occupied Poland, and 
another policy with respect to Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, 
and Finland, which before the end of the year is likely to 
suffer the same fate as the other three Baltic States. ls 
the United States to continue to refuse to recognize the 
fruits of aggression regardless of who the aggressor may be, 
or for reasons of expediency to close its eyes to the fact 
that certain nations are committing aggression upon their 
neighbors. If our Government at this juncture desires to 
take no step which might arouse the displeasure of the 
Soviet Union it would possibly be wise for it to overlook 
the present Soviet aggressive acts in the Baltic States, as 
well as similar acts which will probably take place in 
Finland. On the other hand, our failure to recognize Soviet 
conquests just now, although not pleasant to the Soviet 
Government, may possibly place another card in our hands 
when, if ever, a conference regarding the future of Europe 
takes place. 
2. Does the Government of the United States desire 
to take steps to restrain the export of funds in this 
country belonging to the States of Latvia, Estonia and 
Lithuania, as it has done recently in the case of countries 
taken over by Germany. If no restriction on the export of 
these funds is laid down, it seems almost certain that they 
will pass into the Soviet Treasury. It is impossible at the 
present time to estimate the full amount. It seems likely 
that the assets of all three countries in the United States 
will not amount to much more than 12 or 13 million dollars. 
In this connection it will be observed that if the three 
countries in question are absorbed into the Soviet Union, 
the United States will probably not receive one cent of the 
several million dollars which the governments of these three 
countries owe us. Furthermore, American interests in those 
three countries will probably be a total loss. It is 
7 Johannes Kaiv, Acting Consul General, in charge of 
the Legation of Estonia. 
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estimated that these interests will not approximate more 
than two or three hundred thousand dollars, although it is 
difficult to obtain figures. It will be recalled that the 
Soviet Government announced some time ago that since the 
acts of nationalization of that part of Poland which has 
been annexed to the Soviet Union took place prior to the 
entry of that territory into the Soviet Union. the Soviet 
Government could not be held responsible for losses incurred 
as a result of those acts. 8 It is possible that in the 
interim before the incorporation of the three Baltic States 
into the Soviet Union, the new puppet governments of those 
States might denounce all public indebtedness and 
nationalize property, and that the Soviet Government, after 
their entry into the Soviet Union, will take the attitude 
that it is not responsible for the acts of such puppet 
governments. 
At the suggestion of Mr. Berle, which I conveyed to 
Mr. Livesey 9 last week, Mr. Livesey has informally asked the 
Treasury to investigate the holdings of Latvia, Estonia, and 
Lithuania in this country in American banks and to request 
the banks in which the holdings are extensive to inform the 
American Government, before any large withdrawals are 
permitted. It is probable that during the present week 
endeavors will be made by the Soviet Government to obtain 
possession of these funds. It is essential. therefore, that 
a decision with respect to them be made at once. 10 
° For text of the Soviet note of April 26, 1940, see 
telegram No. 502, May 8, 5 p.m., from the Charge in the 
Soviet Union, vol. III, p. 197; the Department's reply was 
sent in telegram No. 276, May 16, 6 p.m., ibid., p. 201. 
9 Frederick Livesey, Assistant Adviser on International 
Economic Affairs. 
10 In a note attached at this point, Mr. Henderson 
wrote: "Mr. Berle states that Treasury has decided to block 
the accounts of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania in this 
country today July 15, 1940." For text of Executive Order 
No. 8484, by which this was accomplished, see 5 Federal 
Register 2586. The text of regulations of the Treasury 
Department, also issued on July 15, 1940, is printed ibid., 
p. 2593. Although the assets of the Baltic States were 
frozen, disbursements from them were subsequently permitted 
to the extent necessary to support the continued operation 
of the Baltic diplomatic missions in the United States and 
in the several other countries which had likewise not 
recognized the Soviet occupation of these countries. Title 
to the assets remained in the name of the free governments 
of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, since the United States 
363 
3. Are vessels of the Baltic States in American 
harbors to be permitted to depart freely or are they to be 
held up like the vessels of a number of countries which have 
been taken over by Germany. For some time the ability of 
the Soviet Union to handle its foreign trade has been 
suffering because of the lack of ships. For the last 
several months the Soviet Embassy has been endeavoring to 
arrange for the charter of Latvian bottoms in order to 
transport material to Vladivostok. Apparently the Soviet 
plan now is to force the Latvian Government and private 
owners to permit soviet organizations to charter Latvian and 
other Baltic ships and to call these ships into Soviet ports 
where they are to be nationalized. Some of the Latvian 
ships are excellent and have a high rating in Lloyds, 
according to information received from our Legation at Riga. 
The Latvian Minister states that at the present time a 
Latvian vessel is in Baltimore taking on cargo for 
Vladivostok in pursuance of a recent Soviet charter. The 
Maritime Commission is undoubtedly in a much better position 
than this Department to decide whether it would be 
advantageous to the American Government to retain these 
vessels or to permit them to depart. 
L[oy] W. H[enderson] 
never recognized the legality of the Soviet occupation of 
the three states. 
APPENDIX C 
APPENDIX C 
UNITED STATES TREATIES WITH LITHUANIA 
Chapter five of the present study noted that US-
Li thuanian treaties are considered to be still in force, but 
suspended. Further, the Lithuanian minister to the US. not 
representing an active government, has no power to conclude 
new agreements with Washington. The following list is 
reproduced from US Department of State, Treaties in Force, 1 
January 1966 (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 
1966), pp. 122-123. 
Customs: 
Arrangement regarding reciprocal privileges for 
consular officers to import articles free of duty 
for their personal use. Exchanges of notes at 
Washington July 28, September 17 and 19, and October 
4, 1934; entered into force October 4, 1934; 
operative October 15, 1934. 
Extradition: 
Finance: 
Treaty of extradition. Signed at Kaunas April 9, 
1924; entered into force August 23, 1924. 43 Stat. 
1835; TS 699; IV Trenwith 4424; 51 LNTS 191. 
Supplementary extradition treaty. Signed at 
Washington May 17, 1934; entered into force January 
8, 1935. 49 Stat. 3077; TS 879; IV Trenwith 4434; 
157 LNTS 441. 
Agreement for the funding of the debt of Lithuania 
to the United States. Signed at Washington 
September 22, 1924; operative June 15, 1924. 
Treasury Department print. 
Amendment: June 9, 1932 (Treasury Department print). 
Nationality: 
Treaty defining liability for military 





persons born with double nationality. Signed at 
Kaunas October 18, 1937; entered into force July 20, 
1938. 53 Stat. 1569; TS 936; 191 LNTS 351. 
Pacific Settlement of Disputes: 
Arbitration treaty. Signed at Washington November 
14, 1928; entered into force January 20, 1930. 46 
Stat. 2457; TS 809; IV Trenwith 4431; 100 LNTS 111. 
Treaty of conciliation. Signed at Washington 
November 14, 1928; entered into force January 20, 




Convention for the exchange of money orders. Signed 
at Washington April 10 and at Kaunas July 30, 1923; 
operative October 15, 1923. 
Amendments: May 26 and June 13, 1934. June 11 and 
28. 1934. 
Parcel post agreement. Signed at Kaunas December 4 
and at Washington December 28, 1939; operative 
February 1, 1940. 54 Stat. 2021; Post Office 
Department print; 202 LNTS 381. 
and Commerce: 1 
Agreement according mutual 
favored-nation treatment in 
Exchange of notes at Washington 
entered into force July 10, 










Agreement relating to the registration of trade-
marks. Exchange of notes at Riga September 14, 1929 
and at Kaunas October 11, 1929; entered into force 
October 11, 1929. 
Arrangement for the reciprocal waiver of passport 
visa fees for nonimmigrants. Exchange of notes at 
Washington April 17, 1937; entered into force April 
17, 1937; operative May 1, 1937. 
1 Application of controls to trade between the United 
States and Lithuania while that country is under Soviet 
domination or control was acquiesced in by the Minister of 
Lithuania in Washington in a note dated July 11, 1951, to 
the Secretary of State. 
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APPENDIX D 
ACTIVE LITHUANIAN DIPLOMATIC & CONSULAR PERSONNEL 
Chapter nine of the present study noted that a 
number of countries beside the United States had not 
recognized the occupation of Lithuania by the Soviet Union. 
This does not necessarily mean that Lithuania possesses 
active diplomatic representation in all of them. The ranks 
of the Lithuanian Diplomatic Service have been depleted in 
the years since the incorporation. The following list 
represents Lithuanian diplomatic and consular personnel 
active as of this writing. Dates in parentheses indicate 
the time of appointment to the post. 
Chief of the Diplomatic Service of Lithuania: 
Dr. Stasys A. Backis (24 December 1983) 
Charge d'Affaires in Great Britain: 
Vincas Balickas (22 January 1968) 
Gerant d'Affaires at the Holy See: 
Stasys Lozoraitis, Jr. (15 June 1970) 
Charge d'Affaires in the United States: 
Stasys Lozoraitis, Jr. (15 November 1987) 
Counsellor: Dr. Stasys A. Backis (15 November 1987) 
Consuls General in the United States: 
Anicetas Simutis, New York (11 September 1967) 
Vytautas Cekanauskas, Los Angeles (6 October 1977) 
Vaclovas D. Kleiza, Chicago (3 December 1985) 
Consul General in Canada: 





When the research for, and writing of, this 
dissertation commenced, the new political winds initiated by 
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev had just begun to blow 
across the face of the Soviet Union, including Lithuania and 
the other Baltic States. As the work neared its completion, 
radical changes were occuring in Lithuania. 
Two organizations in that country. the Lithuanian 
Reorganization Association (Lietuvos Persitvarkymo Sajudis) 
and the Lithuanian Freedom League (Lietuvos Laisves Lyga) 
were created and openly operated, demanding socio-political 
changes in Lithuania. 
In terms of religious liberty, St. Casimir Church 
had been reopened, mass had been said near (not in) the 
Vilnius Cathedral, and Bishop Vincentas Sladkevicius had 
been elevated to cardinal. 
Politically, the chief of Lithuania's Communist 
Party, Ringaudas Songaila, resigned in October 1988 after 
only one year in office. He was replaced by Algirdas 
Brazauskas. The country has also witnessed environmental 
demonstrations and mass political rallies, culminating in 
the legalization of independent Lithuania's tricolor and its 
raising on the fortress of Grand Duke Gediminas in the 
capital of Vilnius, over which the flag of the Lithuanian 
SSR had flown for four decades. Discussions continue over 
the creation of separate Lithuanian currency and postage 
stamps. Finally, several leaders of Lithuanian emigre 
organizations were invited to participate in political 
organizatio~ within Lithuania. 
Discussion over the possibility of autonomy within 
the Soviet Union has increased. Though no prominent 
Lithuanians have called for independence, the logical 
culmination of current events, even if it took several 
decades, would indeed be the restoration of complete 
Lithuanian political independence. In historical parallel, 
Lithuania today stands in the same position as during the 
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national renaissance, which occured at the turn of the 
present century. At that time, autonomy was the goal of 
Lithuanian leaders, with independence emerging as a viable 
option only shortly before the declaration of independence 
on 16 February 1918. Of course, there is a difference in 
that the Lithuanian population today is a more educated one, 
not having been subject to long-term russification efforts 
as had been practiced by the czars. 
In terms of the US nonrecognition policy, it appears 
that morality and reality may occasionally converge. As was 
mentioned in chapter six of the present study, the United 
States stayed the nonrecognition course and took the moral 
highground at a time when it would have been politically 
expedient to repudiate the policy. Certain State Department 
diehards, Loy Wesley Henderson among them, were of the 
opinion that nonrecognition possessed long-term implications 
for Lithuania's international personality, in addition to 
the practical effects as denoted in chapter five. 
Washington has not abandoned the idea of independence for 
Lithuania. 
It has been this author's contention that the 
Roosevelt administration never intended nonrecognition to 
commit the US to actually liberate Lithuania. This task 
would have to be accomplished by the Lithuanians themselves. 
The events of 1988-1989 are bearing this out. The policy 
crafted in Washington is now awaiting completion in Vilnius. 
Lithuanians there are not going to allow the legitimization 
of the Soviet presence there by way of unopposed 
prescription or formal plebiscitary validation. Statehood 
exists not solely through recognition, but by an active 
manifestation of state consciousness. This exists in 
Lithuania, without yet possessing the formal apparatus of 
statehood. 
In terms of future US policy, those who wish to push 
nonrecognition along to its intended conclusion should do 
best to subtly exercise political leverage toward Moscow and 
inter-Republic cooperation in the Soviet Union. For 
example, a leader of the Armenian national movement has 
visited Kaunas to discuss common issues and goals with 
Lithuanians. 
Indeed, both Americans and Lithuanians must be 
subtle and reasoned in their approach to the new political 
freedoms. A backlash from the Soviets must be avoided. The 
Lithuanian Reorganization Association, which is made up of 
leading intellectuals, has not referred to itself as a 
party, and is more cautious in its dealings with the Kremlin 
than the Lithuanian Freedom League, which has a more 
emotional base of support. If the Lithuanians do not 
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restrain themselves and make excessive demands, Moscow could 
take away the freedoms and changes won in the past year. 
Organizations and activities could once again be declared 
anti-Soviet manifestations, martial law could be declared, 
and the Red Army could easily stage extended military 
maneuvers in the country, as it did during the Polish unrest 
in the early 1980s. 
The same caution must be exercised in Washington. 
Demagoguery and unreasonable demands would not serve the 
nonrecognition policy well, though nonrecognition is itself 
a form of active intervention. Indeed, the US can now take 
advantage of citizen exchanges between this country and 
Lithuania to gain information, as well as to exert political 
influence and encourage the current process in Lithuania. 
The American effort must be private and adroit, not subject 
to needless publicity. 
lf an independent Lithuanian republic is restored, 
it will be the legal continuation of the regime extinguished 
in the summer of 1940. Practically, as mentioned in the 
study, it will be socio-economically very different from its 
predecesor. However, it will still be considered the 
legitimate heir to the mantle of the Lithuanian government 
reconstituted at the conclusion of the First World War, and 
will be able to make the legal and financial claims of its 
predecessor. 
What of Lithuania's diplomats in the US? Their 
status was extended under President Carter. A future 
independent Lithuanian republic could retain and augment the 
already existing network of envoys and consuls, or it could 
replace it. In any event, the Lithuanian government would 
have the advantage of possessing international 
representation and continuity, an advantage which did not 
exist in 1918. Indeed, there have already been calls for 
separate membership for Lithuania in the United Nations. 
The debate over the utility of nonrecognition 
continues to this day, and is probably not fully embraced by 
US policymakers. Yet, it continues to exist and ~t cannot 
be said that it has not had a positive impact upon its 
target country. The US has maintained Lithuania's legal 
personality in the courts, in treaties, as well as in the 
maintenance of the Lithuanian Diplomatic Service and 
independent Lithuania's assets. The nonrecognition process 
is now being furthered in Lithuania, with an eye to finally 
concluding the Second World War in that country. If the 
process is not halted or mismanaged, the policy will arive 
at its conclusion -- and thus will no longer be necessary. 
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